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A
compare

sympathetic reviewer has noted that the best a
his

critic

views invidiously to alternative views. Taking

of Rorty can do

this

is

advice to heart,

to

I

contrast Rorty' s social and political views to Dewey's, and then to an alternative

account which

I

elaborate.

My

standards of comparison are two liberal ideals than

which, according to Rorty, none others are higher. These

suffering,

and

(2) leaving people alone to pursue their

are.

own

( 1 )

amelioration of

visions of personal

perfection.

In

Chapter One,

I

point out that there are significant differences between

Rorty and his alleged progenitor, Dewey, notably when

it

comes

to their respective

conceptions of how to harmonize personal freedom with public responsibility.

Unlike Dewey, Rorty advocates abandoning
the attempt
altruism and the private realm of sublimity
by
In

Chapter Two,

1

concerned to defend bear
quest for autonomy

is

to fuse the public

realm of

means of one all-encompassing

argue that the existing liberal democracies
Rorty
little

resemblance to his democratic utopia,

impeded as

little

as possible

by social

an alternative vocabulary, according to which political

in

theory.

is

which "the

institutions.”

I

introduce

institutions, broadly

conceived, traverse nearly the entire length and breadth of
the private sphere

in the

north Atlantic democracies.

In

Chapter Three,

1

argue that existing liberal democracies fare

better

little

with reference to Rorty's public ideal of ameliorating suffering
than they did with
reference to his private ideal of making
alternative setup

which

I

believe to be

room

for self making.

more promising

Then

1

suggest an

for purposes of ameliorating

suffering.

In the final chapter,

I

argue that Rorty’s private role as ironist and his public

role as self-described apologist for bourgeois liberal

incommensurable as they are incompatible. The
the

more

seriously he

compromises the

other.

VI

democracy

are not so

better he fulfills

one

role,

much
I

argue,
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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the best

known

liberal thinkers

from Locke to the present

have imagined liberalism as standing on “the grounding
the light of reason, the evocation of homo

humanus

Robert Filmer to the Frankfurters, have disputed

on the

right

and the

left

have endeavored

to

this characterization.

show

that

them, the assumption being that

appeal to

Their opponents, from
2

Critics both

Reason does not

practices and institutions associated with liberalism and
2.
legitimate

in natural law, the

human

dictate the

nature does not

this in itself constitutes a definitive

indictment of liberalism.
In recent years,

however, some self-described

abandoned the familiar philosophical
that liberalism

1

)

Comay,

is

p.

no more rooted

120.

A

liberals

rationales for their tradition.

in universal

reason or

human

While conceding

nature than any other

wide variety of beliefs and authors have been associated
its cognates.
will offer a few

various contexts with the word liberal and

in

themselves have

I

preliminary words of clarification forthwith and expand on them in Chapters

One

and Two.
Refer to Filmer, pp. 251-308, and to Rorty's discussion of Horkheimer and
Adorno in Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (henceforth CIS), pp. 56-7. All
)

source references from Rorty's works are listed by

appear chronologically under the author’s entry
other references appear under the

name of the

title

in the

author.

or abbreviated

title

and

bibliography below. All

political creed, they

institutions

have nevertheless maintained their allegiance
to

and counseled others

Richard Rorty

to

do

so, too.

may be counted among

particular defense of liberalism does not

grounded

in reason, or

ahistoncal notions of

liberal

the latter category of liberal

depend

for

its

His

force on claims to be

on epistemological guarantees or transcultural and

human

nature.

He

tells

us he wants to “retain Enlightenment

liberalism while dropping Enlightenment rationalism.” 4
Thus, what he has to say in

defense of liberalism

having read

lots

is

likely to

be received with sympathy by an audience which,

of books by, say, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and the

communitarians, has come to doubt still-prevalent enlightenment assumptions
about

human

nature,

traditionally

community,

historical progress

and so on— assumptions which

have been deployed to repel attacks against liberalism. Moreover,

turns out that Rorty's case against Philosophy with a capital
“P”~that

is,

if

it

roughly, his

case against foundational ism, representationalism and essentialism discussed
below
in this

so

mtroduction-is incompatible with alternative political and social views, then

much

the worse for those alternative views.

If,

on the other hand, the discussion

in the

following pages succeeds in

breaching Rorty’s defense of liberalism, then readers

abandon more

traditional defenses

What

liberalism per se.

is at

defensibility of liberalism

whom

might well register

he has convinced to

this as a

blow against

stake in the present discussion, then,

when

it

is

stripped of

its

is

the

familiar enlightenment

rationales.

3.)

and

4.)

Refer, for example, to Rorty,
to his paper,

CIS,

“Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,”

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism.”

p. 57.

p.

68,

5

Rorty understands a
Shklar, to be a person

uses
ups.

liberal

and

its

These include

liberal, in its occasional

who

thinks that ‘'cruelty

meaning borrowed from Judith

is

the worst thing

He

do.”

also

cognates to describe certain actual and imaginary'
political

his preferred utopia, characterized

ideals introduced in Chapter One, as well as a

"

Atlantic democracies

set-

by the public and private

number of existing

characteristic of what Rorty, following Roberto Unger, has

institutions

dubbed the “rich North

f
'

Rorty holds these institutions to be paradigmatically

In the course ot this discussion,

liberal.

we

it

will

become

increasingly clear that there

are discrepancies between Judith Shklar's liberals and the institutions
and practices
ot the “rich

North Atlantic democracies.”

Before proceeding to examine Rorty’s defense of liberalism, a few words are
in

order to frame the discussion in relation to the larger body of his

other topics. In the balance of this introduction,

saying a few more words in the

first

will

1

section about

serious look at Rorty’s social and political views,

I

why

do several
it

is

own

things:

worthwhile

writings on

After

to take a

will indicate gesturally in

what

5.

respect

I

agree with him and why. This will motivate the discussion

in the

chapters

6.

that follow

and help to narrow

its

scope.

Remarks

in the

second section about

his

views on some chief concerns of analytic philosophy segue to related observations
in the third

and

final section

Critics of Rorty' s social

considerations

if

political

views need to come to terms with these

they are not to beg important questions he poses.

)

CIS, pp. xv, 74.

)

Refer

to:

and

of the Introduction about his projected audience.

“Unger, Castoriadis, and the Romance of a National Future,”

included in Rorty's book Essays on Heidegger (henceforth EH), pp.

1

77-192.

4

Framing the Conversation
7

Rorty's

name,

if

not his opinions,

9

is

as well

known

outside divisional

meetings of the American Philosophical Association
as that of any other

contemporary American philosopher. His name has appeared
about the curricula of

and the
least

liberal education,

of postmodern

state

feminism,* the “culture of human rmhts”

and

politics,

in public discussions

his

works have been translated

into at

seventeen languages, including Chinese, Arabic and Serbo-Croatian.
The fact

that a living

American philosopher’s name

some remove from academia

is

is

recognizable east of the Atlantic and

at

remarkable enough to prepare us for analogies with

Dewey.
Still,

it

would be easy

to overstate his influence

beyond academia. As a

New

7.

York Times Magazine interviewer put

8.

as
9.

it,

any American philosopher has been

very widely.”

“Rorty

is,

in fact,

in the past forty

about as widely-esteemed

years-which

is

to say, not

11

Questions of name recognition and influence aside, what Rorty has had to
say
10. about social and political philosophy has resonated with the din of the
collapsing Berlin Wall.

The

rhetoric of the victors in the

)

Refer, for example, to D’ Souza,

)

Refer, for example, to Lovibond 1989.

)

Refer to Shute and Hurley.

)

p.

A1

Cold War has been

8.

Refer to Haber. Also refer to Stephens,

p.

30, as well as Rorty's remarks

regarding philosophers like himself who “...find ourselves denounced

and newspapers which one might have thought oblivious
“Relativism: Finding and Making,” pp. 19-20).

11.)

Klepp, p.117.

in

magazines

to our existence” (Rorty,

dominated by jubilant accolades

Much

liberalism

to "the free market,”

what he has had

of

"democracy” and

to say about liberalism, in particular,

corroborates the view of a well-known columnist,
to the effect that "political

philosophy
free

over.

West

still

2.

all

Solved .”

Finished.

market reforms

the

in

is

in

suppose that

capitalism

New

Even

after popular disillusionment with

Eastern Europe, a variety of post-Cold

democracy has vanquished

liberal

time, and that the final years of the

threshold of a

12

American

all

contenders for

Century' have deposited us at the

Millennium of Western-style democracy and free-market

n

Rorty’s writings on a range of other topics also

views of some relatively

Warsaw

War commentators

Pact.

influential writers years before the dissolution

In particular,

of the

a variety of writers who, like him, have been associated

with
13.
the term postmodernism

themes and

were consonant with the

1

have for decades repeated the same pragmatist

rhetorical strategies that he has invoked.

Krauthammer. Although Rorty has a hunch that "Western social and
thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it needs” (CIS,
p 63),
he might have reservations about the claim that political philosophy is “solved ”
1

)

14.
political

This point should become clear
Refer to Fukayama.

)

".
.

It

in the

following pages.

should be emphasized, of course, that by rejecting

.both religious and philosophical accounts of a suprahistoncal ground or an end-

of-history convergence’ (CIS,

Rorty,

p.

68

),

Rorty stands far apart from Fukayama (see.

"The End of Leninism”). Their

differences, however, only

make

similar conclusions with respect to the future of political philosophy

)

I

use this term reluctantly.

a term which "bears only as
injected into

it

by

much

this or that writer”

by Bhaskar 1991,

among

p.

poignant.

As Sabina Lovibond notes, "post-modernism”
way of determinate meaning as may be

is

(Lovibond 1992, pp. 56-7). Nevertheless, each

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism”) or
is

more

in the

of the writers cited either identifies himself as a “postmodernist”

p. 6,

their

is

139; Lovibond 1989,

(cf.

Rorty,

frequently described as such (as Rorty

p. 5;

Nielsen, pp. 133, 139, and Haber,

According to David Hall, however, Rorty remains a modernist
Perhaps under the influence of Bernard Yack’s The Longing for

others).

(Hall, pp. 24, 5

1 ).

Total Revolution Rorty
,

more

recently has expressed misgivings about incorporating

the term into his self-description:

6

Rorty has launched an audacious flanking
maneuver against the

fully-

arrayed ranks of analytic philosophy, which
he takes to be the main contemporary
tradition of epistemology-centered philosophy.

Nature (henceforth PMN), published
battle

and stated his aim:

If

in

16

Philosophy and the Mirror of

In

1979, he deftly identified the stakes of the

philosophy since Descartes and Locke

is

the attempt to

meet skeptical doubts concerning the problem of our knowledge
of the external
6.
world or other minds, then we should abandon philosophy
altogether.

7.

1

In its

place

have sometimes used “postmodern” myself, in the rather narrow
sense defined by Lyotard as “distrust of metanarratives.” But 1
now
wish that I had not. [...] have given up on the attempt to find
something common to Michael Graves's buildings, Pynchon's and
Rushdie's novels, Ashberry’s poems, various sorts of popular music
and the writings of Heidegger and Demda. (EH, p. 1
1

15.

I

.)

Compare

1

this

passage to relevant remarks

)

Refer, tor example,

)

William E. Connally succinctly

calls the

in Rorty,

“Movements and Campaigns,”

Kuhn, Baudrillard and

to:

“dilemma of epistemology”

in

some

respects Lyotard.

restates Hegel's account of

what Connally

as follows:

[E]very criterion of knowledge is itself a claim to knowledge and
thus must itself be proven; but any attempt at validation must either
appeal to the criterion itself or to a new criterion which is, in turn, in

need of validation. The first strategy
fosters an infinite regress. (Connolly,

1

Refer, for example, to

)

PMN,

p.

called “indifferentism,” “the mother in

(Ax);

cf.,

for example, Bonjour,

inditterentists fall

back

p.

14).

181.
all

is
p.

circular while the second

124)

Rorty has been accused of what Kant

sciences of chaos and night” (Kant,

Pretending to reject

all

p. 8

metaphysics,

into metaphysical positions, while hiding their regression

“by substituting a popular tone for the language of the Schools," and in this way
excusing themselves from giving their metaphysical views the attention they
deserve (Kant, Ax-xi, pp.
thirds

8-9).

It

should be noted, however, that

of PMN, much of Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (henceforth

other wntings, Rorty does offer something in the

way of reasons

walking away from sticky epistemological problems—even
to little

come

in the first

more than pointing out

that, after centuries

if

two-

ORT) and

for advocating

those reasons amount

of futile endeavor, no one has

close to solving these alleged problems (Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism

(henceforth CP), pp. xvi-xvii).

7

Rorty offers a different conception of
philosophy, notably
the essays published together as

This

is

in Part

111

of

PMN

and

Consequences of Pragmatism (henceforth CP).

philosophy as one form of literature alongside
others, including poetry,

novels and literary criticism. Philosophy, by
this conception, need be

little

more

than

An

attempt to see how things, in the largest [or “broadest
possible”]
sense of the term, hang together, in the largest [or
“broadest
possible”] sense of the term. 18

The cash value

ot philosophy so conceived

is

not to establish an unshakable

8.

foundation for the Tree of Knowledge, nor to adjudicate

on high, nor finally to

get

it

right

all

after all these centuries.

knowledge claims from
Its

cash value, rather,

is

simply to “continue the conversation.” 10 Philosophers, accordingly,
should view

themselves as “all-purpose intellectuals,” 20 para-professionals ready and
willing to
“kibbitz" on a wide range of topics.

Rorty hopes this different conception of philosophy, philosophy with a
lower-case “p,” will eclipse philosophy as
tradition-that is, roughly, the
19.
20.
ot knowledge, philosophy

PMN,

that sees theories

of language and philosophy of science as providing

important areas of culture.'

)

has been practiced within the analytic

contemporary anglophone tradition

21.
foundations or guarantees for the truth

1

it

of knowledge claims

in all

of the most

1

In its

place he envisions “a post-Kantian culture, one

Rorty invokes Wilfred Sellar's formulation in CP, pp. xiv, 29, 226, and
p.

in

114.

)

PMN,

)

Kolenda,

p.

391.

p. xii.

The word “culture” might be understood loosely to designate “. the large
and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures and successes
)

.

together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics and religion.

.”
.

8

in

which there

others.”

is

no all-encompassing discipline which
legitimizes or grounds the

22

Rorty

s

disparagement of the “traditional problems” of
philosophy and his

desire to thoroughly “de-divimze“ culture
in the rich North Atlantic democracies

provides a thematic and programmatic continuity,
be
socio-political writings with his

in

ever so tenuous, linkinu his

views on epistemology, philosophy of mind,

philosophy ot language and so on. Beyond

be much more to the manner

it

which

this,

however, there does not appear to

views on a wide range of topics “hanu

his

together.”

This observation

is

fully in

he calls “systematic philosophy”
philosophy

...designed to

make

keeping with his intentions; He disparages what

in favor

of “edifying philosophy ” conceived as

the reader question his

philosophizing, rather than to supply him with a

“Systematic philosophy,” by contrast,

22.

is

new

own

motives for

philosophical program.”

philosophy that aims to

map

the

domain of knowledge of all of culture and provide an epistemological

23.

basis for such fields as ethics, politics
24.

and

23

whole

or ontological

24

art.

(John Dewey, “Half-Hearted Naturalism,” in Journal of Philosophy, 24 (1927),
p
59, quoted in CP, p. 73). Cf. Rorty's similar characterization in ORT, p. 12.

)

PMN,

p. 6.

)

PMN,

pp. 5-6.

)

Using an expression reminiscent of Sellars' definition of philosophy cited

above, Rorty's mentor moderated his earlier anti-systematic claims:
find that with respect to the hanging together of various problems
and various hypotheses in a perspective determined by a definite
point of view, have a system. In so far have to retract disparaging
remarks I have made in the past about the need for a system in
philosophy. (Novack, p. 77. Novack quotes Dewey from “Nature in
Experience,” in Philosophical Review Vol. 49, pp. 244-5.)
1

I

I

,

9

This discussion will focus on what
Rorty has had to say about liberalism,
selfhood and community. His early
books, written through the 1970s, 25
and most

though not
1

970s

all

of his

articles

and reviews published between 1959 and
the

do not take these "moral and

discussion.

social questions”

late

27

as their first topic of

Rather, the bulk of these early writings
target the views of truth as

correspondence

2

*

and knowledge as an assemblage of representations, 29
together

with the notions of reason, 30 and theories of
meaning and reference 3 which are
'

parasitic

on

this view, as well as the notion

of “system,” which,

north Atlantic, at least, has been associated with

in the

post-Kant

32
it.

Arguably, however, the

“moral and social questions” which long have been a
concern for Rortv 33 have

26.

become more

explicit in recent years.

27.
28.

25

)

PMN

Including The Linguistic Turn (1967); Exegesis
(1979).

As

far as

and Argument

(1975)' and

am

aware, the most comprehensive published bibliography of
works appears in Saatkamp (ed.), pp. 231-244.

)

29.
Rorty 's

1

30.
)

CP,p.

64.

PMN,

p

31.
66.

According

to the truth as correspondence view, truth is
constituted by a relation between a truth-bearer— a belief, utterance or
statement—
)

32.

1

and
33.

something not essentially mind-dependent, such as a fact, a state of affairs, a set
of objects, a sequence of members of a domain, or a piece or spacio-temporal
real
estate (cf. Gerald Vision, in

)

PMN,

p.

136.

)

PMN,

p.

126;

)

PMN,

Chapter IV.

)

PMN,

p.

)

That

Science and

is,

Pt.

Malachowski,

pp. 75-6).

11.

138.

at least as early as his

Human Ereedom.

1960 review of David

L. Miller's

Modern

10

For Rorty, to “continue the conversation”

engaged

is

a worthy

most worthwhile

the

works of a

his social

and

activity

may

sake, however,

end

which our predecessors have

Indeed, if we are to believe him

in itself.

it

is

the single

remaining for philosophers today. Erudition
for

strike

some of us

prolific philosopher.
political

in

its

own

as a rather poor incentive for plowing
through

Perhaps a more compelling reason for taking

views seriously

is

that so

many

others invoke his

name and

reputation to bolster favorite themes which for years
have been the stock-in-trade of

on the winning side of the Cold War. Since the prestige of
Rorty’s

writers

non-political writings, especially
social

and

PMN,

political interventions,

it

has transferred

at least to

would be a good idea

to

some

earlier

extent to his

review some of his

favorite non-political themes.

Three Anti-Isms

Rorty’s salutary departures

from Platonic and Cartesian perspectives may be

appreciated by turning to three related positions he promotes in the
ot

PMN. These

are:

first

two-thirds

(a) anti-foundalionahsm, (b) anti-representationalism

anti-essential ism. Without claiming that these three “anti-isms” are in any

foundations of his thinking,

I

because

way of placing what he

this is a

convenient

will

Ant i-foundat tonal ism:

(c)

way

devote space to an exposition of them simply

social questions” within the context
(a)

and

has to say about “moral and

of his larger body of writing.

In

PMN,

CP, Parts

I

and

II

34

of ORT and

elsewhere, Rorty has presented a strong case for abandoning the search for

Kai Nielsen reports that Isaac Levi similarly has identified “anti34.)
foundationalism, anti-representationalism, and opposition to glassy essences” as
chief characteristics of Rorty's thought (Nielsen, pp. 168-9; Nielsen cites Isaac Levi,

“Escape from Boredom: Edification According to Rorty,”
Philosophy XI, No. 4 (1981), pp. 589-602).

in

Canadian .Journal of

foundations tor knowledge, or conditions for
the possibility of knowledge,

experience and science.

He

has noted that most philosophers nowadays
consider

themselves to be anti-foundationalist; nevertheless,
he disparages analytic
philosophers, in particular, for foundationalism,
at least to the extent that they are

...committed to the construction of a permanent and
neutral framework for

still

enquiry, and thus for

all

culture.”

35

Rorty's anti-foundationalism

depends crucially on what he has

to say about

vocabularies , in contrast to sentences or beliefs. Vocabulary
shifts such as those
Plato, St. Paul,

Newton and Freud provoked amount

to literalizations

of new

metaphors. Taking his cue from Donald Davidson, 36 Rorty holds a view
of
35.

metaphor as having no agreed-upon

meaning of its constituent words,
36.
ettects

on

its

PMN,

and hence no meaning other than the

their prevailing

A

At

has argued that Rorty

p. 8.

one

least

critic

Whether or not

37.
withstand the occasional relapse into the

metaphor produces
it

should

is

himself a shamefaced

this criticism hits the
in

view he

PMN
is

mark,

and elsewhere might yet

concerned to attack

Frank B. Farrell has argued that there are “profound differences” between
(Farrell, p.
7). For Davidson, but not always for Rorty, there

)

Rorty and Davidson
a sense in which

1

some

in his

Davidson has been lukewarm
notwithstanding,

more

it

will

1

beliefs get nonlinguistic matters right (Farrell,

(Judging from his remarks

Afterthoughts to

to Rorty’s overtures.) Farrell’s

become

p.

1

19).

“A Coherence Theory of Truth,”
remarks

clear in the following pages that

1

interpret Rorty

charitably as holding that nonlinguistic events often cause beliefs to be

accepted as

true.

Although some might dispute the point

(refer to the discussion in Farrell, pp.

117-147), Rorty follows Davidson in claiming that, while explanation

under a description, pain and causality are
“...what

shows us

reality, is the

rest

literal

37

for beliefs.

however, Rorty's case against foundationalism

)

use.

ground or reason

foundationalist (refer to Sosa).

is

normal

audience, and thus can be a cause of beliefs; nevertheless,

not be counted as a

)

use,

that life

is

always

Thus, for example, Rorty writes that

not just a dream, that our beliefs are

in

touch with

causal non-intentional, non-representational, links between us and the
,

of the universe” (ORT,

Pragmatism,”

not.

is

p. 4;

and

p.

159; also refer to CIS,

Hall, p. 92).

p.

40; Rorty, “Feminism and

12

Rorty views words as “nodes

organism together with

its

are adopted widely and

become

He

environment.”

38

network which binds the [human]

When

certain metaphors “catch on” or

current, they eventually

example of a mouth of a

cites the

in the causal

may become

The terms private sphere and

river or a bottle.

public sphere are also likely candidates. The designation
sphere

one of a number of spatial metaphors, including
“arena,"

and

all

literalized.

“circle,”

in this

“domain

”

context

is

“realm” and

of which have been used to differentiate the sum of public
communities

from the sum of private ones. As should become clear

activities

Two, these metaphors, routimzed

in

law and custom,

function as metaphors. Such metaphors are

now

in

Chapter

31
'

have largely ceased

to

“dead”: Like the bread of the

Eucharist in the orthodox doctrine of transubstantiation, they, too, have
acquired a

conventional use.

When metaphors
for beliefs

4

"

die, they

cease to be merely causes and become reasons

Recurring to Wittgenstein's slogan that the meaning of a word

use, together with Davidson’s definition
that has
39.

no agreed-upon

acquires a
40.
In

meaning

PMN,

that there is

38

41

,

it

use,

we may

comes

to

of a (living) metaphor as a figure of speech

say that, as a dying metaphor gradually

produce effects through

that

meaning.

Chapter One of CIS and elsewhere, Rorty has made a strong case

no way rationally

41

to adjudicate vocabularies, in the

.)

“Relativism: Finding and Making,”

)

Rosenblum,

)

ORT,

)

In Rorty’s view, “rationality” is a

p.

p.

manner

that

sensation” (CP,
is

one

12.

pp. 66-7

171.

name

for “...a suitable balance

between

respect for the opinions of one’s fellows and respect for the stubbornness of

formulation

is its

p.

195; also refer to the discussion in Kolenda,

p. 7).

This

not inconsistent with his occasional definition of rationality,

mentioned below, as “the way we do things around here.”

13

may

adjudicate sentences within a “normal" discourse
or vocabulary. There

is

no

such a thing as an irrational nonlinguistic effect;
there are only irrational
justifications-that

game with

certain sentences with

is,

set rules.

Moreover, since any

existing vocabulary or language,

it

What
former

is

set

is futile

arching set ot super-rules adjudicating

all

no use within a pregiven language
of rules must be stated

is,

language games for

all

time.

sounds or marks with

literal

mark

meaning, there can be no metaphors. Thus, metaphor
or, to

is

parasitic

is

that the

meanings; sounds

or marks that, in Rorty’s terminology, are “about" something. Without

vocabularies

an already-

to seek, as Philosophers have, an over-

distinguishes a metaphor from an inarticulate sound or

made up of words - that

in

literal

on agreed-upon

borrow a term from Kuhn, on normal discourse. Dead

metaphors make up a large part of any given discourse, normal or abnormal. As

metaphors are created,
another, and

new

literalized

and

killed, vocabularies

change and supplant one

physical theories, manners of versification and moral and religious

creeds eclipse incumbent ones. In this way, “...progress

in the cultural interests

of

poetry, science, philosophy, or politics results from 'the accidental coincidence of a

private obsession with a public need.'“
42.

So

it is

42

not an exaggeration to say that for Rorty, “the motor of history, the

43.

chief vehicle of intellectual and moral progress"
tropes and the literalization of metaphors.
political vocabularies

such a

shift

may

)

Hall, p.

)

Fraser, in

44.)

EH,

p.

1

from Althusser's

4

'

is

When

the successive creation of

he urges readers to change their

to Unger's, for

example,

44

he

is

aware

not only register a change in the political climate, but also

7,

quoting Rorty.

Malachowski,

189.

p.

306.

new

that

14

contribute to such a change.

many

years ot hard

He confirms

work here

this

assumption when he salutes Unger's

North America, changing the curricula of
many of

in

our law schools and the self-image of many
of our lawyers,” 45 and the

thousands of recently graduated lawyers

who

[Rorty assures us,

despite appearances to the

contrary-MM], influenced by Unger and
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, are now

members of
make institutions

other

helping

and decent.

in the

46

United States slightly more flexible

This example lends credence to an interpretation of Rorty
according to which poets,
in the

extended sense as metaphor-makers, are “the unacknowledged
legislators of

the social world.”

Tom

47

Sorell

summarizes Rorty’s “deflationary" account of the development

of culture well:

...individuals who happen to have been bom at certain times,
who
have been driven by certain obsessive states, who happen to have had
neurons firing in response to certain random stimulations, happen to

invent forms of words that are

place and catch on.

made

public at the right time and

4x

45.

This account resonates with Kuhn's case that scientific progress has less to

46.

do with discovering

truth than adoption

47.

by a

scientific

community of new

paradigms, or conceptual vocabularies. Rorty draws on Kuhn,

48.

make

among

others, to

the case that the pronouncements of the hardest of the hard sciences have no

epistemological privilege or priority over poetry. All are concerned with the

)

EH,

p.

177.

)

EH,

p.

182.

)

Cf. Fraser, in

)

Hornsby,

in

Malachowski,

Malachowski,

p.

p.

306.

20.

15

production of new descriptions; to

another amounts to

little

one

call

more than

set

of descript, ons more accurate than

the claim that the preferred set has
paid

its

way

better than others.

There

are,

of course, different ways of paying one's way.

many people

useful to

The

tingles in spines.

for coping, for

making

life less difficult.

Some

ideas prove

Others produce

realization of either the romantic intellectual’s
impulse to

create herself anew by redescribing, or Shklar’s
imperative to ameliorate cruelty

depends on the creation of new
set their faces against

final vocabularies.

Both the poet and the reformer

metaphysics; both distinguish abnormal discourse from

normal discourse, the invention of a new metaphor from
application.

4

literalization or social

its

'

Since, according to Rorty, the chief vehicle of intellectual and
moral

progress

is

the creation of

new tropes,

it

is

imperative that the scope of admissible

alternate forms of words, descriptions, metaphors, literary genres
and final

vocabularies be unlimited in principle. “[I]t
49.
society," Rorty writes, “that, in respect of

is

central to the idea of a liberal

words as opposed

to deeds, persuasion as

50.

opposed

to force, anything goes.”

(b)

50

Ant i-represenlat umal ism: Rorty counts the tendency

vocabularies, or congeries of metaphors, as

if

to treat

they could be warranted like

statements, beliefs or propositions as the cardinal sin of traditional philosophy. This

Malachowski,

)

Fraser, in

)

Quoted by

of course,

this

Tom

p.

Sorell, in

309.

Malachowski,

p.

formulation has been espoused by

23.

lots

Taken

as a normative ideal,

of people, not just

liberals.

Rosa Luxemburg was every bit as adamant on this point as was John Stuart Mill.
Few of Rorty’s opponents on the left would dispute that, when it comes to the
exchange of ideas, we should let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of
thought contend (Rorty approvingly quotes the slogan
219).

Mao

popularized at CP,

p.

16

is

because there are no reasons not already couched

could establish once and for

all

that

in

some vocabulary which
51

one had the right vocabulary

Correspondence of a belief with a non-linguistic

state

of affairs, then,

is

not

a criterion of knowledge or truth. Rather, according
to Rorty, an antirepresentationalist account of knowledge

is

one which

“...does not

view knowledue

as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter
of acquiring habits of

action for coping with reality.’ 02 Anti-representationalism, for
him,

abandonment of a

'spectator'

“the

is

account of knowledge and the consequent

abandonment of the appearance/reality

distinction.”

53

Following Wittgenstein and Davidson, Rorty makes a particularly
convincing case that the relation between language and the world
than representational.

It is

objects
52.

and events

53.

What Rorty

is

,

medium more

well-suited to the purpose of representing nonlinguistic objects.

51.

as, say, the

causal rather

a mistake to treat vocabularies or languages in

Tractarian fashion as a collection of representations, or as a

language such

is

To

or less

say that a

language of modem chemistry, represents nonlinguistic

merely a way of paying that language a compliment.

0

has to say about representational ism depends crucially on what

54.
he has to say about sentences or beliefs.

Beliefs

do not represent non-beliefs. Like

55.

Fraser, in

)

appears

among

Malachowski,

Two

in Part

p.

of PMN and

305. Rorty’s case against representational ism

his essay

“The World Well Lost” (CP,

pp. 1-18),

other places.

)

ORT,

)

Rorty, Introduction to Murphy,

)

ORT,

)

“Truth

way” (Klepp,

1.

p.

p.

60.

is

p.

p. 2.

simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying their
118, quoting Rorty).

17

the unhyphenated coherentist,

“The pragmatist recognizes

relations ofjustification

holding between beliefs and desires, and relations
of causation holding between
these beliefs and desires and other items in the
universe, but no relations of
,o6

representation

Of course,

the world causes beliefs to be accepted as true
or

rejected as false; nevertheless, these causes themselves
cannot constitute
justifications or reasons for retaining beliefs.

innumerable nonlinguistic events or
by other

Beliefs can be caused by any of

of affairs: but they can only be justified

states

Thus, there are no causes for the truth of beliefs. 57

beliefs.

Rorty places himself squarely within the tradition of American pragmatism,
represented by William James,
as

one

that “pays

who

held that a true belief is more fruitfully viewed

way,” rather than one which accurately represents

its

58

reality.

56.

The “core of pragmatism,” Rorty

writes,

is

“to replace the notion of true beliefs as

57.

representations of 'the nature of things' and instead to think of them as successful
58.

rules for action."

5

'

Accordingly, he advocates blurring “the positivist distinction

between the semantic and the pragmatic,

)

ORT,

p.

97.

)

ORT,

p.

121.

59.

[...]

theory and observation.”

60

60.

PMN,

176; CP, pp. 162-3; also refer to the discussion in Murphy, pp. 104“
According to James, The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good
)

5.

in the

p.

way of belief and good,

too,

for

definite,

assignable reasons' ’ (James, pp. 75-

Since these “assignable reasons” for a belief to be true function as determiners

6).

of epistemic value which are privileged

in the

sense that they allegedly require no

would appear to constitute transcendental conditions of
knowledge. Perhaps this is why, as Davidson reports, Rorty has explicitly
repudiated James' version of pragmatism (Davidson, in Malachowski, p. 138).
further justification, they

)

ORT,

)

CP,

p.

65.

p. xvii.

In

keeping with

theories of reference, in favor of
talking about”

(PMN,

this point,

Rorty advocates abandoning

all

an everyday notion of “talking about" and “really

pp. 289-93; 300- In).

18

By
good

this conception, truth has

tor us to believe.”

usefulness

is

61

become,

“...in

William James’ phrase, what

is

Like the ancient sophists, James and Rorty
recognize that

always usefulness for someone or some group. Since
something can

be said to be useful or good

in the

way of belief only

in relation to a

given need or

purpose, usefulness and goodness, and hence truth, depend
upon “our” needs and
aims.

6

And

“

this, in turn,

depends upon who “we”

large part at least, because

we have

certain needs.

then, apart from usefulness for a given

1

or we.

are, since

There

As we

is

we

are

who we

are, in

no usefulness or good,

will see

below,

this

observation, together with Rorty’s account of selfhood and self-creation,
has

important ramifications

when

(c) Anti-essent lal ism:

it

comes

is

he writes,

a divinized world.”

political views'.

symmetrical with his case against the notion of

expression of an inner essence, or true

,

and

Rorty’s rejection of the notion of representation of an

outer essence of Nature or Reality

human

to assessing his social

“is to abjure the

self.

“To abjure

the notion of the ’truly

attempt to divinize the self as a replacement for

63

61.

However

great his differences with

Hume

in other respects,

Rorty lauds the

62.

Scotsman's redescription of selfhood as nothing but a loose bundle of preferences,
63.
fears,

hopes and other mental atoms.

64.

64

For Rorty the “nominalist,” selfhood

thing with attitudes, but simply the set of attitudes themselves,

and emotions with nothing behind

beliefs, desires,

)

ORT,

)

Novack,

)

CIS,

)

EH,

65.)

22; Rorty, in

p.

p.

180.

p. 35.

pp. 145-8.

Hall,

p.

97.

Rajchman and West,

65

“a network of

it--no substrate

p. 5.

is

behind the

not a

19

attributes,”

66

a

network that

constantly reweaving

is

historically conditioned beliefs

and desires.”

67

itself,

These

“a centerless

attitudes are not expressions

or attributes of selftiood, but rather
constituent elements of selfhood:
attitudes,

and there

is

no

self

Strip

is

not a

Selfhood, rather,

medium of expression

is

away

the

left.

“For such philosophers as Davidson and Sellars,” Rorty
reminds

“language

web of

for

us,

something pnor called ’experience’.” 68

“a tissue of contingencies,” 6 ” a concatenation of beliefs,
desires,

emotions and other putative mental
historical contingency all the

way

70

states.

He views

it

as “centerless, as an

through,” rather than as the locus of a center, a

66.

divine spark, or a truth-tracking faculty called “reason.” 71 Thus,

67.

do not need a categorical distinction between the self and its
We can dismiss the distinction between an attribute of the

...we

situation.

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,”

)

p.

217.

ORT, p. 192. Geras has noted that: “Rorty sometimes writes as though
)
people were simply what their society and culture make of them They have no
inherent nature” (Geras, p 49).
68.

deny

Geras does not discuss the possibility that one could

way down” (CIS, pp. 64,
human nature distinct from the

that “socialization goes all the

69.

same time denying an

Homo sapiens sapiens.

70.

inherent

1

85), while at the

biological

Rorty, too, as when, in contravention of his acknowledgment that

something

in

common

makeup of

This possibility occasionally appears to have been

lost

on

humans have

with other animals (“Feminism and Pragmatism,”

p. 4), he
of human beings as children of their time and place,
without any significant metaphysical or biological limits to their plasticity” (the

recommends

to us “a picture

cited passage, from Rorty's article “Trotsky and the

Geras,

)

Rorty, in Balslev,

p.

85.

)

CIS,

)

CIS, pp. 23-43; Rorty,

71.)

Wild Orchids,” appears

p. 89).

p.

32.

in

Rorty, in Malachowski,

Malachowski,

p.

288.

p.

299, note 24.

in

20

self

and a constituent of the

self,

between the seifs accidents and

its

essence, as “merely' metaphysical. 72

By Rortv s
“
.

lights.

Metaphysicians" are people

who

are on the lookout for

..continuities-overarching conditions of possibility which
provide the space

within which discontinuity occurs” 77
story of our alienation from

A

prime example of such a continuity

and ultimate return

to a universal

is

the

and ahistoncal human

essence. Instead of human essence, Rorty wishes to
substitute a characterization of
the self as “the accidental tangle of compulsion,
desires and roles that
refer to with the

He

pronoun

we

crudely

74
’I.'“

favorably contrasts his view of the self as an historical product
to the

72.
non-empirical self

which Kant had

to postulate in the interests of Enlightenment

7
73.
rationalism. ' This helps to explain his high esteem for Freud,
or at least

Donald

74.

Davidson’s interpretation of the Austrian neurologist. 7

*’

According

to Rorty,

Freud

corroborated a conception of the self neither as a discreet, integrated consciousness.

75.

)

Rorty, in Malachowski,

)

CIS,

p.

289.

76.
p.

25n. Cf. Hall, pp. 131-2.

p. 122. Norman Geras has argued that, in the course of making his
case for solidarity and decency, Rorty surreptitiously relies on a conception of
human nature (refer to Geras, Chapters Two and Three). Similarly, Haber has
)

Klepp,

claimed that Rorty assumes that humans have a universal essence, namely a moral
subject within them that can be humiliated (Haber, pp. 67-8).

)

Rorty, in Malachowski,

p.

301, note 39.

Refer to Rorty's excellent paper, “Freud and Moral Reflection,” included in
EH, pp. 143-163, and “The Contingency of Selfhood,” included in CIS (pp. 23-43),
)

The Davidson- Rorty interpretation of Freud has not gone
By Martin Hollis’ lights, for example, Freud does not reject human

especially pp. 30-39.

uncontested.

essence, but rather holds that “...poetically speaking, our glassy essence

essence but not glassy” (Hollis,

in

Malachowski,

p.

is

an

246). Even if Hollis were

right,

however, Davidson and Rorty might well have produced a “productive misreading”

of Freud that deserves to be taken

seriously.

21

a “natural kind with an intrinsic nature,
an intrinsic set of powers to be developed
or
left

undeveloped,

nor as merely a “decentered machine.” In this
way, “Freud

himself eschewed the very' idea of a paradigm

Davidson and Rorty’s Freud showed us
fantasts

human

being.”

how the more

77

sublime creations of

and poets may be traced not to an essence expressed but to
idiosyncratic

events of the past, neuroses, infantile experiences and the

Strong poets, then,

like.

are not external izers or expressers of an essence within:
Their metaphors catch on

not because they resonate with something universal and atemporal
within the
heart, but

because for any of a number of contingent reasons

the needs of

members of a

madelleine was not so

particular

much

community

it

just

happens

at a particular time.

human

to

meet

78

Proust's

a light turned inward for self-discovery as a catalyst to

self-creation.

These observations subvert a
This

is

the criticism,

institutions

line

of criticism leveled against liberalism

which Rorty associates with communitarians,

that political

presuppose a doctrine about the nature of human beings and that such a

doctrine must, unlike
77.

Enlightenment rationalism, make clear the essentially
77

78.
historical character

of the

79.

seen, Rorty advises us to

As we have

self.

tell

stones of our past as the saga of

successive comings of new tropes and the literalization of metaphors. Metaphor
the growing point of language.

80

)

Passages quoted

)

CIS, pp. 34-5.

)

Rorty, in Malachowski,

Malachowski,

80.)

EH,

p.

342.

p. 12.

Keeping

in the last

p.

in

mind

that

metaphors are causes of

two sentences are from CIS,

p.

35.

282. Also see: Guignon and Hiley, in

is

amounts

belief, this

and

history,

to advising us to

It

amounts

to

if

Two

is

more than an

attack on one individual's

promoting the "freezing-over of culture” and the
81

dehumanization of human beings.
Chapter

"cultural

cultural history as in large part the literalization
of metaphor.

Muzzling strong poets, then,
freedom

view history as predominantly

Here, Rorty's precursor

of On Liberty famously argued

that, to

abnormal discoursers were one day to disappear,

is J.S.

Mill,

who

in

borrow Kuhnian terminology,

it

would behoove normal

discoursers to raise them up themselves.
In a

paper entitled “Pragmatism and Choosing to Believe,” Jane Heal

challenges a view she associates with Rorty, namely the view that acquiring beliefs
is

a matter of choice.

8

“

Although Heal does not deny

actively consider the sort of persons they

want

to be,”

that
83

"men and women may

she questions Rorty's

emphasis on the contingency of self-creation.
Heal's criticism might loose

some of its

force, however, in

view of Rorty's

81.

recognition that the strong poet

is

a rare individual, and even this rare individual

82.

depends on normal discourse, which
83.
belief.”
84.
move

84

When

is

composed

in large part

Rorty characterizes the strong poet as one

of "unchosen

who

on to new and exciting forms of discourse, we should

is

free to invent

recall that for

and

him

)

Guignon and

)

Included in Malachowski, pp. 101-14. Charles Taylor echoes Heal's doubts

(Malachowski,

)

Hiley, in Malachowski,

p.

339.

pp. 258-9).

Rosenblum,

p.

135.

"The Contingency of Selfhood” (CIS, pp. 2343), a rewrite of a Northcliffe Lecture he delivered in 1986. The only writings of
Rorty that Heal mentions in “Pragmatism and Choosing to Believe” are PMN and
)

CP.

Rorty presents these views

in

freedom
little

the recognition of contingency.*0

is

or no choice

when

it

comes

to the

He

recognizes that the strong poet has

forms of life into which she was

bom

and

the blind impresses which her behavings, including
her discursive behavings, bear

Indeed, one thing that

makes

a strong poet strong

is

her refusal to try to escape this

86

contingency.

Rorty has indeed produced an account of selfhood that assumes that
acquiring

some

beliefs is a matter of choice.

poets' choice of descriptions that

the chooser

chooser

always a

is

who

is

make up

finite, historically

However, even when

it

is

the strong

the story of her appearance on the scene,

and culturally constituted subject, a

herself a tissue of contingencies.

Part of this finitude, this historical and cultural specificity, has to do with the

array of choices perceived to be available, the range of “live options.”

Some

commentators, problematizing the perception and range of these options, have
identified

what they have dubbed the problem of adaptive preferences. As Marx

recognized, our preferences are often, and perhaps always, adaptations to social,

economic and

assume

political

86.

years

and voluntary consent may simply be adaptations

to be free

85.
circumstances in

some

circumstances beyond our control. What liberals typically

which

live options

have been confined

to

narrow

to

limits.

feminist writers have noted this problem and have deployed

it

In recent

in attacks

87.

what

against liberal notions of consent. Their claim

is

women’s

arrangements

because

free

it

they have

is

and voluntary consent

to various

that

liberals take to

is

spurious

be

when and

based on preferences that are adaptive to circumstances over which

little

or no control

87

)

CIS,

p.

26.

)

CIS,

p.

28.

)

Refer, for example, to Walker.

24

The term adaptive preferences, however, might
have already noted,

all

in this sense, at least,

beliefs

have causes, even

if

well be a pleonasm.

they do not

all

As we

have reasons. So

even the most capricious or whimsical preferences

conceivably could be described as adaptations to
“nonsubjective” factors,
biological, social or otherwise.

Rortv’s

u

We’s”

Long before Dewey, Jefferson made

the connection between pragmatism

and the experiment of democracy, although he used utilitarian-sounding words

to

do

so:

[Njature has constituted
virtue.

Men

utility to

man, the standard and

circumstances, different habits and regimens,
utilities;

the

of

test

living in different countries, under different

same

act, therefore,

virtuous in one country which
differently circumstanced.

is

may be

may have

useful,

different

and consequently

injurious and vicious in another

KX

Jefferson also recognized that a particular description of institutions and
practices that proves useful to

within the same country.

It

all

some people may be worse than
depends on who “we”

have seen, his pragmatist successors,
spotlight

are.

useless to others

Recognizing

like his sophist predecessors,

on “us” and directed the question of who “we” are

this, as

have shined a

to center stage.

Like Jefferson and James, Rorty acknowledges the non-universal,
on

contingent, “historically-situated” character of his

88.)

Jefferson, pp. 639-40.

89.)

EH,

p.

42.

own normative

we

views:

...what counts as rational or as fanatical

which we think

is

relative to the

group to

necessary to justify ourselves-to the body of
shared belief which determines the reference of
90
the word “we.”
it

is

Educated inhabitants of the rich North Atlantic think

necessary to justify

is

it

themselves to various “we's” of different degrees of exclusivity.

“We”

in the

broadest sense might correspond to one’s ethnos which
“comprises those
,

enough of one’s

beliefs to

make

fruitful

Within the context of public

abandon the search
“as

much

belief.

affairs, then,

intersubjective agreement as possible”

Extending the reference of “us” as

engage

it

share

91

behooves seekers of truth

to

for conditions of possibility of experience, and instead
to foster

in fruitful discussion,

92

about what

good

in the

way may

one already shares enough

but also the attempt to

more and more people with whom one

is

far as possible in this

whom

not only the persuasion of people with
to

conversation possible.”

who

make

hitherto has not

way of

involve

in

common

oneself understood to

communicated.

Accordingly, Rorty has urged setting aside such “Kantian questions” as “What

should

1

90.

do 9 What may

questions such as.

Reviewing
92.
possible to group
93.
“private

)

I

hope? What

is

Man?” and

Which communities' purposes
his references to the

them

into

us,” an “us insiders

two broad

who

Rorty, in Malachowski,

p.

fixing instead on

shall

1

share 0

”9

“Deweyan

’

communities whose purposes he shares,

categories:

On

the one hand, there

share [Derrida's] background,

who

is

find the

it is

a

same

281.

Rajchman and West, p. 13. One may, of course, be capable of
conversing with someone without thereby thinking it necessary to justify oneself to
91

)

Rorty, in

that person.

Rajchman and West,

)

Rorty, in

)

“Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,”

p. 5.

p.

67.

26

rather esoteric things as funny or beautiful or

moving

as he does,”

94

“we

[...]

have read and pondered Plato, Newton, Kant, Marx,
Darwin, Freud, Dewey,
an

us tor

whom

other hand, there

democrats,”

98

is

“we

a “public us,

as in

“we

liberal intellectuals,”

99

liberal

democrats,”

“we modem

101

and “us American

we

should be more willing than

the best polity actualized so far,”
94.

10
'

102

liberals.”

[...]

What “we philosophy

philosophers”
97.

10

"

have

in

common

“we

liberal

When

he

is

professors”

with

104

or

“we Western

)

EH,

p.

120.

)

CP,

p.

173.

100.)

EH,

p.

108.

101.

Rorty, in Malachowski, pp. 279-302.

is first

and foremost

“we Anglo Saxon
liberal intellectuals”

102.

Rorty, “Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

565.

103.

Rorty,

)

“Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodemity,”

p.

173.

104.
105. )

)

Rorty, in Malachowski,

Rorty, in

p.

Rawlsian

explicitly addressing the latter “us.”

99.

)

social

he writes that

98.

)

the

are to celebrate bourgeois capitalist society as

Presumably, the background “we” share with Derrida

educational:
96.

97

On

inheritors of the traditions of

and constitutional government,” 100 “we

searchers for consensus”

95.

95

etc.,”

96
the discourse of philosophy actually has been
important.”

religious tolerance

“We

who

287.

Rajchman and West,

p.

1

2.

)

Rorty, “Pragmatism without Method,”

)

CP,

p.

210 note

)

CP,

p.

189.

)

Rorty, “Signposts along the

p.

272.

16.

Way

that

Reason Went,” pp

5-6.

106

is

27

having read
literature

among

„]Q7
criticism.’
‘

of books. For Rorty, philosophy with a small
p

lots

others and should

become

or

is in

is

one form of

the process of becoming "culture

'

’

project

So, in keeping with his views on the aims of
philosophy, Rorty's

would appear

to consist in large part of “continuing the
conversation” with

contemporaries and precursors

departments and programs

in

in

philosophy departments, as well as

comparative

working mothers

in

Slum dwellers

English

literature.

Education and the leisure time necessary to read
not universally accessible.

in

in

lots

of books, of course, are

Lima, longshoremen

in

Lagos and

East Los Angeles are not likely to have the leisure time-let

alone the acquired taste-for reading

lots

of books by Rorty's preferred authors. So

whether or not “we powerful, discursive types” 108 are powerful because we are
discursive,

we

certainly are discursive because

Rorty acknowledges

community of the

this.

As

it

liberal intellectuals

we

turns out,

are powerful.

“we” happen

of the secular

modem

to

be “the

West,”

109

“us relatively

106.
leisured
intellectuals, inhabiting a stable and prosperous part of the world,” 110
107. educated, leisured
“us...

policy-makers of the West,”

111

“people like ourselves-

108.
middle-class
American and European readers of magazines like [Dissent]” uz

109.
110.
)

ORT,

p.

29; Rorty, in

Rajchman and West,

111.
112. )

Hall, p. 19.

)

EH,

)

Rorty, in

)

PMN,

p.359.

)

CP,

203.

)

“Movements and Campaigns,”

p.

p.

182.

Rajchman and West,

p. 12.

p. 4.

p.

12.

“we

rich

North American bourgeois;

11

'

“we

the North Atlantic Bourgeoisie.” 11 ’

rich, fat, tired

Rom,

then,

is

North Americans" 114 and

unlikely to dispute

Roy

Bhaskar's characterization of him as catering to

...a

leisured elite-intellectual vuppies-neither racked
by pain nor

immersed

toil-whose lives may be devoted to the practice of
aesthetic enhancement, and in particular to generating
self, other and
116
genealogical descriptions.

From

in

the perspective of

its

public role, this leisured elite would appear to

correspond to Alastair MacIntyre's Managers, and perhaps to some of his
Therapists,
These, together with the Rich Aesthetes (Rorty's “private we’s"), allegedly

too.

dominate “our culture,"
According to
aesthetic

117

both civic and private.

this picture, then, there are private

enhancement and there are public communities which dominate

Community, however,

culture.

is

preeminently a public category. This

according to Rorty, the private sphere
113.
idiosyncrasy:
114.
The

communities dedicated to

The

point of private

Contingency of Selfhood,"

115.

creature which

is

not only

new

is

is

life in

to

political

is

because,

the sphere of aloneness, narcissism and
Rorty's liberal utopia, as he describes

it

in

have the opportunity to make oneself a

but unique. Rorty denies that there

is

or should be

116.
)

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,”

)

EH,

)

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,”

with the

p.

list in

p.

588.

p.

216.

178.

Comay,

p.

Compare

this list

of “we’s”

120. Also refer to the relevant discussion in Bernstein,

pp. 553-4.

)

Bhaskar 1991, pp. 134-5. Also refer to relevant remarks
this with Kolenda's view of Rorty as a democratizer.

Compare
117.)

Cited by Rorty,

in

Malachowski,

p.

282.

in

Held,

p.

573.

29

any consensus about competing conceptions of
the good

118

life.

And

in

keeping

with this he does not emphasize private “we's,”
except for “tiny circle[s] of
initiates,

small bands of kindred souls drawn together by
the private projects

they share.

Whether public or
evidently

private,

however, what Rorty's “we’s” have

in

common

a shared educational background, thanks to leisure and wealth
in the

is

north Atlantic. Liberal intellectuals and policy makers share with
the strong poets

and

their necessarily elite audience leisure, wealth

Thanks

common

to this

write novels as

we

and freedom from censorship.

background, “we” have the freedom to run for office or

wish, depending on our idiosyncratic conceptions of personal

perfection.
Self-identification

the

manner

and considerations of audience have a crucial bearing on

which Rorty presents

in

argumentation.

He would

argument against the old

his

views and on his evaluation of rational

not agree that he himself has provided a sustained

sort

of philosophy.

12

"

Drawing on

the arguments of Quine,

19.

Davidson, Sellars and others
tradition,

he considers to be reductios of the analytic

he wants to convince his audience that a philosophical defense of

liberalism
118.

is

This

He
most
120.

whom

unnecessary.
is

not to say, however, that he does not believe in promoting liberalism.

emphatically does. Indeed, he describes himself frankly as engaged in

apologetics in the sense of “a circular justification of our practices” which “makes
,

one feature of our culture look good by

1

)

CIS,

p.

)

CIS,

p. xiii.

)

PMN,

121.)

CIS,

29; Berstein,

p. 6.

p.

57.

p.

552.

121

citing

still

another.”

Mincing even fewer

30

words, he has described his writings on the “broader
questions’' as “a

PR

)0 b”

122

for

liberalism.

Noting that for him, as for Wittgenstein, language

is

a “tool,” not a

medium

of communication open to rational analysis from a position
outside of any particular
language, David Hall has concluded

There

is little

to

that:

be gained from attempting to micro-manage,

fine-

tune, disassemble, or deconstruct the account Rorty provides.
The
best one can do is to judge the relative attractiveness of Rorty’s

views

by recourse to alternative visions. 123

Unfortunately, Hall goes on to conclude that “Rorty's philosophy
rational analysis, critique or dialectic.”
that Rorty

124

This conclusion

is

precipitous.

closed to

is

The

fact

emphasizes rhetoric over argumentation and deploys a wide variety of

rhetorical techniques in

making

eschewed argumentation,

if

we

26.
124.
could
be so viewed,

is

pleonastic.

in this section,

is

that

it

is

imply that he has entirely

use the word as he does, in a sense in which the
12

122. “rational argumentation”
term
123. remarks earlier
from

his point does not

“the

"

As

the reader might have guessed

Rorty’s only criterion of rationality,

way we do

things around here.”

126

if

indeed

And

it

as the

125.

56

)

Klepp,

)

Hall, p. 4.

)

Hall, p. 6.

)

Rorty has defined philosophical argumentation as “the practice of playing

p.

sentences off against each other
It

is

as different sorts of language

believe, after

101

order to decide what to believe” (EH,

p.

125n).

easier to distinguish argumentation from suasive rhetoric, however, if we view

them

1

in

)
).

all, is

not the

same

games with

distinct goals:

Deciding what to

as convincing others to believe something.

Rorty offers this definition for the words scientific and objective (EH,
It

could as well apply to rational however

Liberalism,”

,

p.

587; Rorty, in

(cf.

Rajchman and West,

p.

“Postmodernist Bourgeois

p. 6;

and “Relativism: Finding

reader might have guessed from the preceding
section, “around here”

is,

if

not

exclusively philosophy departments, then at
least in large part academia-that

an

is,

enclave inhabited by people unusually well-prepared
to produce sentence sequences

which conform
recognize

At

to the rules

of formal

informal fallacies

when

one commentator

least

is

engage

logic, to

in dialectic

and criticism,

to

they encounter them, and so on

puzzled that

positions look good Rorty appears to argue for

in the

course of making his

them much

as other writers

do

127

Rorty offers reasons for changing certain subjects; he respects
logical consistency as
well as the next philosopher, and he attacks opponents

informal fallacies.

I2X

As we can

see,

when

they resort to so-called

however, his recourse to philosophical

argumentation remains justifiable on pragmatic grounds even though he does not
address his writings of recent years exclusively to analytic philosophers
but to a

broader audience of “individuals

Because the educated
28.
identifies himself

in all precincts

intellectuals, philosophers

and to

whom

specially trained to identify

he thinks

and defer

it

is

of the intellectual community .” 129

and professors with

whom

he

necessary to justify himself are

to cogent arguments,

13

"

philosophical

127.

and Making,’

pp. 22-25).

It is

true that

on other occasions he

definitions of rationality, including the attempt to

“coherent” as possible (ORT,

p.

106;

EH,

p. 30).

offers different

make one’s web of belief as
He offers little in the way of

emphasis on the coherence of beliefs (Geras, p. 125); however,
one possible justification might be that seeking to make one’s body of beliefs as

justification for his

129.

coherent as possible, whatever that
130. around
done

1

may

entail, is just

one of the ways things are

here.

)

Geras,

)

Such as ad hominem arguments against the philosopher Heidegger, the

p.

122.

genetic fallacy with reference to the ignominious origins of existing liberal

democracies, and so on

)

Hall, p.

)

Refer to his remarks on “philosophical ability”

9.

in

CP,

pp. 219-20.

32

argumentation of the sort one finds

PMN

in

and elsewhere

is

an especially effective

rhetorical technique for bringing his audience around
to his point of view.

True, Rorty

audience, however broadly or narrowly

s

we may

describe

it.

is

probably less impervious to flattery and argumenta ad populum
than many members

of the audience would
in

America Today,”

1

'

As Rorty

like to admit:

1

way

the

points out in his paper “Philosophy

things are done in philosophy departments in the

anglophone countries today typically resembles more closely the practice of a clever
lawyer, juggling briefs, citing precedents and case law, and so on, than that of

white-smocked laboratory researchers driven only by the passion
truth.

Nevertheless, what distinguishes “us for

whom

the discourse of philosophy

actually has been important” from a wider audience presumably
the former

community

are

more impressed by

for disclosing

is

that

members of

the sort of argumentation of which

philosophers have long considered themselves to be exemplary practitioners.

So Hall may be

right

when he

writes that,

dependence upon metaphors rather than statements,
pictures rather than arguments, and global interpretations, rather than
internal analyses of the thinkers he employs, means that the
.Rorty's

persuasive dimension of his thinking

is

stressed above that of the

132

strictly logical.

He

is

mistaken, however,

if

he assumes that the persuasive dimension of Rorty's

thinking can be promoted effectively without the “strictly logical” dimension: In

view of his projected audience, the

latter

dimension

instance of the former.
*

131.)

This article appears

132.)

Hall,

p. 7.

in

CP,

*

pp. 211 -30.

*

is

a pragmatically authorized

So
what

is at

far,

1

have stated the problem to be taken up

in this discussion, indicated

stake and located the problem in relation both to the larger body of

Rorty's published work and to his audience. In Chapter
Rorty's liberal predecessors, focusing on his debt to
the

and

two pragmatists when

comes

it

One

I

will turn attention to

Dewey and

to their conceptions of

their proposals for allaying the traditional opposition

differences between

democracy and

liberty

between the public and

private spheres.

Dewey once wrote
In

Chapter

Two

I

will

that “All intelligent political criticism

compare some

between the private sphere and
emphasizes the

comparative.

assumptions about the relationship

state institutions to

political character

alternative description that

liberal

is

an alternative account which

of the private sphere and private selfhood. The

present in rough outline seriously compromises Rorty’s

I

evaluation of existing liberal democracies.

With some key terms

for an alternative conceptual vocabulary in hand,

I

will

turn a critical eye in Chapter Three to Rorty's claim that the liberal democracies

already contain institutions and practices well-suited to advancing the public ideal

of ameliorating suffering.

1

will then suggest an alternative political setup

appears to hold greater promise in relation to this

And

finally, in

Chapter Four,

I

Century, Rorty’s role as private ironist

133.)

Dewey

1984,

p.

304.

ideal.

will suggest that, at the

is

which

end of the American

incompatible with his role as apologist for

“bourgeois liberalism.”

compromises the

1

34.

)

134

The

better he fulfills one role,

1

will argue, the

more

other.

Regarding

this

term Rorty writes:

call it “bourgeois” to emphasize that most of the people I am
talking about would have no quarrel with the Marxist claims that a
lot of those institutions and practices [which supposedly typify it,
such as an independent judiciary, a free press and free universities]
are possible and justifiable only in certain historical, and especially
economic, conditions. (“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, p.
1

585.)

CHAPTER

1

DEPARTURES FROM DEWEY

Of the

three

main heroes of PMN, Rorty has written

the closest affinity to John Dewey.'

He

engaged American philosophers of the
in articulating

United States.

that he has

wistfully appreciates

New Deal

era

who

come

Dewey and

to feel

other

played a significant role

public policy and establishing the tone of public discourse in
the
(

1

Like Dewey, Rorty has been concerned to defend liberal

West-including “a free press, free

institutions in the

universities,

and enlightened

public opinion,’' as well as an independent judiciary and electoral representation 137 against their intellectual detractors.
little

more than an updater of his pragmatist

would appear
the

Indeed, he has described himself modestly as

way

to be accurate, at least in

predecessor.'

view of the

of a positive political vision that

38

fact that

Rortv's self description

he has offered

Dewey, standing on

little in

the shoulders of Mill.

Jefferson and Locke, had not already proposed. Acknowledging this, Rorty, with

equal modesty, has apologized for his “lack of imagination.” 139
135.

Dewey,

then,

would appear

to

be a reasonable point of departure for an

136.

investigation of Rorty’s social and political views.
137.

pragmatists

at

close quarters, however,

it

becomes

Comparing the two American
clear that Rorty

is

more

138.

)

CP,

p.

)

CP,

pp. 63; 207.

)

CIS,

)

Klepp,

139.)

p.

49; “Relativism: Finding and Making,” p.l; Berstein,

63.

p.

EH, p.l

Compare with

122.

84.

the

list in

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

541.

p.

567.

original

36

a thinker than his self-evaluation

would lead one

to believe.

There are important

differences between the two pragmatists.

One
Rorty alone

reason these differences might not be more
apparent from a reading of
is

that his

Dewey

revised specimen, to be sure.'’
a sharp distinction

to

is

be anything

140

as one

commentator has put

One Dewey

141

at all,

True, both

it,

“a surgically

scholar, J.E. Tiles, for example, draws

between the two philosophers when

of the tasks of philosophers:

it

is,

Dewey and

should be an attempt to see

it

comes

to their conceptions

Rorty hold that philosophy,

how things,

if

in the broadest

possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest sense of
the term. Beyond
this,

however, they offer divergent views of what the scope and ends of
philosophy

should be. Rorty disparages defenses of liberalism which rely on high
theory"Philosophical Liberalism" of the sort Kant

is

held to have provided.

instead a defense of liberalism which casts a bright light on
beliefs such as the belief that slavery

worship

God

140.
“and say that

as they please.

when

it

I4 ~

comes

“We

to the

is

He

commonsense

14

'

liberal

bad, and that people should be allowed to

should 'privatize philosophy,’^ Rorty' counsels,

communal

self-reassurance of the

modem

democratic societies, most of the work gets done not by deep thinkers
superficial dreamers."

prefers

Recognizing

this,

[.

one commentator has noted

.

.]

but by

that

what

is

141.

unique about Rorty’s position on social and political questions

is

that

it

“manifests

142.
)

Hall,

p. 84.

Also refer to Rajchman and West, pp. ix-xxx, p. xxviii, note 7.
may be culled from: “Overcoming the Tradition"

Rorty’s interpretation of Dewey

and “Dewey's Metaphysics,"

in

CP, pp. 37-59 and 72-81, respectively; “Pragmatism
in EH, pp. 1-5; and “Dewey between Hegel and

and Post-Nietzschean Philosophy,”
Darwin.”

)

Tiles, pp. 3-4.

)

Rorty contrasts

143.)

common

Rorty, “Posties,”

p. 12.

sense to irony in CIS,

p. 74.

37

the insight that actually there

is

by contrast, had grander ends

in

not

much
As

view.

be said that

to

Tiles put

is

distinctive'”

144

Dewey

it:

The

point of having a broad vision was for Dewey to
have a vantage
point from which to criticize, judiciously and
sensitively, existing^

cultural institutions.

ot philosophy

and

Such criticism was

for

him the

distinctive role

could not be conducted properly without an
understanding of the methods of science. To mount such criticism
it

effectively, moreover, requires certain distortions in
our conceptions
of experience and of reality to be corrected, and it cannot be
carried

out without a sound grasp of the nature of the general goals
of
endeavor (such as “truth”) and how these goals are

intellectual

progressively refined as our methods for pursuing them develop.

If Tiles is correct,

made

then he has

difficult to

it

imagine

145

Dewey

as

authorizing Rorty's view of a “post-philosophical culture” and the vision
of a liberal
utopia presented in CIS. Tiles casts aspersions on Rorty's claims to Dewey's
legacy:

[Rorty]

the end no

is in

more prepared

to take seriously

and develop

the philosophic position for which

Dewey argued than are those who
remain firmly within the analytic tradition. He is no more able to see
how Dewey's arguments might achieve what they set out to achieve

144.

145.

than are those for

movement.”

)

Burrows,

)

Tiles, p 4.

in

146.

whom

pragmatism

is

“an outdated philosophical

146

Malachowski,

On

the

p.

327.

same page.

Tiles adds that

All this leaves intact a great deal of what Rorty stigmatizes as

“Philosophy,” and moreover presents “Philosophy” as instrumental
to the proper conduct of “philosophy.”

Similarly, Kai Nielsen has noted that “For

method were

)

central” (Nielsen,

Nielsen,

p. 5.

Also consider David

The
Hall's

Dewey (pace

Rorty), considerations of

p. 168).

citation within the

quoted passage

is

from CP,

p. xvii.

doubts about Rorty's “strong misreading” of Dewey as a

hero of anti-foundationalism (Hall,

p.

1

16).

38

Whatever the merit of Tiles’ misgivings about

when

it

comes

Rorty and
are the

to the public role

Dewey

are

more

Rorty’s similarities to

of philosophy, however, other differences
between

relevant to the present discussion.

two pragmatists' divergent conceptions of liberty and

Two

such difference

their different attitudes

towards democracy. The balance of this chapter will
focus on Rorty's debt
departures from

Dewey when

it

Dewey

comes

to their

and

to

conceptions of liberty, democracy

and alternatives to the diremption of public and private persons.

The

first

section of this chapter consists of a sketch of Dewey's
account of

the public-private

appreciate Rorty

This will prepare us

split.

s

in the

second and third sections to

debt to him and to take measure of the distance separating the

two pragmatists on these
important bearing on

issues.

As we

how the younger

shall see, these differences

have an

pragmatist conceptualizes and defends his

brand of liberalism.

Dewey and

In at least

his

best-known

society.

one important respect, Dewey shared a

liberal predecessors:

“Society,”

Dewey

Dewey

1957,

p.

All agreed as to the

crucial assumption with

most basic constituents of

wrote, “is composed of individuals: this obvious and

basic fact no philosophy, whatever

147.)

the Public/Private Split

its

pretensions to novelty, can question or

Also refer to

187.

Dewey

1984,

p.

278: “...‘society’

individuals in their connections with one another.” Rorty rarely uses the

society { Bhaskar 1989,

p. 4;

Lentricchia,

not noticeably diverge from Dewey’s.
society, according to

which

of production, appears

in

its

p.

137),

(My own

Melkonian, pp. 33-55.)
,

in

as these are discussed below.

his usage

does

very different conception of

constituents are not individuals but rather practices

avoid using the word society except
quotation marks or appears

and when he does,

is

word

In the present discussion,

in citations or

when

the

word

is

I

will

bracketed by

such terms as “civil society” and “political society,”

The

qualifier social as

I

shall use

it

in this discussion

39

This
think that

basic fact

humans

are

notwithstanding,

.

14X

Humans

.societies, associations,

ties

who

Dewey,

in association

to

with

only enter into association as a means

what they are quite capable of wanting regardless
of whether they

socially or in isolation.

.

a mistake, according to

is

what they are independently ofliving

others or to think of humans as creatures
of getting

it

live

make up and have been formed by

both

groups of an immense number of kinds, having
different

instituting different interests.'’ 149

and
1

o appreciate the

last

point

more

fully,

will help to

it

be more specific about

these "societies, associations and groups.” Dewey's
inventory of latter-day

examples includes:

...gangs, criminal

bands; clubs for sport, sociability and eating;

and professional organizations; political parties and unions
within them, families; religious denominations, business
partnerships

scientific

and corporations; and so on

in an endless
be local, nation-wide, and trans-national.

Of course, none

of these groups

present form from time immemorial.

1

list.
""

The

associations

and associations have existed

Dewey

may

in their

noted that defunct forms of

association that existed three to four centuries ago restricted trade and shackled
148.
149.

should be taken as interchangeable with “collaborative” or “cooperative.” This
usage is consistent with Dewey's: “In the broad sense any transaction deliberately
carried on between

)

two or more persons

is

social in quality”

(Dewey

1984,

p.

244).

Tiles, p. 207.

Novack, p. 205. Novack cites: Intelligence in the Modern World: John
Dewey's Philosophy (Joseph Ratner, ed ), (New York: Random House, 1939), p.
)

382.

150.)

Dewey

1984, pp. 278-9.

40

The

inquiry.

latter point is

easy to discern in the cases of, say, guilds,
the

apprenticeship system and ecclesiastical education.
Those

who

struggled against

the old restrictions formulated their
opposition to existing institutions by appeal
to
the sacred authority resident in the
protesting individual. These appeals gave
rise to

a theory which

endowed

singular persons in isolation from any
associations, except

those which they deliberately formed for their
rights.”

own

ends, with native or natural

152

Dewey could
individual

s rights

see no reason

why

the political appeal should have been to the

rather than to the right of

“some primary groupings,” except

that

similar battles were being fought on several fronts, religious
and intellectual as well
as

commercial and

political,

and the individual was the lowest

denominator for the protesters on
the belief in

fronts to

all

the naked individual,

to

whom

make common

guaranteed his

As

own

shall

private ends.”

become

cause.

“all associations

nature and rights save as they proceeded from his

own

common
153

Thus arose

[were] foreign to his

voluntary choice, and

134

clear below, the activities of individual

151.
consensual
associations figure prominently

in

members of

both Dewey's and Rorty's

characterizations of liberal communities. Nevertheless, they both opposed the
152.
picture of the

“ready-made and complete individual” making choices and forming

153.

these associations, preferring instead to characterize individuals as socially

)

The discussion

in this section

chapter entitled “The Public and
discussion in Tiles, pp. 204-27.

)

Dewey

1984, p.289.

)

Dewey

1984, pp. 289-90.

154.)

Dewey

1984,

p.

290.

Its

draws from Dewey

1

984, especially the

Problems,” pp. 235-372, and from the

41

produced, historically variable and unfinished
agreed with George Herbert Mead's view
social creation
in a social

155
.

Both pragmatists would have

that, at least in large part, the self
is a

Furthermore, Rorty would agree with

and moral sense

is

Dewey

that “Individuality

something to be wrought out ” 157 and

that social

arrangements, laws and institutions are means of creating
individuals.

Observing that the lines drawn between the

and between

their activities

circumstances change,

1

and those of public

^ Dewey

of different individuals

activities

officials are

redrawn as

advised against attempting to trace such lines

before examining the particular historical circumstances within
which the publicprivate split

is

This reasonable advice, presumably,

inscribed.

Dewey’s “historicism”

which Rorty applauds him

for

Language makes

it

an instance of

is

159
.

possible for interactions to take the form of collective

actions with anticipated consequences or ends. These ends often
serve as the

immediate means of setting collective powers

into operation,

and inform or are

155.
present
in the various stages of activity leading up to achievement of
them.
59.

156.extent that individuals in a
the
group hold such ends in
157. a
into

group with an identity of

interest.

The

anticipation in

158.

consequences of conjoint

activity, the possession

1

161

of a

)

Refer to James Gouinlock's Introduction to

)

CIS,

)

Dewey

)

Tiles, p. 220.

)

Refer, for example, to

)

Tiles, pp. 158; 200, 207.

160.

.)

I

am

p.

common,

Dewey

of particular
161

interest

1984,

To

they are united

common

common

160

p.

,

is

what

xxx.

63.

1957,

p.

194

PMN,

not convinced that

it

is

pp. 9-10; CIS, pp. 57-8, 63.

useful to distinguish

between

true, authentic or

objective interests on the one hand and false or illusory interests, on the other. At

makes

participants in a collective activity a

aggregation ot individuals
realizing

wrote,

it.

if

'The planets

who happen

,

rather than a

mere

be working towards the same end without

to

in a constellation

would form

a

community,” Dewey

they were aware of the connections of the
activities of each with those of

the others and could use this

common

community

knowledge

to direct behavior.”

162

When

such a

interest obtains,

...there is

generated what, metaphorically,

may be termed a general
and social consciousness: desires and choice on the part
of
individuals in behalf of activities that, by means of
symbols, are
communicable and shared by all concerned. 163
will

Dewey
not so

sensibly recognized that persons

much because

more and more

are joined together

they have voluntarily chosen to be so united, but because
“vast

currents are running which bring

men

inmates, refugees or bonded laborers

together.”

come

164

Still,

unless and until prison

together to form gangs, resistance

organizations, unions or other formally organized and more-or-less
voluntary
associations, he

was not prepared

them

to count

as communities.

community does not obtain when only one member of a group
events

mean and manipulates them

in furtherance

goals. Thus, child labor contractors,
162.

qualify as
163.

any

community

rate, for

purposes of this discussion

such thing as an interest of which no one

Dewey

1984,

p.

251

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

331.

164.)

Dewey

1984,

p.

301

of personal private interests and

whom

they wield authority do not

will suffice to use the

it

sense in which the term perceived interest

)

aware of what

Elmer Gantrys and imperious gurus do not

leaders, since those over

Geuss, pp. 45 ff.

is

Conversely,

is

is

redundant.

By

word

interest in a

this usage, there is

no

aware. For an alternative view, refer to

43

constitute proper communities.

Nor does community

group forces others to surrender

obtain

their interest, as in the cases

religious conversion or dictatorship.

To

when one member of a
of slavery, forced

the extent that neither egregious

manipulation nor forced renunciation of self-interest
takes place within an
organized group, however, associated

life

therein constitutes

community

life,

however rudimentary.
It

may, of course, be

futile to

attempt to draw a sharp line of distinction

between voluntary and involuntary acts of association or

As with many

or consent.

to try to quantify coercion

other things, however, one often can distinguish
greater

or lesser degrees of consent by, say, comparing particular
cases, with an eye to the

rough extent to which members of a group share

which collective

When

activity is

people act

their actions often

conducive to these ends. 165

in association

with one another with certain ends

all

practical purposes confined only to those

At other times, cooperative actions considerably
in

165.
distinction

them.

ends, and the extent to

in

view,

have unintended or unforeseen consequences. Sometimes these

consequences are tor

engaged

common

Dewey

tied his distinction

between people who are

and others who are

indirectly but

affect people

who

who

share in

are not directly

between public and private

directly affected by

it.

to the

some cooperative

endunngly and extensively affected by

activity
166

it.

166.

This distinction between public and private,

same

as that

between social and individual

)

Similarly, Rorty notes that “There

)

Dewey

1984,

167.)

Dewey

1984, p.244.

167
.

should be noted,

it

Dewey

recognized that

no neat way

is

not the

many

draw a line
between persuasion and force.” Nevertheless, he adds, “the distinction is no fuzzier
than most” (CIS, p. 48).

p.

243-4.

is,

to

be

sure,

to

44

cooperative (and

consequences

tor

in this

many

sense social) activities do not have
serious indirect
people.

In this sense, these activities

Unsurprisingly, on the other hand, people

some

activity often recognize that they

have an

who

remain merely private.

are not directly

interest in

engaged

Those who are not

it.

direct participants in a transaction but
nevertheless are seriously affected for

or evil
result

may

constitute a public

of the recognition of a

consequences of conjoint
for

oil

m

By

common

this account, a public

in

comes

good

into being as the

interest in relation to the indirect

activity, notably the activities

of private associations. So,

example, an association consisting of concerned residents

in the vicinity

of an

refinery constitutes a public group, if they are
indirectly affected by the refinery's

operation in an enduring and extensive manner, such as,
say,

On

value assessment.

management of the

oil

is

company

constitute a private group directly engaged in

clear that one and the

refinery.

same act-say,

increase production, or to close the refinery
private character.

property

the other hand, the board of directors and top echelons
of

ownership and management of the
It

air quality or

a decision by executive officers to

down— can have

both a public and a

Furthermore, the line between public and private, which

“...is

to

be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are
so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or by promotion,” 16V would

appear to be highly variable. For one thing, the notion of “indirectly and seriously
affecting for

good or

collective activity

evil"

may

may, of course, be interrogated

further:

be judged to affect seriously for good or

Whether or not a

evil

may depend

crucially on one's final vocabulary. Jefferson's assertion that “it does

168.)

Dewey

1984,

p.

257.

169.)

Dewey

1984,

p.

245.

me no

injury

45

for

at

my

170
neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or
no God,"
for example, clearly

odds with the Hebrew

scriptural account

is

of the judgment of nations by a jealous

God
This

last illustration

underscores the importance of consensus to
Dewey’s

vision of community and the importance to
final

him of a common

common

vocabulary as "ties which consciously hold the members”
of a public

together.

common

According

to him,

interest in the indirect

when

individuals are not aware that they share a

consequences of some

these individuals constitute only a potential public.

any

interest or a

institutional

means

When

which

affects them,

they are aware but lack

to control such consequences, they constitute

called an inchoate public.

To

activity

what Dewey

172

regulate the activities which affect

its

interests, a

proper public must

have some

institutional

institution

which possesses any form of organization allowing some degree of

means, however rudimentary or ill-adapted

it

may

be.

An

regulation of the indirect consequences of private activities constitutes
a public
organization. These consequences, of course, are controlled and regulated
not by
170. Public”
"the
as “something/?^ se, something intrinsically manifesting a general

171.
will

and reason,”

173

but by individual persons acting conjointly. Those

who

are

invested with the duty of controlling these consequences in a manner responsible to
172.

)

Jefferson,

)

The quotation from Dewey

p.

274.

is

from

Tiles, p. 212.

Tiles cites

Middle Works Vol. 9 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
Press, 1984),

p. 89.

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

317.

173.)

Dewey

1984,

p.

278.

Dewey:

Illinois University

46

the public are officials. These
officials, taken together, constitute
a government

,

and the public thus organized thereby
becomes a form of political state .' 14

According to Dewey, then,

a state

is

a politically organized public.

is

It

“the

organization of the public effected through
officials for the protection of the
interests shared

entity

by

its

members .” 175 Dewey’s

which incorporates the

One may be

a

entire life of the

member of many

state,

moreover,

Chapter

formulations
since

Dewey

Two

in the

it

will

associations, and in

be seen that there

preceding paragraphs.

not an all-inclusive

community, as does Hegel’s

In the

is

state.

most instances, according

Dewey, these associations do not have consequences
requiring
In

is

room

to

regulation

to

176
.

doubt some of the

meantime,

it

will

be noticed

that,

defines a public in terms of indirect consequences
of con)oint

behavior, what public

we

define depends on what consequences

we have

in

mind

Accordingly, a state conceived as the politically organized
public will also depend
74.

on what consequences we have
It

might be noted

effect that

them

all

Dewey

in

in

mind.

177

passing that this picture has prompted complaints to the

flattens out qualitatively different types of association

together under the heading “the public.” According to one

and

ties

critic.

Such

a theory of free-floating and equally graded publics might have
had a certain semblance of plausibility in reference to a small trading
and fanning community of the nineteenth century like Burlington,
Vermont, where property was more or less evenly distributed and

175.
176.

distinctions of wealth and social standing

177.

were not too

glaring.

But

Dewey 984, p. 257. “Government is not the state, for that includes the
)
public as well as the rulers charged with special duties and powers” (Dewey 1984
1

p.

1

253).

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

)

Dewey

1984,

p. xxvii.

)

Tiles, p. 208.

256.

47

it

ignores the fundamental fact of

monopoly capitalism

The question then

arises

communities or publics are

which

pulls

how

for a

life in

the highly centralized

17 *

these various voluntary' associations,

to coexist as

Dewey hoped

communities.

today.

components of larger national

community of communities

or “partial publics" in

and responses of different groups reinforce one
another and

their

1711

values accord.”

For him, the ideal of such a Great

Commumty-a community

in

which harmony has been achieved without coercion,
manipulation and dominationis

the idea of “.

.

.a

society in

consequences of associated

which the ever-expanding and
activities shall

so that an organized, articulated Public

be known

comes

intricately ramifying

in the full

into being.”

180

sense of that word,

This ideal was

intended to meet a need to resolve a conflict of interests, to
find a framework of

purposes which incorporates each conflicting interest and reveals
thereby

each reasonably
178.
82.

may

be pursued

1X1

It is

how

the hope for compromise, class peace, 182

piecemeal
reform, experimentation and open debate.
179.

Dewey

180.

claims that his conception of the state and the public “gives a

criterion
for determining
181.

1

how good

a particular state

is:

namely, the degree of

)

Novack,

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

328.

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

350.

)

Tiles, p. 214.

)

For Dewey, according to one commentator’s interpretation.

p.

The shared

206.

universal

human

relations

summarized

in the

category

“social” are, should be, or will be (his tenses are not always clearly

defined) predominant over narrow class factors-provided the
scientific

204-5).

far

method of instrumentalism

is

brought to bear (Novack, pp.

48

organization of the public which

is

attained,

and the degree

which

in

its

officers are

so constituted as to perform their
function of caring for public interests,” 183
Further

down

in the

same

essay, he

characteristic ot the present

acknowledges

that

“The forms of associated

action

economic order are so massive and extensive

that they

determine the most significant constituents of the
public and the residence of

power.”

At times of widespread domestic

Dewey’s account

that a “constituent

community opposed

more
in

conflict, then,

to the public interest, as defined

by much

less

numerous but

“significant constituents of the public and the residence
of power.”

France

in

1995 remind

us,

such a scenario

as such, his vocabulary lends itself to those

state

would seem by

of the public” could be transformed into a

is

which

is

is

and thus acting

public interest.

For

in the

Dewey

a

good state,

as for Rorty,

Dewey

who would

well enough organized to defeat a

organized opposition

As events

not entirely hypothetical, even

within the rich North Atlantic democracies. Although
it

it

surely did not intend

claim that one or another

more numerous but

less efficiently

protecting the interests shared by

human communities

virtue of the contingency of their circumstances,

its

members,

bring together those who, by

happen

to

be susceptible to

persuasion ot the desirability ot the community's aims, or guiding purpose.
183.

Conscious and voluntary choice, then,

is

a necessary (though not a sufficient)

184.

condition for community. Seeing themselves as falling under certain descriptions,

community members may view
desirable forms of

1

life,

rather than expressing pre-established facts.

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

256

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

302.

85.)

Kolenda,

p. 16.

these descriptions as constituting optional and
185

49

It

is

significant that

Dewey

appears to view membership

in

an economic

class not in the first place as inclusion
in a social group identifiable
with reference
to

its

relationship to appropriation of the social
surplus or ownership and control of

means of production or some other

criterion independent of consensual
association,

but as membership in a particular community
with shared ends in view. According
to this view, in

an era ot dwindling union membership and
declining support for

explicitly working-class political initiatives,

wage

earners

would

constitute at most

an inchoate public.

Dewey’s emphasis on the consensual character of political
association has
important implications
liberalism.

we

when we

turn to the rationales he and Rorty have offered
for

Before counterposing a different vocabulary to that which
they share,

should register several significant differences separating the two
American

pragmatists.

Dewey on

Liberty and

Democracy

Traditional English liberalism from Locke through Mill has rested on a fairly

simple “negative” conception of liberty as freedom from the constraints of the

conceived of as a system of public
liberalism, a liberalism

absolutism to

demand

which did not go much

186.)

liberty as a state

Merquior,

p.

This

is

the liberty of classical

further than setting

its

face against

religious freedom, central national authority with well-

defined and limited powers and

Locke defined

institutions.

state,

297.

at least

some degree of control by

the ruled.

which an individual enjoys when she or he

186

is

under

50

no other

legislative

power but

that established

as the progressive elimination of
the arbitrary

who

Mill,

negative liberty,

by consent

from

in the

and

political

commonwealth, and
social regulation.

187

often represented as one of the most
consistent advocates of

is

mapped

domain exempt from public

the

intervention in broad

strokes:

It

comprises,

liberty

first,

the inward

of conscience

thought and feeling,

domain of consciousness, demanding
"
most comprehensive sense, liberty of
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on
in the

subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or
188
theological.

all

He added
from

that “the liberty

of thought

liberty

plan of our

life,

of expressing and publishing opinions”

itself,

to suit our

as

own

is

is

inseparable

the “liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the

we

character, of doing as

like,” as well as the liberty

of combination among individuals; freedom to unite for any
purpose not involvinu

harm

to others.”
Mill's

legislation

189

“inward domain of consciousness,” free from

“political

and social

corresponds to the classical liberal representation of the private sphere,

as well as to Berlin's “inviolable private sphere,” the

domain of Rorty's strong

poets.

187.

Many

liberals

have viewed

this

“inward domain of consciousness” as “...something

188.

invaluable in

itselt,

not just as a

means

to anything else.

1

For them, government

189.

regulation of the private sphere

is

undesirable, since

it

is

pointless to regulate or

190.

)

Two

)

Mill, p. 71.

)

All citations in this paragraph are from Mill,

)

Merquior,

Treatises

p.

of Government,

34.

in

Locke 1988,

p.

p.

112.

71.

51

interfere in activities that

do not have serious

indirect effects for

good or

evil

outside the circle of a voluntary association.

Although classical
that the liberty

a far cry

liberals believed, like the decidedly
non-liberal

of "particular

men

[depends] on the silence of the Law,” 191 they were

from anarchists. Classical

liberal

proponents of negative

state institutions as a necessary evil, securing

of Life, Liberty and property.”

These

insisted that “...the only purpose for

member of a

others

civilized

what Locke called the

civil interests

viewed

“civil interests”

--conceded that the state

include law and order

security of possessions.

which power can be

community, against

promote education, hygiene,

liberty'

1

home, defense against foreign invasion and

any

Hobbes,

may

Even Mill-who

rightfully exercised over

his will, is to prevent

invade the private domain

social security or justice.

at

in

harm

to

order to

194

English liberals have maintained that the law can also extend the liberties
of
subjects by curbing and limiting the executive. Like subsequent liberals
including

Dewey and

Rorty, they held that the law should properly reflect a public concern

that the public sphere not

191.
ot habeas
192.

corpus and

The

193.
the classical

bail,

traditional

encroach on the private sphere. Thus, they promoted laws

and

legal restrictions

form of English

on police entry and

political liberalism

economic doctrine of laissez-faire.'

9

arrest.

went hand

in

''

In his first inaugural address

194.

195.

)

Hobbes,

)

“A

)

Mill, p. 68.

)

As, for example, Isaiah Berlin noted (Berlin,

)

Refer to the interesting discussion

p.

271

Letter Concerning Toleration,” in

in

hand with

Locke 1979,

Dewey

p.

p.

172.

192).

1984, pp. 282-303.

of

1801, Locke’s most illustrious American follower

summed up

this doctrine in a

well-known passage:

;

a wise and frugal government, which shall
restrain

injuring one another,

which

men from

them otherwise free to
regulate their own pursuits of industry and
improvement, and shall
not take from the mouth of labor the bread it
has earned This is the
sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the
circle
our

shall leave

of

96

felicities.'

Although Dewey admired Jefferson, he found much

to criticize in Jefferson's

belief that that government governs best that governs
least, and in the related

Lockean conception of liberty. 197 Dewey’s differences with Locke and

become

especially acute

when

it

comes

to the relationship

democracy. The American philosopher acknowledged

may

member of the

involve each

behalf

In either case,

between liberalism and

that

some

public in every decision taken;

however, decisions will be taken by

we have what

official representatives

he

is

democracy. Dewey defined a democratic

prepared to

call

his followers

public institutions

more commonly,

of the public on

its

a form of political

state as “a public articulated

and

196.

operating through representative officers.” 198
197.

Locke and Burke as well as James Mill and Bentham viewed

political

198.

democracy
1

199.
weal.

sense as one of the chief “immoderate” threats to the

in this

Locke did not propose

)

Jefferson,

p.

323.

)

Bernstein,

p.

546.

)

Novack,

Ratner, ed.),

p.

p.

207; Novack

to

make

cites:

common

the people into the governing authority, nor

Intelligence in the

Modern World (Joseph

379.

Cf. Macpherson. Macpherson separated Merquior's pre-industrial heroes
)
two often opposing camps: utopian democrats epitomized by Rousseau, and
anti-democratic liberals. With reference to the elder Mill’s “dread of pure

into

democracies,” refer to

Dewey

1984, pp. 293-4.
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to raise the

people to the level of co-equal with the
monarch; rather, he was

concerned to provide a

gauge the

right

of a

criterion,

namely collective community consent, by
which

political authority to rule,

while

at the

to

same time providing

guarantees against “the credulous superstition
of the giddy multitude.” 200 Even

more famously, the younger
his chief

concerns

Mill identified “the tyranny of the majority”
as one of

On Liberty. Montesquieu

in

classical liberals as Tocqueville, the Mills
all

warned

far, in

liberal successors,

11

'

when democracy

is

extended too

the form of universal adult suffrage.

in itself, or

liberals or proto-liberals, then, did not portray

something

intrinsically good.

early and classical liberals,

efficacious than other
will of the nation,”'

it

and their conservative

of the danger to “the public welfare”'

These early
end

and the Whigs, 201 as well as such

1

’

if

the “governors

means of securing

As

classes.

it

less

they could be forgiven for limiting democracy, or jettisoning

the slogan

became

gradually
201.

judge democracy to be

“the public welfare” or the “interest and

C.B. MacPherson has pointed out that liberals only

began to espouse egalitarian democracy-the

summed up by

According to some of the best-known

3

altogether, as needs arise.

200.

democracy as an

sort

of democracy

One man one vo/e-when,

that could

be

well within the industrial era,

clear that extending the franchise did not threaten the propertied

has turned out, of course, representative democracy with

202.
franchise has proven

itself, in

full

adult

England, the United States and elsewhere, to be a

203.

1

)

“A

)

It

Letter Concerning Toleration,” in

will

Locke 1979,

p.

219.

be recalled that English Whigs came to be known as liberals

830s, with the passage of the

)

The term

)

Mill,

p.

is

60.

first

Reform

in the

Bill.

from Two Treatises of Government

,

in

Locke 1988,

p.

122.

it

54

particularly effective

means

for securing the consent

of the ruled, and hence the

property and prerogatives of the rich
and powerful.

On

the eve of the French Revolution, as

stage as Locke's foil

democracy

in

was not viewed

state

as a necessary evil, but as a servant

well-being, an instrument of collective
betterment.

a conception of liberty as
capacities,

state as a positive instrument for attaining
liberty

thus conceived. This conception of liberty

republicanism, Jefferson's civic

is

conducive to Rousseau’s civic

humanism and Dewey's "community.” The word

autonomy sometimes has been used interchangeably with
liberals,

instrument for attaining the good

life,

in

democratic institutions not merely as an

but as part of the good

Arendt and other latter-day disciples of Aristotle,“
204.
the affairs of the political

"liberty” so conceived. 204

embracing such a "positive” conception of liberty or

autonomy, have portrayed participation

in

They embraced

freedom of opportunity to develop one's individual

and they viewed the

Subsequent

entered the

Rousseau's followers looked forward to an
egalitarian

which the

common

for the

we know, Rousseau

community

life itself.

Like Hanna

(

they view citizen participation

as a characteristically free and

human

206
205.
activity.

206.

Lovibond 1989,
autonomy, refer to CIS,
)

p. 9.

For Rorty's views on self-creation and private

p. xiii.

)

Rosenblum,

)

Robert Paul Wolff, for example, has argued that there

pp. 80-82.

values (a distinct class, that

do motivate a person
values,

is,

of objects or

to act for or against them),

which are not reducible

means

is

a distinct class of

of affairs which might or actually

namely

social or

community

to private values (Wolff, pp. 168, 170).

these social values, direct democracy
efficient

states

is

an end

in itself,

Among

and “not merely the

to such desirable political ends as peace, order or distributive

justice” (Wolff, pp. 191-2).
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Judging from passages such as the
following,
prominently

among

Liberty

is

Dewey

also

may be counted

these non-classical liberals:

that secure release

and fulfillment of personal potentialities
which take place only in rich and manifold
association with others:
the power to be an individualized self
making a distinctive
contribution and enjoying in

Reading

this

passage

in the light

conception of the public,

it

own way

its

the fruits of association. 207

of what has already been said about Dewey's

becomes

clear that

what

is

described here

is

not the

negative liberty of the classical liberals, the freedom
of the individual from the
state,

but something

more akin

Furthermore,

Dewey

to the Rousseauians’ positive liberty.

distinguished between political democracy as a
system

of government and democracy as what he called a
“social idea.” As he explained.

The idea of democracy
exemplified
all

modes of human

religion.

Regarded as an

is

a wider and fuller idea than can be

in the state

208

even at its best. To be realized it must affect
association, the family, the school industry

idea, the author states,

principles of associated

life.

democracy

Rather, “It

is

is

not an alternative to other

the idea of

There are ways to draw a connection between

community
liberty

209
life itself.”

and democracy without

207.

invoking the notion of autonomy

in the

public sphere. According to a familiar

208.
liberal rationale for

American-style representative democracy, for example,

209.

experience has taught us that unless there are some widely accepted and enforceable
constraints on individual behavior, individuals, each pursuing her or his

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

329.

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

325.

)

Dewey

1984,

p.

328

own

56

irreducibly unique vision of personal
perfection, are likely to

with one another

into conflict

Thus, individuals find they must have
some form of recognized

government to adjudicate and ameliorate

good of the

larger public.

government

officials,

means

come

conflicts

among

Unfortunately, people in positions of
authority, including

have an advantage over others when

to realize their non-political, private
aspirations

positions of authority

private parties, for the

may

find their

own

it

comes

to procuring the

and aims, while those not

in

aspirations thwarted by magistrates

availing themselves of the advantages of
their positions. Thus, leaving
institutions

of government
invites abuse.

in the

hands of people

The most

effective

who do

way

not have to answer for what they do

so far found to prevent such abuse

the institutions of government answer ultimately
to everyone.
subject to the

same

constraints, at least formally,

by authority widely deemed to be answerable
recognize themselves in the government, or

government

to

to

everyone

make
is

and those constraints are enforced

everyone equally, the governed

at the

to be hostile or externally-imposed.

When

is

very least do not consider

Under such

a

regime of political

democracy, government takes place peacefully, with the consent
(however passive
or tacit) of the governed. Political democracy, thus
conceived,

resolving conflicts between individuals pursuing their
liberty is the classical liberal

own

is

an instrument for

private aims.

210

And

freedom from excessive government.

210.

Whatever the merits of this

rationale,

Dewey

rejected

21

In contrast to

it.

211.

many of his
not as a

liberal predecessors,

mere means

he viewed participation

to an end, but as

something

in

intrinsically good,

only for the community as a whole, but for each individual

community: For Dewey, public

democratic institutions

member of the

institutions as well as the family

)

Tiles recapitulates this rationale on

)

Refer to the discussion

in

Dewey

1

p.

and good not

206.

984, pp. 282-304.

and friendships are

57

pan of being not only

As he put

a responsible citizen, but also a
fulfilled private individual

it.

Law,

church, family, friendship, industrial
association, these
and other institutions and arrangements are
necessary in order that
individuals may grow and find their specific
state,

capacities and

functions.

Dewey
experience

is

well

in its

own

known

having viewed elementary education as a creative

for

right, rather

Similarly, he

viewed participation

activity in

own

its

right.

than exclusively as a preparation for adulthood.
in

democratic institutions as an autonomous

In this respect, then, the inextricably related
institutions

of

democratic participation and public education are as much
components or instances
of the

good

life

as they are instruments for attaining

By

it.

participating in these and

other noncoercive public institutions and identifying herself
with policy, the
individual-as-citizen

becomes

and resources which these

institutions

Dewey's evaluation of public
him

at length

on

a person

life

more securely

have helped to

in

possession of capacities
Since, as

foster.

contrasts sharply with Rorty’s,

it

is

we

shall see,

worth quoting

this point:

When a state is a good state, when the officers of the public
genuinely serve the public interest, this reflex effect is of great
importance. It renders the desirable associations solider and more
coherent; indirectly
It

of life precarious.
individual

aims and purges

their activities.

In

performing these services,

members of valued

it

gives the

associations greater liberty and

them of hampering conditions which if they had
cope with personally would absorb their energies in mere negative

security':

to

clarifies their

it

places a discount upon injurious groupings and renders their tenure

it

relieves

struggles against evils.

It

enables individual

members

to count with

reasonable certainty upon what others will do, and thus facilitates

mutually helpful cooperations.
one's

212.)

self.

Dewey

A

1957,

It

creates respect for others and for

measure of the goodness of a

p.

188.

state is the

degree

in

58

which

it relieves individuals
from the waste of negative struggle
and
needless conflict and confers upon
him positive assurance and
reinforcement in what he undertakes.
This is a great service, and

there
ot

no call to be niggardly in acknowledging
the transformations
group and personal action which states
have historically
is

effected.

Dewey

disputed the view of means and ends which
permits us to treat public

democratic institutions merely as external means
adopted to ensure a
private life/

According

thoroughly reciprocal:

to him, the relationship

What

individual

human

fulfilled

between means and ends

is

selves desire constrains and provides

the standard of adequacy for means; means,
as they are hit upon, refine and enlarge
ends.

Nor

Ends

are not pre-given:

They

are constituted in the course of pursuing
means.

are there “genuine” or “authentic” ends, in view
of which

present and future,

may be

realizing those ends.

evaluated with respect to

Dewey urged

means, past

how conducive

they are to

us to treat our ends as open, so that our

can become “genuine instruments”~that
in

all

is,

means

constituents of our ends. Participation

democratic institutions constitutes a particularly important body of
shared

experience which,

in turn, bolsters

democratic participation

those institutions, extending and deepening

T reating our ends

as

open helps us

to adapt to the

contingencies of our existence, thereby helping us to act freely. 21
213.
If

214.

^

Dewey's view of the relationship between means and ends on the one hand

and freedom on the other appears to be tenuous, this
215.

is

because of a

set

of

presuppositions underlying the familiar rationale, presuppositions which he viewed
as distortions of important facts

)

Dewey

)

Tiles, p. 204.

)

Tiles, p. 204.

Dewey

1984.

These presuppositions represent individual human

1984, pp. 279-80.

Compare

the account in this paragraph to the account in

59

selves and what they desire as something
given, something already there. 216
These

givens then function as absolute constraints
on inquiry which in turn give nse to
fruitless

conceptions of our relationships as individuals
to political institutions and

the larger communities of

which we are a

217

part.

Thus, for example, debates about psychological
egoism versus altruism,
about whether or not people always or usually
pursue their self-interests and what
those self-interests are, quickly lead into familiar
philosophical cul-de-sacs.

Recognizing

this,

one Dewey scholar has noted

that.

The individualism of “classic Liberalism” has bequeathed

to us an
opposition between self-regarding and other-regarding, egoism
and
altruism, neither of which is satisfactory and between
which we

should not

Dewey

feel

we have

to choose.

2

refused to enter into such debates.

“the celebrated

modem

their reconciliation.

He abandoned

antithesis of the Individual

the problem of

and Social, and the problem of

For him, as the previously cited source noted.

The choice is not between a self-regarding person and an otherregarding person, but between a person whose regard for self is
regard for something narrow, trivial, transient and exclusive, and a
person whose regard for self is for something wide and inclusive

216.
217.

enough

to

)

Dewey

1957.

)

Tiles, p. 205.

)

Tiles, p.223.

)

Dewey

embrace the interests of other people and permanent and
significant enough to flourish only in an environment sustained by
"
shared values and cooperative action. 22

218.
219.

220.)

p.

193.

1984, pp. 289-90.

Tiles, p. 219.
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As we have

seen, Dewey’s conception of liberty
as autonomy, and his

evaluation of democratic participation
and public education as ends
represent significant departures from
classical liberalism.

In

in

themselves

few other places

is this

departure clearer than in his refusal to endorse
the opposition of public and private
persons.

On

the other hand, Dewey's use of key terms
such as interest government
,

political state

Apolitical democracy

vocabulary. The same
question, cited above,
shall see,

is

true, also,

is

not noticeably inconsistent with Rorty’s

with reference to “community,” as

“Which communities' purposes should

Rorty agrees with

Dewey

in so far as

I

share'’”

in Rorty’s

And, as we

both rejected the choice between

either the narrowly self-regarding egoist or the
exclusively other-regarding person of

the neo-Aristotelians.
In

the following pages, however,

it

should become clear that Rorty's way of

averting the clash of public and private persons differs significantly
from Dewey's
It

should also become clear

how much

weight the public and private spheres must

bear as repositories of altruism and egoism, respectively, to sustain Rorty’s
view.

Rorty on Liberty and Democracy

One well-known
and

his father.

controversy

among

classical liberals

The author of On Liberty came

Bentham and James

concerned

to feel that the liberalism

J.S. Mill

of

Mill one-sidedly focused on “external culture”~reason and

truth-and did not take proper account of “internal culture”~the individual's
feelings, passions, impulses, natural inclinations

Mill

was convinced

that individual

and idiosyncrasies. The younger

freedom was increasingly threatened by “the

tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” as well as the tyranny of

61

magistrates.

His reaction was to

insist

on reserving as large a space as possible

exempt from the intervention of magistrates
and the
“appropriate region of human

liberty*’

majority. This space

which we encountered

Mill's

is

in the previous

section.

J .S.

Mill's liberal successors

have thought of themselves as standing

in

defense of individuality and self-creation, of maximizing
and defending the region

of individual liberty against others, whether singly or
organized as governments or

non-governmental associations. At the same time, however,
for the

liberals

containment of individuality and self-creation. Thus, for

Benjamin Constant, Liberalism's task

is

chaos of unconstrained self-expression.

’

have also stood

liberals like

to protect against personal politics

and the

222

Like Mill, Rorty also prizes idiosyncrasy, individuality and
what one

reviewer has called “the idea that freedom makes room for self-making” 222
as ideals

which

his liberal utopia

One commentator

is

bound

to

count as

its

chief purpose,

if

not

its

only one.

underlined the importance of this ideal for Rorty, noting that

The imperative “Know thyself' now is interpreted as coming to a
knowledge of that which is private, idiosyncratic. The object of selfknowledge is whatever divides the public from the private self, and
221.

the private self from

all

other public and private selves.

224

222.

For Rorty, as tor Mill, freedom from the tyranny of prevailing opinion and

223.
feeling

is

a precondition for pursuit of one’s self-perfection.

Rorty’s approving description of Dewey:

)

Mill,

)

Rosenblum,

)

Kolenda,

224.)

Hall,

p.

p.

63.

p.

100.

p.

66.

36.

Consider, for example,

62

He assumed

no good achieved by earlier societies
would be
worth recapturing if the price were a diminution
in our ability to
leave people alone, to let them try out their
private visions of
that

perfection in peace.

democracy
the

He admired

American habit of giving
by asking, about any vision of

the

priority over philosophy

meaning of life, “Would not acting out this vision
interfere with
work out their own salvation?” 225

the ability of others to

The
person

s

authority of law should intervene only

pursuit of private perfection

another's— only

when

“..

.the

For Rorty, the ideal

only sort of human liberty which

225.
‘negative liberty'— being

226.

226

left

alone.”

becomes

it

clear that one

interfering extra-linguistically with

strong poets and revolutionaries

deeds, rather than just words.

which

is

when

is

make

liberal

hoped

for

life

harder for others by

community
is

is

one

in

Isaiah Berlin’s

227

Like Constant, however, Rorty also worries about the dangers of
one-sidedly

focusing on this ideal.

227.

x

These dangers are not limited

)

Rorty, in Malachowski,

)

CIS, pp. 60-

p.

to

whatever cost the

294.

228.

Compare

1

principle,” that “the sole

end

to Mill, p. 141,

for

and

“one very simple
which mankind are warranted, individually or
to Mill's

collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their

protection” (Mill,

)

)

p.

number

“Habermans, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” pp

And

like

is self-

68).

many

liberals since.

1

6-7.

Karl Popper, for example, wrote:

demand, must uphold equalitarian and individualistic
principles; dreams of beauty have to submit to the necessity of
Politics,

helping

I

men

in distress,

and men who suffer

injustice;

and

to the

necessity of constructing institutions to serve such purposes. (Popper

1963,

A

p.

165.)

note of caution, however: Leaving aside the question of his use of the terms

historicism and totalitarianism his association of these two terms puts him
,

philosophical cross-purposes with Rorty, despite their
political concerns.

common

at

polemical and

63

community may have
part ot aesthetes

they

make

to bear for withdrawal or aloofness

from public

affairs

on the

and visionaries. Strong poets may well
pose a greater threat when

politics 'an arena for heroic self-display.” 229

exclusive emphasis on individual self-assertion,

we

By placing

inordinate or

invite into the public arena

passionate visionaries intent on realizing their
utopian obsessions by any means

necessary (to borrow an expression popularized
by one such visionary).

Like Plato,

St.

Paul and Kant,

Marx

allegedly tried in his

own way

to

produce a single vocabulary capable of serving two different
purposes, namely

making oneself a new creature and
it

establishing justice on Earth. 230

And

at a point,

seemed he succeeded:

Marxism has been

the envy ot all later intellectual movements
seemed, for a moment, to show how to synthesize selfcreation and social responsibility, pagan heroism and
Christian love,
the detachment of the contemplative with the fervor of
the

because

it

revolutionary

Marxist revolutionaries, and other revolutionaries besides, have viewed
the
public sphere as an arena within which to do two things
simultaneously: In the

course ot building the revolution, the revolutionaries reinvent themselves

229.

image of the

New

Socialist

230.

messianic radicals,”

Man.

2 '2

As Bernard Yack

in the

describes “the discontent of

it

231.
...is so intense partly because they believe
world hastens their own redemption. The

232.

)

Rosenblum,

)

EH,

that the
fate

of the institutions they

p. 4.

pp. 127-8.

The

attribution of this

aim

to

Marx

Admittedly, however, some Marxists have subscribed to

)

CIS,

)

According

p.

redemption of the

is

disputable.

it.

120.

to Rorty, Marxists “see one’s

own

inner transformation as

auguring the transformation of the human world” (EH,

p.

137).

64

hate determines the success of their pursuit of
psychic health The
destruction of the old order redeems their souls
as it cleanses the
world. The end of the old world ends their
dissatisfaction with

themselves.

Dr.

233

Wolfgang Huber, of the

Psychiatric Neurological Clinic of Heidelberg

University, provided a caricature of this

the Rote

Armee Fraction he counseled

view when,

at

his patients to

,

the height of the activity of

“Bomb

for mental health!”

After Herculean efforts in this century, however, attempts thus to
fuse public

and private aims have ended

in debacle.

Self-proclaimed Marxist regimes in the

East have either collapsed in the face of popular discontent or, as in the case
of

China, have thoroughly capitulated,
profit motive, the “Free

if

not to Western-style democracy, then to the

Market” and the sanctification of the public/private

This record of failure

in practice is the best

split.

argument against attempting

fuse public and private aims in theory. Accordingly, Rorty urges us

to

to:

stop looking for a successor to Marxism, for a theory which fuses
Ironists should reconcile themselves to a
private-public split within their final vocabularies, to the fact that
resolution of doubts about one's final vocabulary has nothing in
particular toydo with attempts to save other people from pain and
234
humiliation.
...

decency and sublimity.

233.

As Constant's

heirs are quick to point out, the

means

visionaries in the public

234.

sphere have deemed to be necessary have often included cruelty and the violent
obstruction of the self-creative acts of others.

235

When

politics

becomes

the terrain

235.

)

Yack,

)

CIS,

Marxism,

p.

p.

like

25.

120.

On

at least

one occasion, Rorty appears willing

to

concede

tracing “the blind impresses our behavings bear” (refer to Rorty’s review of

Derrida’s Spectres of Marx (henceforth: “Review of Spectres of Marx ”),

)

that

Foucauldianism, might be useful as a private vocabulary, as a way of

Rosenblum,

p.

80.

This

is

why

the romantic sensibility

under no other system but liberalism, with

its

is

p.

13).

said to be safe

“regular and pacific liberty”

65

of sublimity, narcissism and the romantic impulse
to make
self-asserters are

people

tempted

may be swept up

to

merge

politics

it

new, and visionary

and sublimity, then large numbers of

romance of history 236 and deposited

into the

at the

slaughter bench. Thus, where private projects conflict with
minimizing the
possibility

of humiliation, these projects should be privatized, de-politicized. 237

examples of dangerous

Rorty's

self-asserters prominently includes such

3x

“nonpoets”~

as Lenin, Stalin, Hitler

and Mao.

2V
’

The

list is

noticeably skewed

against Uncle Sam’s bates noirs and at least one commentator views Lenin's
,

inclusion on
spite

it

as

little

a gratuitous anti-Marxist political gesture. 240 In

of misgivings about his choice of illustrations, however, Rorty's warning

clear enough:

When

over tolerance and
is set

more than

is

the aesthetic obsessions of a strong public figure supervene

all

other ideals as the chief values in public discourse, the stage

for evitable cruelty'

on a grand

scale.

For Rorty, as for Dewey, thinking of oneself as a
a necessary part of being a

member of a community.

member of a community

is

Rorty has defined a liberal

236.

community

as one with

no

purpose other than making

ideal or

life

easier on strong

237.
poets, allowing

them

to continue to

25).

Other well-known

change language.

241

In this

way he

registers his

238.

(Rosenblum, p

239.

liberals,

romanticism to liberalism (Popper 1963,

by contrast, have opposed

p. 168).

240.
)

“The End of Leninism,”

)

CIS,

p.

197.

)

CIS,

p.

159

)

Refer, for example,

)

Fraser, in

p. 3.

241.

to:

Malachowski,

CIS, pp. 66,

p.

320, note

1

57 and “The End of Leninism,”

p. 2.

5.

Rorty may, of course, value liberal community for other reasons,
too, including protection of rights, maintenance of peace and so on.
)

CIS,

p.

41

66

concern to avert the tyranny of the majority.

It

is difficult

to

imagine any additional

purpose (with the possible exception of protection of property

ideal or

whether emanating from a public or a private impulse, which would

some

extent, encroach

sometimes defined
freedom,

is

community

as “one

which makes room

which has no purpose except

for self-making.

other occasions, however, he has defined a liberal as a person for

the worst thing

we

24

do,

'

amelioration of evitable suffering.'

decency

not, at least to

Mill's “internal culture.” Accordingly, Rorty has

a liberal

the freedom

On
cruelty

on

rights),

in the

West

with that peculiarly
redescription.

'4

and insisted
44

that the defining ideal

According

to him, vocabularies

are concerned with the alleviation of cruelty, and

human form of cruelty,

whom

of liberals

is

of public

most notably

humiliation, or “forced

Rorty has stated that no goal, public or private,

is

more important

than ameliorating suffering. Despite manifest problems with utilitarianism, he
242.

claims that “Our political imagination has not been enlarged by the philosophy of
243.
46
our century,”' and sees no better way of stating duty to others than the greatest
244.

happiness principal.

)

CIS, pp. 60-1.

)

CIS,

p.

xv.

)

CIS,

p.

65.

Rorty's claim that humiliation so conceived

245. )

is

the worst form of suffering

has not gone undisputed (refer, for instance, to Haber, pp. 68-71,

86).

This claim

underscores his emphasis on the efficacy of linguistic practices, sometimes

at the

expense of non-discursive causal processes. At times this has resulted in far-fetched
formulations, exemplified by his approval of “a Whitmanesque sense that our
democratic community is held together by nothing less fragile than social hope"

(EH,

p.

48).

Having said

this,

however,

it

should be noted that one could easily

redefine suffering along less emphatically discursive lines without thereby

abandoning Rorty's particular utopian
246.)

EH,

p. 26.

vision.

67

By Nancy
making

Fraser’s lights, Rorty at

one time made the case

that the

the world safe for strong poets and ameliorating
suffering,

two

ideals,

complement

each other: the romantic poet and the pragmatic reformer
are “natural partners.” 247

By

de-divinizing things about which they are concerned, both
figures encourage us

to cease pinning our hopes
in this

way they

direct us

on God, Reason,

away from

Human

objectivity to

clinging together against the night.

By

finite,

and

ungrounded

solidarity, to

redescribing our situation in various and

unfamiliar ways, strong poets teach us to view

ourselves as

Nature and the Moral Law, and

life

as a tissue of contingencies,

liberal institutions as fragile

Rorty, according to Fraser, has emphasized that

we

human

inventions. This earlier

only see the practices of earlier

ages as cruel and unjust because the poets have taught us

how

to redescribe

them

using metaphors and vocabularies they invented. Moreover, by redescribing and reredescribing hitherto familiar objects, they teach us tolerance of alternative
perspectives and
light,

accommodation

the freezing over of culture

to the opinions

is

of our fellow

citizens.

In this

a threat to a far broader constituency than just

romantic intellectuals. Thus, by making society safe for strong poets,
safe for everyone-except perhaps those

who

aspire to

we make

it

become Orwell’s O’Brien

247.
Fraser's periodization

of Roily's views on the usefulness of the romantic poet

248.
to liberal

democracy may be too

tidy:

Even

in

more recent work he sounds

4
249.
respects
like an advocate of the “natural partners" view .'

In

in

some

any case, events since

)

Fraser, in

Malachowski,

p.

304-5.

)

Fraser, in

Malachowski,

p.

307. Cf. Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity?” in

Rajchman and West.

)

As when he

states:

“To sum

up, poetic, artistic, philosophical, scientific, or

political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with

a public

need” (CIS,

p. 37).

68

the collapse of the Berlin Wall have brought

posed when romantic poets-in Russia,

home

very graphically the dangers

in the Baltic republics, in the

Caucasus and

Central Asia, in ex-Yugoslavia and, yes, even in the
Czech Republic-are propelled
into high political office.

Not so long ago Rorty wrote

that

"‘...in

contemporary

Russia and Poland, poets, playwrights, and novelists serve as the
best examples of
certain

[...]

became

the

moral virtues.”

acknowledged

As soon

as the former dissident novelists

legislators of the social world,

however, the

and poets

result has

often been tyranny and misery far worse than the worst of their immediate

“nonpoef predecessors.
'

few

In a

short years the Karodics and

Gamsekhurdias, Elchibeys and other former dissident
extended to an impressive length )-for

whom

Tudimans, the

intellectuals (the

liberals in the

West have

list

could be

for years

provided generic paeans-have embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars, expelled
or imprisoned a

new

generation of dissidents, assassinated political opponents,

impoverished tens of millions of their compatriots, turned millions of others into
refugees and presided over ethnic-cleansing campaigns in a dozen locales, from

Not even Rorty’s

Tajikistan to the Trans-Dniester.

remained unsullied: The playwright and

first

liberal

hero Vaclav Havel has

President of the Czech Republic has

250.
given his imprimatur to repressive legislation which was objectionable even to the
251.
editors of the Wall Street Journal
.

...just

signed a

new law

,

who complained that

calling for

up

to

he

two years

in prison for

anyone convicted of “defaming” the government, parliament or the
1

constitutional court.'"

)

ORT,

)

Editorial, W.S.J. (Nov. 26, 1993), p. A8.

p.

62.

Measures Violate Freedom of Expression and
Rights

Watch seventeen-page

report

Also

“

see:

Decommumzation

Due Process Standards Human
,

on the Czech Republic

(April, 1992).

With

reference to persecution of Gypsies under the Havel regime, refer to

Czechoslovakia's Endangered Gypsies

(Human

Rights Watch, August, 1992).

69

By

Rorty’s lights, the production of imaginative literature

means by which

bright youth

gam

a self-image.”

the syndicated columnists that the balance of
irreversibly shifted in lavor of

come

identification.”

in the early 1990s, then,

cultural innovators

Even before
in

Bonn and Washington

communal

Developments

view

power

to discern a “selfish, anti-social motive in

the very antithesis of

252

is “. .the
.

principal

became

it

clear to

Eastern Europe had

D C.,

however, Rorty had

Romanticism, one

that represents

255

have made

it

the

all

more

difficult to

and seekers of social justice as “natural partners.” These

developments only underscore the conclusion

that to take either self-creation or

public welfare alone and elevate that single ideal to the status of sole definitive

purpose of a

liberal

community

is

to invite disaster.

seen, the romantic impulse to

make

evitable pain and humiliation.

On

it

On

the one hand, as

new, when unleashed

in public,

we have

can lead to

the other hand, solely focusing on the public

welfare or the greater good can lead to Mill's tyranny of the majority and Rorty's
“freezing over of culture."
invent

some

sort

One of the most

difficult tasks

of

liberal Utopians is to

of modus vivendi for these two liberal impulses, these two ideals

of liberal society.

To claim

as Rorty does that freedom for self-assertion and alleviation of

same time

cruelty both deserve equal claim to our allegiance, while at the
252.

acknowledging

253.

that there is a constant tension

between the two

is

entirely in

keeping with a long-standing self-image of liberals as promoters of tolerance and

compromise. Like Constant, Rorty can think of no better way

compromise between equal opportunity and the freedom

)

)

CP,

p.

66.

Fraser, in

Malachowski,

p.

309.

that

to achieve a

makes room

for self-

70

making than

to distinguish carefully

between private and public spheres of life,

the spheres of altruism and self-perfection,
respectively.

as

As he emphasizes.

The core of my book [CIS]

is a distinction between private
concerns,
the sense ot idiosyncratic projects of self-overcoming,
and public
concerns, those having to do with the suffering of other

in

beings.

The

distinction

same page,

is

human

254

between public and private concerns, Rorty hastens

emphatically not

to

add on the

the distinction between the domestic hearth and the

public forum, between oikos and polis ”

For Rorty, the private sphere

is

the space within which idiosyncratic projects

of self-overcoming take place, and the public sphere

is

the realm of shared concerns

of the community. For the latter-day Rorty of what Fraser
position,

it

is

imperative to keep these two spheres apart.

calls the partition

It

is

not surprising, then,

that he envisions

...political institutions that will foster

public indifference to such

issues [as theology and metaphysics, the nature of the self, the nature

of God, the point of human existence and the meaning of life], while
putting no restriction on private discussion of them. 2 "

These

which nothing

liberal institutions than

is

more precious include an

2>6
254.
independent judiciary, free universities, a free press and so on.

“A

liberal

255.
democracy,’' he has written, “will not only exempt opinions on such matters
[theology, metaphysics, etc.] from legal coercion, but will also aim at disengaging

)

Rorty, “Habermas,

)

ORT,

256.)

p.

1

Demda, and

82n.

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

567.

the Functions of Philosophy,”

p. 1,

note

1.

71

257
discussions of such question from discussions of
social policy.”
In this respect

he

indeed a continuator of Jefferson, who,

is

in Rorty's

words, held that citizens:

..must abandon or modify opinions on matters of
ultimate
importance, the opinions that may hitherto have given sense
and
point to their lives, if these opinions entail public actions
that cannot
be justified to most of their fellow citizens." 58
.

Part of the originality of Rorty's position

is

his use

of an anti-essentialist

vocabulary to defend Jefferson’s compromise between an individual's opinions
on
matters of ultimate importance and her public actions.

way

The best-if not

the only-

to ensure that the romantic urge for "total revolution” remains unavailable for

political exploitation is to

ensure that the ideal of noninterference with the

self-

creation of strong poets will not be the one and only purpose of a community, but to

temper

it

with the ideal of ameliorating suffering.

tyranny of the majority
It

is

is

to

promote the freedom

And
that

a

good way

makes room

to

check the

for self-making.

not surprising, then, that in Rorty's liberal utopia, the optimal political synthesis

of love and justice
257.

may

turn out to be “an intricately-textured collage of private

narcissism and public pragmatism.”
258.
It is,

259

of course, unremarkable for the decent citizen and the strong poet to be

combined within one and

the

same narrative about

the life of an individual

26 "
.

If,

as

259.
)

ORT,

p.

183.

)

ORT,

p.

175.

260.

department

in

It is

1983, to

interesting to note that Rorty left his last philosophy

become Kenan

Professor of Humanities

at

the University of

Virginia in Charlottesville-Jefferson's “bantling of forty years' growth and nursing”
(Jefferson,

p. xlii)

and the

first

North American university free of official church

recognition.

)

ORT,

)

Refer to “Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens,”

p.

210.

in

EH,

pp. 66-82, for Rorty's

invidious contrast of the philosophical treatise as a genre with the novel.

72

Whitman

put

it,

contain multitudes'

I

incomplete— we may expect

that

-many

selves,

more

members of liberal communities

contain both public and pnvate selves. Furthermore,
as

and desirable

to

imagine a

or less transient and

liberal utopia

we have

typically will

seen,

which would serve both

is

it

figures.

possible

This

utopia would place no ideal higher than the pursuit of
self-perfection and the

amelioration of suffering. Moreover, thanks to the public/private

no need

to place

one of these two ideals above the

split,

it

would see

other.

Despite occasional appearances to the contrary, then, Rortv refuses
to define
a liberal

community— that

one over-arching goal

is

making room

consensus,

it

comes

for self-making).

This reluctance,

agreement and novelty.”

agreement on the need to ameliorate cruelty

in Shklar's

sense of the word “liberal.

to granting every private self unlimited

produce novel tropes
at the

of God, the greatest happiness for

strives after both mtersubjective

strive for mtersubjective

when

term— in terms of

a feature of his “pluralism.” Instead, he upholds “...the idea of a

community which

liberal

a public in the broadest sense of the

(as, say, the glorification

the greatest number, or

presumably,

is,

is

To

is

strive for

261

To

to seek

consensus

freedom of opportunity

to

to strive to ameliorate humiliation in the public sphere while

same time promoting

toleration

of humiliation

in

words, but not

in deeds, in

the private sphere.

261.

Rortv praises Irving

Howe

for having taught during his editorship of Dissent

262.
“...how one could combine the contemplative and the active lives without trying to
synthesize the two.”

26

'

Rortv advocates abandoning the invariably unsuccessful

attempt to devise an algorithm for determining from case to case which ideal will
prevail.

In the utopian future this task

)

ORT,

)

“Movements and Campaigns,”

of determination

p. 13.

p. 7.

will

have to take place as

it

73

has

in the past,

by “muddling through as the need
'

practices they have at hand.

recommendation

The

with the institutions and

closest thing to a guideline Rorty proffers

that the strong poet not

likes tor selt-pertection-as long as he

sloganized this ideal as follows:

arises,

is

his

be hindered from striving as much as he

does

‘Always

it

on his

own

time.

an interview, he

In

on weekends.”263

strive to excel, but only

Rorty insists on the radical separation of the public and
private spheres

Refemng

to historicist writers

concerned with private perfection and those

concerned to promote more just and free human communities, he

We

writes:

shall only think

think that a

of these two kinds of waters as opposed if we
more comprehensive philosophical outlook would let us

hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human
solidarity, in a single vision.

Rorty, of course,

is at

264

the farthest

remove from those who have held

that the

private ideal of self-creation and the public-spirited ideal of greatest happiness for

the greatest

Man

number

are realizations of eternally pregiven potentialities latent in

but only recently released, thanks to the Renaissance, the Reformation, the

French Revolution or the Romantic movement. For him, these and

all

other ideals,

purposes and goals are historically and culturally specific discursive productions.
Since his anti-essentialism prohibits him from positing a genuine

263.

human essence

to

be expressed, repressed or liberated, these goals have no foundation in universal
264.
reason. Rorty cannot imagine what a non-question-begging argument in favor of
265.

these ideals would be like: They have long been part of a form of
the north Atlantic, and as such they are elements of what

)

Quoted by Klepp,

)

CIS,

)

Hall, p. 130.

p.

it

is

to

life

be

prevailing in
263

w.v.

122.

p. xiv.

Objectivity?” (in

These are themes Rorty enunciates

Rajchman and West) among other

in “Solidarity or

places.

74

Contemporary inhabitants

of liberal

democracies would be inclined

anyone who would deny these ideals-in words,
than taking them seriously

To deny

necessarily in deeds-is just not the

if

to dismiss

not in deeds-as irrational rather

these ideals-again, in words, but not

way

things are done around here.

Moreover, Rorty adds, public debate should not
problematize these
It

there

is

one thing one should not allow oneself to be ironic
about

such ideals of justice/’

To

the extent that ironism

is

ideals.

in public,

it

is

the stock-in-trade of the

strong poet, this returns us to the injunction to exclude
the strong poet from the
public square. And, to the extent that the strongest theorists
are ironist theorists,

Rorty concludes that political theory

is

not very useful to contemporary liberals. 268

For the mature Rorty of the “partition position,”

all

attempts to merge public

altruism with private egoism into one all-encompassing theory
are either futile or

inadvisable or both.

The separation of public and

private persons, of public

altruism and private sublimity, should also be a separation

in

“theory.” In the

absence of a universal essence which members of a community' share, an essence

which can bridge the public/private
figures, decent citizen

split,

it

is futile

to try to

do justice

to these

and strong poet, within one integrated theory, or

two

to try, as the

266.
stoics and their successors have tried, to combine inward tranquillity and duty to
267.
others within one and the
268.

same

Indeed, the attempt

is

ethical system.

ill-conceived at the outset.

Since, as

we have

seen,

Rorty denies the value of any notion of human nature independent of what our

Rajchman and West,

)

Rorty, in

)

Refer to Rorty, “Review of Spectres of Marx”

)

Refer, for example, to Rorty’ s

p.

12.

“The

Priority

p. 4.

of Democracy to Philosophy”

Malachowski, pp. 279-302); “The End of Leninism” and “Movements and
Campaigns.”

(in

latest

75

vocabularies put in play, there can be no such
thing as grounding a

community

in a correct

view of human

nature.

If the

human

notion of an intrinsic

human

nature from which to be alienated or
authentic needs to be fulfilled falls by the

wayside, criticisms of institutions and practices
because they allegedly defy these
natures or needs

By

269
fall flat.

Rorty’s nominalist lights, language

marks and noises
want

to get

what they want.”

270

amounts

to “just

One of the

things

to get with language, in addition to food

solidarity with other

developing one's

two items are

humans, and

own

private,

still

another

and

may be

is

we human

an enhanced sense of

“to create oneself by

is

backed up by a

picture of the self as a space of self-elaboration which can freely
cenerate

new forms

new ways of being human-bv

abnormal discourse.

of

sense of being

one

of us

is

On

creating

new

new

vocabularies,

that

abnormal discourse

only against a background of normal discourse

270.
which defines our shared identity.
271.

These observations have prompted Rorty

272.
essentialist

vocabulary

is

more

to

conclude that his

own

anti-

useful to contemporary liberalism than the

)

Rorty, in Malachowski, pp. 281-2.

)

EH,

p.

127.

)

EH,

p.

127.

expand one's possibilities and to multiply one's
perspectives through curiosity and constant learning” (Guignon and Hiley, in
)

That

is,

Malachowski,

“...the desire to

p.

352).

self-

the other hand, our community-oriented

backed up by the recognition

269.
is possible only “at the margins,

latter

and private concerns, respectively.

for negative liberty and “self-enlargement” 272

mterpretations-and hence

using

beings

autonomous, philosophical language.” 271 The

distinct purposes, proper to public

Our concern

sex,

human beings

76

essentialist rhetoric of natural rights.

associated with liberalism.
liberalism, to ground

it

to

ground

make

it

political practices but

When

it

is

seen,

it

is

not very useful to theorize

view of human nature; however,

useful to

is

it

attractive to the next generation, not
by pretending

by expressing

political hopes.

273

possible to bring together elements of a given
discourse

a set of rules which will

would

As we have

in a correct

articulate liberalism, to

Reason and so on which has hitherto been

settle the issue

tell

us

how

rational

“.
.

.under

agreement can be reached on what

on every point where statements seem

describes these elements, in terminology he borrows from

to conflict,”

274

Thomas Kuhn,

Rorty

as

commensurable. Normal and abnormal discourses are incommensurable.
Rorty's
claim that the private vocabularies of strong poets and abnormal
discoursers are

incommensurable with the public vocabularies of decent reformers allows him
deny the necessity of placing one

ideal

above the other, or claiming

that

to

one reduces

to the other or logically entails the other.

For this reason, he agrees with

Dewey

that

we

choose between public altruism and private egoism,
self-creation.

In contrast to his

best-known

should not feel

in the

we have

to

form of the striving for

liberal predecessor,

however, he

believes both are satisfactory, as long as laissez faire and individualism are reserved
273.
for the private sphere, and equality, democracy and solidarity are reserved for the
274.
public sphere. “Normal discourse,” Rorty continues, “is discourse in which

commensuration works.

I

his condition obtains

when

all,

or most, contributions to

the discourse are treated in accordance with conventions in place by consensus.

)

Cf. Bernstein,

)

PMN,

275.)

p.

316.

Hall, p. 122.

p.

548

1

will return to this point in

Chapter Four.

27>

77

Abnormal discourse, by
another.

contrast, occurs in periods of transition

In this transitional or
“revolutionary” stage, “old

from one theory

to

terms take on exotic

meanings and new words are introduced.” 276
Public discourse, the discourse of the
dutiful citizen, discourse

which

is

useful for ameliorating suffering,

is

incommensurable with private discourse, the discourse
of the strong

poet, aiming at

self-perfection.

To

two

conflate the

language games. Rorty
Orwell:'

77

sorts

of vocabularies

illustrates this

The Englishman might

with sublimity in his writing.

appears to have

made

little

to run together

two

distinct

with reference to Nabakov's disdain for

or might not have tried and failed to fuse decency

What he

is

rightly praised for,

however-and what

impression on Nabakov—was the manner

brought our attention to evitable suffering, and
humiliation.

is

in

which he

in particular, to officially

sanctioned

Similar misunderstandings abound on the other side, too, as

engaged writers condemn

their aestheticist colleagues as irresponsible for

describing the color of the dying man's lips

Rorty agrees with

when

Dewey

that

we

27x

should not feel as though

choose between either the role of a community

we have

spirited, dutiful public

to

person or a

276.
narcissistic private person.

Like Dewey, the younger pragmatist rejects “the

277.

celebrated antithesis of the Individual and the Social.”
278.
however,
to self

when

it

comes

to the attempt to break

down

Hall, p. 122.

)

Refer to “The Last Intellectual

in

Dewey,

the distinction between duty

Europe: Orwell on Cruelty,”

169-188.

279.)

disagrees with

and duty to others, the private and the public imperatives, respectively. 27

)

)

He

Ruskin's image

EH,

p.

197.

is

cited in

Rosenblum,

p.

98.

in

CIS, pp.

78

Dewey's attempt, described towards the end
of the previous

section,

,s

characteristic

of a long-standing tradition in
social philosophy since Plato, a tradition

the pohs as
illustrious

man

writ large.

By

which sees

Rorty's account, however, one of Dewey's

contemporaries showed us

how

to break with this tradition:

gave up Plato's attempt to bring together the public
and the
and the parts of the soul, the search for
social justice and the search for individual
perfection.
He
...Freud

private, the parts of the state

[...]

distinguished sharply between a private ethic of
self-creation and a
public ethic of mutual accommodation. He persuades
us that there
no bridge between them provided by universally shared
beliefs or
2X1

is

desires.

Pragmatists, in contrast to Plato's heirs, “promote the use of
both

vocabularies of private self-creation and vocabularies of public praxis,” 282
without
trying to reduce the one to the other. Accordingly, Rorty
proposes a division of

labor according to which.

The

and engineers, with the exception of
those very few who are able to serve as paradigms of self-creation,
are accorded the task of easing the pains of social existence; the poet
and novelist are to provide new vocabularies which can serve as

280.

scientists, technicians,

models of private perfection. 28

’

281.

Robert Westbrook has criticized Rorty for ignoring the communitarian side
)
282.
of Dewey and overemphasizing what Berlin called “negative liberty” (Westbrook,
pp. 541-2).

With reference

to Westbrook's claim that Dewey believed, as Rorty
does not, that “the springs of private fulfillment and of human solidarity are the
same,’ Rorty states parenthetically: “I am not sure whether or not Dewey thought
this

and would urge

Hegel and Darwin,”

that there
p.

)

CIS, pp. 33-4.

)

Hall, p. 22.

283.)

Hall, p. 121.

is

a lot of evidence on both sides”

320, note 43).

(“Dewey between

79

Rory's assignment of distinct stations
and duties

to public

and private

persons allows him to shunt the dutiful
citizen and the divine egoist off
to separate

and incommensurable spheres.

between altruism and egoism

He does
the

that

Dewey

of so doing, he boldly redraws the

tried to efface.

the

same biography may contain

the story of a dutiful

concerned with ameliorating pain and humiliation
of his fellows, and the

story of a strong poet, striving for personal
perfection.

Moreover, he does not deny

that private obsessions occasionally coincide
with public needs;

acknowledges

that

sometimes great

when

on the contrary, he

a private fantasy finds an audience, the result

is

284

art

Nevertheless, he does deny the assumption that duty to

others and duty to self can or should be

combined

into

one multi-purpose

normative vocabulary, that “self-creation and justice can be
brought together
level

line

not deny, of course, that public and private
persons do exist within

same body: One and

citizen,

In the course

at

the

of philosophical theory.” 283
Rorty agrees with

to self

Dewey

and duty to others, but he

manner

in

which he wishes

that there

need not be any opposition between duty

differs with his predecessor

to avert this opposition.

when

As we have

it

comes

to the

seen, the elder

pragmatist believed that public education and democratic participation could and

should play a decisive role

in

promoting a broader, more inclusive and permanent

sense of selfhood and hence a convergence of self interest with
a larger public.

common

interests

of

Rorty also wants a more inclusive ethnos nevertheless, he does not
;

challenge the continuity of narrow individualism.

romantic desire tor self-creation and
of politics.

He

associates those

284.)

CIS,

285.)

Kolenda,

p.

37.

p. xiv.

who

He merely

“total revolution” out

urges us to keep the

of the public domain, out

yearn for revolutionary movements, both

80

political

and

will, but the

cultural, with self-surrender

movement's, be done

"- 8

'’

and the self-deceptive slogan: “Not

Rorty wishes to shunt self-assertion and

narcissism to the private sphere, while holding
that
appropriate to the public sphere.

my

“we consciousness"

The exceptions--”tiny

kindred souls involved in the same private projects
as

circle[s]

we

of

more

is

initiates,”

287

are ourselves-onlv prove

the rule, by virtue of their isolation and elitism.
Rorty' also differs

from

his pragmatist

respective conceptions of autonomy.

autonomy

is

something which

all

As we have

institutions,

as

and

was

in particular

genuine instruments

he

288

Nevertheless,

for creating individuals with

denied that

is

indeed waiting

Dewey

at

held that public

more

inclusive

“We

consciousness” for the

common

“we consciousness.”

This conviction contrasts sharply with Rortv’s.
is

to their

within them and which society'

In this sense, then,

treading.

comes

schools and democratic institutions, should be viewed

interests, and hence a stronger
286.

younger pragmatist

it

Dewey

seen,

human beings have

can release by ceasing to repress them.
the end of the road Foucault

mentor when

principally a public concern, not a private one.

“Movements and Campaigns,” p. 8. The citation is from an approving
)
discussion of Irving Howe's alleged repudiation of “movement politics.” Rorty
seems

unaware

to be

though

Howe

disparaged the Black Power

movement and
came to embrace one especially brutal messianic-redemptive
movement all the more enthusiastically. Zionism, both as a body of doctrine and as
a colonial settler project, epitomizes “movement politics” and the sort of yearning
Yack disparages. To acknowledge the Zionist commitments of Howe and other
contributors to Dissent (such as, say, Jacob L. Talmon, Jean Amery and others,
that,

287.
the New Left, he

including Michael Walzer, of whom Rorty also approves)

them and on the motives he imputes
denunciations of political movements.
characterization of

)

288.)

CIS,

CP,

p. xiii.

p. xviii;

EH,

p.

207.

is

to cast doubt

to their selective

on Rorty’s

81

you accept the distinction between the
public and the private
realms which draw m Contingency,
Irony, and
If

I

Solidarity, then [the
question of which kind of human being
you want to become] will
divide into two subquestions. The first
is: with what communities
should you identify, of which should you
think of vourself as a
member'7 The second is [...]: what should do with
my
*0
aloneness 92
I

Autonomy, the
and on

own

their

The

sort

time,

sort

is

of thing some people actually achieve

aloneness

a private concern, not a public one:

of autonomy which self-creating

Derrida, or Foucault seek

embodied
all

in their

is

ironists like Nietzsche,
not the sort of thing that could ever be

in social institutions.

Autonomy

is

not something which

human beings have

within them and which society can release by
ceasing to repress them. It is something which certain
particular

human beings hope
actually do.

The

by self-creation, and which a few

to attain

desire to be

autonomous

is

not relevant to the

liberal's desire to

avoid cruelty and pain-a desire which Foucault
290
shared, even though he was unwilling to express it in those
terms.

For Rorty, then, autonomy

Autonomy

selt-creation.

achieve, and which

some

is

is

private autonomy, autonomy synonymous with

something self-creators

rare individuals actually

in the private

do achieve

Such

sphere seek to
rare individuals

are the results of incalculable contingencies, accidents and cosmic rays
scrambling

neurons. This being the case, public institutions cannot

embody autonomy and

289.

should not be expected to do

so.

290.
Participation in democratic institutions and public
in Rorty’s vision

of private perfection,

from Dewey. David Hall has noted

)

ORT,

)

CIS,

p.

291.)

CIS,

p. xiii.

p.

13.

65. Cf. Yack, p. 365,

either.

that,

And

compared

life

has no special place

in this respect, too,

to

Dewey,

he differs

82

Rorty's democratic sentiments (or,
at least, his democratic
expectations) are seriously qualified.
Democracy is the vehicle for
the rise in the minimum standards
of life-increased freedom and
autonomy. But the freedom is a formal
freedom, empty in the sense
that only a very few will be able
to exercise it in a meaning creatinu
and, therefore, meaningful manner.
And the autonomy is, for mosf a
blind autonomy, unguided by a sense
of relevance. 292

For Rorty, as tor Hegel and Sidney Hook,
democracy

is little

more than one

of the most efficient ways of selecting candidates
for government office and
conferring legitimacy on them nowadays.

It

should not be surprising, then, that

Rorty would describe his “democratic utopia,”
uninspiringly enough, as one

which the quest
institutions.”

for

autonomy

is

impeded

little

as possible

by social

293

*

As we have seen
their respective

to

as

“...in

in this chapter,

views on autonomy,

do with the very

*

different

Rorty differs from

liberty

manners

in

*

Dewey when

it

comes

to

and democracy. These differences have

which the two American praumatists view

the relationship between the public and the private. For

Dewey, public

institutions,

notably public education and democratic institutions, are indispensable from the
perspective of positive liberty or autonomy, as he used these words. Rorty, on the
292.

other hand, has reverted to a classical liberal conception of private autonomy and
liberty as exemption from state intervention. Autonomy, for him, does not entail
293.

merely a duty to

)

self,

Hall, p. 37.

but a duty to self which, even at those felicitous

Hall's

remarks concerning Rorty's democratic sentiments

contrast sharply to Bernstein

s

remarks with reference to Dewey,

in Berstein, pp.

539-40.

)

moments

“Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,”

p. 4.

83

when

happens to coincide with duty to others,

it

is

necessarily in contrast to

others™
Though Rorty might
liberals,

refuse the neo-liberal tag, he, like contemporary'
neo-

views democracy not as an end

the idea of democracy, but as a

we have

means

in itself, as

Dewey viewed what

for securing other ends.

seen, these ends are amelioration of suffering and

for strong poets.

advances

The alleged

fact that

In Rorty’s case, as

making the world

safe

Dewey's vision of democratic community'

liberal ideals suffices to legitimize

We

he called

it.

have noted that Rorty' subscribes to the idea that freedom makes
room

for self-making.

But what of the freedom from want and humiliation which

concern of his decent, dutiful citizen

in the public

police are impediments to this freedom.

and autonomy.

So are corporate managements

In the latter case,

it

leisure time

is

clear that

celebrated “institutions of large market economies” stand

Rorty recognizes

this,

the

sphere 9 “Thugs” and the secret

promote "lean production," thereby eliminating the
for self-creation

is

in the

that

and energy required

some of Rorty’s

way of freedom

295

of course, but can think of no better remedv than constant

294.
adjustment and compromise between state intervention and the market.

He

also

acknowledges more than once

that poverty'

is

an impediment to

295.
autonomy. Nevertheless, his stress on the role of one particular institution of “large

Compare

)

to Haber's claim that

Rorty assumes humans have a universal

essence, namely a moral subject, something within them that can be humiliated

(Haber, pp. 67-8).

Recent figures from the Bureau of Labor

)

Secretary'

Statistics bear out U.S.

Labor

Robert B. Reich's view that U.S. workers, struggling to maintain

their

standard of living in the face of declining wages, are working longer hours and

more jobs

to

make ends meet

Times September
,

4,

1992) pp

(cf.
1,

“Employees Get
A22).

a Real

at

Workout” {Los Angeles

84

market economies"

commentator

I

in

promoting freedom has prompted one sympathetic

to write:

wish Rorty had included

in his

discussion of political theory

some

upon the relationship between liberal democracies
and
economic determinants. [...] Rorty's tailure to treat

reflections
their
in

these issues

any argumentative

makes his
seem somewhat detached. Viewed in

the idea that
interests

We

cruelty

come

detail

is

reflections

on

political life

the light of his endorsement of
the worst thing we do, his programmatic

off as rather thinly urgent

will return to the question of Rorty s

ameliorating suffering in Chapter Three. Before

296

at best.

programmatic
that,

however,

interest in

we

should

first

turn

attention to his defense of liberal institutions with reference
to the ideal of impedinu

the quest for

autonomy

chapter.

296.)

Hall,

p.

113.

as

little

as possible. This will be the focus of the next

CHAPTER

2

THE ELUSIVE IDEAL OF FREEDOM

One

of the most

common

representations of

modem

states-a representation

which has gamed even more force since the proclaimed
end of the Cold Wardepicts political

power chafing

at

an external limit posed by the private sphere.
As

I

indicated in the previous chapter, Rorty subscribes
to this conventional model of the
relationship between the private sphere and political
authority. This

when, as

in the

is

most evident

passage cited above, he celebrates existing liberal democracies
as

setups which "leave people alone to
perfection in peace.”

let

them

try out their private visions

of

297

1 his conventional

model may have been an accurate picture of the

relationship between the private sphere and political authority in
eastern Europe in
the final years ol the

Cold War; however,

I

will argue in this chapter that

accurate representation of the state of affairs

in the rich

North Atlantic.

case, as the sanctity of the private sphere has been proclaimed ever

it is

not an

In the latter

more

vociferously, the scope of surveillance, regulation and control by agencies of
political authority has

become ever more

efficient

and has extended ever further

into the private sphere.

One account of the

latter

development immediately presents

accessibility of private life to surveillance
relatively high level

management, a

and control by

retrieval

297.)

in his castle

cannot

make

Rorty, in Malachowski,

decisions about

p.

294

how

and

advanced stage of

technological development and centralization of economic practices.

king

The

state agencies requires a

of development of information collection,

level that is attainable only at a relatively

itself:

A

medieval

his peasant subjects will live

86

when he has no way of even knowing how
many
let

it

subjects he has, or

w here

they live,

alone their birth and death rates and
levels of productivity. As Marx
pointed out.

is

capitalism that

first

develops the forces and relations of
production

in

ways

that

make

a high degree of centralized control
possible. Since Poland or Russia, with

their

pre-capitalist

economies, lacked much of “the power that

technology makes available to thugs,”
not have been able to

mount

modem

298
it is

unsurprising that regimes there would

the sort of massive invasions and manipulations
that

are standard operating procedure in
France, Japan and the United States.

This account, of course, has more than an element
of truth to

it.

Certainly,

simple access to the technical means of surveillance
and manipulation will go a
long

way

in

accounting for the greater scope of authoritarian control

Pakistan-tormerly a U.S. Cold

regime

in

ally

which,

until the

end of the Najibullah

Kabul, was a beneficiary of relatively unimpeded
computer technology

compared with

transfers--as

A

War

in, say,

Pakistan's erstwhile “nonaligned” neighbor to the East.

narrowly technological account of the expansion of state control,

however, ignores problems

that should not

be ignored. For one thing, by portraying

innovations in the technologies of surveillance and control as more
or less
unilaterally determining the scope ot state intervention,

of state institutions
technologies.

were posted

at

in

we

risk understating the role

promoting or squelching the large-scale deployment of certain

In a state

such as the old Soviet Union, for example, where guards

tax machines, where telephone directories were classified secrets,

and where mimeograph machines, photocopiers and even typewriters were required
to be registered with

one or another mimstry-in such a

the productivity of labor

298.)

would have

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

fallen far

567.

below

state,

that

it

is

not surprising that

of the advanced

capitalist

87

economies, and that citizens would be deprived
of consumer goods and services
available to

many people

in the

West.

Aside from the devastation of the Second World
War, there were

at least

three reasons for the lack of development
and widespread application of these

technologies
the

in the

West deprived

Soviet Union: (a)
the Soviet

A

technology and trade embargo enforced by

Union of credit, foreign

consumer markets, and of the opportunity

capital

to emulate Japan,

and labor and
China or the Six Tigers

of the Pacific Rim, whose nascent high-tech industries have
relied

in large part

on

copying foreign designs; (b) a constant push to increase the
productivity of labor
through automation would only have
constitutionally-guaranteed

full

made

it

harder to maintain the charade of

employment; and

telecommunications and computers, fueled the
audience for w'hich was burgeonmg-thanks
subsidization of intellectuals on a scale

(paraphrasing Nabakov)

we might

(c) new' technologies, notably

of the samizdat, the

official fear

in large part to

unknown

call capitalist

in the

high literacy rates, state

West and what

propaganda, disseminated through

Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, black-marketed videocassettes and so

The

officially

imposed

fetters

Ironically,

what happened
r

development of the productive

North Atlantic, by contrast, the story has been very

There, the rhetorical apotheosis of the private sphere has proceeded

299.)

Rorty believes that

magazines and movies,

He

“...it

in the first

Marx expected would happen w hen dominant

relations of production persistently retard the
In the rich

2w

on the productivity of labor had a predictably

disastrous impact on the All-Union economy.

workers' state was exactly what

on.

forces.

different.

in

lock step

was images of freedom, conveyed through

that finally brought

down

Wair

(Klepp, p 122).
does not discern “any useful distinction between propaganda and the use of

reason” (Klepp,
only about

how

p.

122).

Nevertheless, one

still

the Berlin

could raise

lots

these images were received and interpreted, but

financed, selected, framed and transmitted.

of questions not

how

they were

88

wnh

increased surveillance, manipulation
and control by institutions both
public

and private

in that

very same sphere. In the
democracies of this region,

witnessed an expansion of regulation
in almost

all

aspects of

life,

while

we have
at

the

same

time odes to the inviolable private
sphere have become louder and
found an ever
larger audience.

This strikes

me

as remarkable,

and

need of a

in

sort

of explanation

narrowly technological approach cannot
provide. In considenng

two trends have taken

we ought

place, surely

how

to consider whether,

and

it is

if

that the

that these

so in what

manner, the degree of violability of the private
sphere on the one hand and the
efficiency of political authority on the
other hand are related by

common

more than just

the

preconditions provided bv development of the
productive forces, narrowly

conceived along technocratic
balance of this chapter.

It

This

lines.

will

is

the problem to be broached in the

be helpful to begin by examining

at closer

quarters

representations of the triumph of the inviolable
private sphere

Depicting the Apolitical Private Sphere

In

an oft-cited

article,

Francis

reached the end of history: Western
stage ot world history,

is

to

be "the

Fukayama suggested

liberal

final

democracy,

lately universalized

on the

to

do with

little

more than

in the

the

and consumption of commodities which inexplicably pop up on display

shelves and
ideal

we “might” have

torm of human government,” while

domain of the economy (which evidently has
selection

that

showroom

floors), ‘‘easy access to

of the universal homogeneous

31

state.

"

VCRs and

stereos”

is

the actualized

For Fukayama, then, economic

Refer to Fukayama. The End of Flistory, of course, has been a regularlyrepeated theme of “futurists” and “culture critics” of various stripes. Not ten years
earlier than Fukayama, for example, Jean Baudrillard announced that history had
300.)

89

liberalism

amounts

essentially to the satisfaction of ever

consumer demands by
and

a market

selling, investment, hiring

private hands.

which

more

presumably

is free,

sophisticated

in the

sense that buying

and resource allocation decisions are largely

in

1

Accordingly,

when

control and ownership of the

means of

production are wrested from the state and returned
to private hands, the absolutely
free will has taken a stride

forward

in its career

of self-actualization.

Similar paeans to the private sphere have been
voiced by contemporary'
figures

who might

be thought to have

little in

common

with Fukavama. Rorty, for

example, approvingly quotes Milan Kundera's announcement
that w'hat
precious about European culture

is “...its

spirit

of freedom,”

most

respect for the individual, for his original

thought, and for his right to an inviolable private life.” 302

Kundera's “European

is

we

are told,

is

The hallmark of

the sanctity of a sphere of

conscience, a private sphere protected against incursions by the

These paeans have not been limited

to the usual

state.

anti-Communist

301.

millenanans of the

come
that

New

World Order,

either.

In his

address to the

to an end, thanks to the allegedly homeostatic coexistence

is,

the United States and the Soviet

Union (Baudrillard,

p.

1

989 congress of

of “the Big

Two”~

66).

Fukavama, pp. 3- 7. Though it has proven useful for Radio Libertv
)
programmers, the term free enterprise is more than dubious as a description of
leading contemporary economies, in view of: (a) the crucial role of state fiscal and
monetary policies and regulation in these economies; (b) increasingly centralized
302.
1

private sector planning

Munkirs); and (c) the increasingly close interaction and
identification of state agencies and corporate capital. Recognizing this, David

Bazelon has observed
...the

(cf.

that.

only existential meaning of enterprise

generally happen to be doing

accompanying demand
Munkirs,

)

p.

at

the

that they

be

is

what businessmen

moment, and free
left

alone to do

it.

is

merely the

(Quoted

102.)

The quote, from The Art of the Novel appears
,

in

CIS,

p.

10.

in

90

the

Communist

Party of Great Britain, Martin Jacques,
editor of Marxism Today

suggested that in both the East and the West

“We

live in a society

increasingly driven by civil society rather than
303
the state.”

development he

invites us to

which

,

is

As evidence

for this

“Think of the enormous membership of environmental

groups, or the range of cultural activity, or the
massively enhanced role of the
media.’' This postwar

Jacques, because

development has been a source of crisis
have always seen the

leftists

change. However,

if the state at

concentrated lorm,

it

society,

In

most

one time used

According

whatever else

least for the

state as the centerpiece

it

may

part lies

order to execute

is

a pluralistic

somewhere
its

safely

must periodically make limited forays

says

of political

it

would seem

shifted

from the

that civil

domain of political power which

beyond the reach of the

constitutionally

peace and securing property, even Mill, as

Power has

that:

to this picture, then,

be,

left,

to represent politics in a

should no longer be seen like

state to civil society.

for the

at

state.

mandated function of preserving the

we have

seen,

conceded

into the private sphere.

that

government

For the sake of

preserving freedom, however, these forays must be checked by a vigilant public, a
free press, free universities, an independent judiciary

and other agencies

independent of the government.

A recent emigre

writer restated the conventional paradigm well

claimed that the distinction between the public and private spheres

is

when he

determined by

“the actual intrusion of the state or other organizations into the activity of groups

and individuals.”

which the

304

In the case

state controls all

public and private spheres

303.)

Reprinted

304.)

Shlapentokh,

in

major spheres of social
lies in

Jacques,

p. 4.

of “authoritarian societies

p.

life,” the distinction

“the degree of individual

18.

like the Soviet

Union

in

between the

autonomy from

govern,

305

interference.”

Thus,

in

both the authontanan East
and the liberal

dentocrac.es of the West,
actmt.es wh.eh belong to the
private sphere-act, vines

wh'ch include

a person's cho.ee of
occupat.on

rel.g.ous convictions and
activ.ties in that the

by the

state

and place of work,

mam age-partner,

consumption habits-are distinguished
from public

former enjoy a larger degree of
independence from intervention

and other organizations.” Presumably,
these other organizations
'

correspond to "secondary associations,”
or Hegel’s Korporat,onen

m of

civil

society.

It

evident, then, that the conventional
paradigm admits degrees of

IS

privateness:
pri vate

The

circle

of family and fnends, for example,

by virtue of being

less intruded

upon by other

is

held to be

institutions,

more

governmental or

otherwise, than the sphere of such
voluntary associations as. say,
chambers of

commerce, unions and
then,

is

sports clubs.

The

distinction

not absolute: “the concept of a
continuum

is

between public and

more appropriate

private,

in the

307
application of this paradigm to social
analysis.”

According to

305.

this

paradigm.

With an aggressive state like Stalin’s or
Mao’s, private
society can be reduced to almost zero,
with

life in a
family and other small

)

306.

)

Shlapentokh, pp. 5-6.
This

is

bodies which

word Hegel uses to refer to the decentralized administrative
halfway between the universal will of the state and the

the

lie

particular

of “private enterprise.” Among these constituents
of civil society we may
include commercial associations, chambers of
commerce, guilds (and

will

their

analog, trade unions), professional associations and
the

like.

It

modem

will be noted that

Hegel’s Korporationen more closely resemble Dewey’s
“public” than does Hegel’s
civil society,” since the latter, a “welter of
competing wills,” lacks a uniting
interest and hence an organizational embodiment of
that interest.
307.)

Shlapentokh,

p. 5.

92

groups almost

completely exposed to the regular
intervention of state
308
agencies, usually the political
police.

In the liberal

democracies of the West, by contrast,
there

is

supposedly

less

intervention by state agencies in the
activities of individuals, family and
friends, and

voluntary associations.
In the

vocabulary ot this paradigm, when the
government or the state

supposedly divests

of whole domains which

itself

supervised directly,

it

is

it

had previously controlled or

309
said that privatization has taken
place.

privatization that has taken place

is

and non-democratic societies.” 310

The degree of

“a leading indicator of dynamics in
democratic

In

view of how widespread

this

paradigm

is, it is

not surprising that the decisions of central
authorities to privatize the Russian and

Chinese economies have been hailed by some as
the dawn of a new era of

democracy, while the same sources have denounced
popular victories

in

Guatemala,

Chile and Nicaragua as totalitarian when they
have involved the nationalization of
309.
loreign-owned corporate holdings. 31

-1

08.

)

Shlapentokh,

p. 5.

To

his credit,

Shlapentokh admits the inadequacy of his

knowledge about “America and other countries” (Shlapentokh,
310.

311.

)

As we

shall see

p. 14).

below, privatization

of expansion of the private sphere

at the

may better be understood as a process
expense of the public sphere-but not

own expense, as Shlapentokh's picture would have
we might take privatization to refer merely to the economic,

necessarily at the state’s
the time being,
political

it.

and ideological expansion of the private sphere, regardless of how

For

this

expansion takes place.

)

)

Shlapentokh,

p. 7.

Jo Burrows has noted that a prominent feature of liberal rhetoric is “to see
ideological monsters lurking in every alternative creed” (Burrows, in

'totalizing',

Malachowski, pp. 327-8). This certainly appears to have been the case with some
of Rorty's heroes, including Isaiah Berlin, Sidney Hook and Leszek Kolakowski. It
is

interesting to note in this regard that

epithet “totalitarian” (Lamont,

p.

1

13).

Dewey

himself has been a recipient of the

93

As

already noted, and as should

become even

clearer below, Rorty

subscribes to this picture of the
relationsh lp between the pnvate
sphere and

governmental institutions

in the liberal

democracies.

will argue, by contrast, that

I

private individuals, as well as
“primary” and “secondary groups” in
the rich North

Atlantic democracies are controlled
and defined to an unprecedented
extent by

dominant

political forces,

which project power

far

beyond the

institutions

of the

state proper.

According

to

a

common

assumption which contrasts sharply to the
view

defend, the legal right to privacy, like the
nght to property,

which has
state

finally

come

In this regard,

appears

in

to

is

be respected and protected by the

we may

refer to an

I

a natural relation

liberal

democratic

exemplary “expert opinion” which

an anthology published by a prestigious
university

press:

One

basic finding of animal studies is that
virtually all animals seek
periods ot individual seclusion or small-group
intimacy. This is
usually described as the tendency toward
territoriality in which an
organism lays private claim to an area of land,
water or air and
313
defends it against intrusion by members of its own
species.

The author proceeds

to expatiate about

sicklebacks and the long-suffering laboratory

meadow

rat.

And

pipits, three-spined

then the cultural

anthropologists are trotted out on cue to testify to the universal
need for privacy

among

the Tikopia, the Tlingit and the Tuareg. Thus, in the
figure of the Savage

discover once again the requisite link between Nature and Civilization.

The author

ot this passage has given

prejudice which Karl

Marx excoriated

academic imprimatur

a century

to a pervasive

and a half ago. Referring

to the

312.) The notion of privacy as a distinct right originated in English and colonial
American opposition to arbitrary police intrusion and search and seizure
(Rosenblum, pp. 67-72). Louis Brandeis notwithstanding, no such right is
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.

313.)

Westin,

p. 56.

we

94

political revolution

which resulted

in the

foundation of the secular democratic

republics ot his day, the twenty-five year
old
Its

Marx

wrote:

attitude to civil society, to the

world of need, to work, to private
that they are the foundation of its
existence
its own presupposition that
needs no further proof and thus its
natural basis.
interests, private

As

law

is

recent interpreters ot "animal studies” confirm,

Man

today that Natural

is

it is still

a widely held belief

the precondition for civil society, which in turn

basis ot the bourgeois state. Today, as in

1

843,

we

are invited to

draw

is

the

the

conclusion that bourgeois social relations and the relations
of domination which
they inscribe are as immutable as the natural order. 315

One need do
cast doubt

on them.

little

It is

more than

state these

assumptions explicitly

in

order to

tempting to suspect, for example, that the whole history of

our species has been retrospectively reconstructed to conform

to

an historically

contingent contemporary prejudice.

One would

expect Rorty, the historical nominalist, to support Marx's view.

After wnting-perhaps with

much

naivete

left

314.
that something

is

some degree of naivete-that “There

is

not, in fact,

these days,” he adds: “Tell a sophomore at an American college

only a social construct, and she

is

likely to reply 'Yeah,

I

know.

316
315.
So are you, Mac.'"
Since Rorty views humanity as a product of luck and chance,

presumably he also views the public/pnvate
liberal

West today,

On

as such.

When

he

is

split, as

it

is

institutionalized in the

explicit about the contingency of the self

)

Marx,

)

This brings to mind a remark by an emigrant from Eastern Europe.

the .Jewish Question

asked by an N.P.R. interviewer

responded that capitalism
316.)

is

in

,

1990

p.

56.

why he

prefers the

“more natural” than

“Review of Spectres of Marxf

pp.

1

1-12.

socialism.

West

When

to the East, he

95

and community, he does sound

of 'liberal individualism.

1

as though he has slipped

”’

one of the “histoncist, including
Marxist,

back

into the

in the

altruistic

obviously

criticized.

This

is

apparent, for

decent citizen as perennial and ineradicable
members

principles of justice).’

so, in his

view Marx

previous chapter, he reinstates the egoistic
private

of any remotely attractive polity (any

Rawls two

critics

17

At crucial junctures, however, he
occasionally writes

example, when, as we saw
person alongside the

like

polity, that

is

to say, that is

conducive

to

17
It

is

also apparent, though perhaps less

approval of what Berlin and Kundera have referred
to as the

inviolable private sphere.

Whether or not we

reject the

ordained by nature, however,

modem

period at

reasserted

itself

contemporary

it

are

still

confronted with the impression

certainly appears to be ineradicable.

time and again, with almost

reality

the West, from

One

least,

we

assumption that the private sphere was

and

in the

irresistible tenacity,

works of the great dead

Hobbes and Locke

After

modem

all,

that, in the

it

has

both in
political thinkers in

to Constant, Tocqueville, the Mills

and Dewey.

reason Hegel has attracted renewed attention from liberal thinkers
like

Fukayama might be

that,

while he acknowledged the historical specificity of the

private sphere, he also emphasized the inevitability of

its

appearance. Hegel also

317.
provides insights into the relationship between the notions of the private sphere
and
318.
civil society, and between the latter and political institutions.
Might, the author contrasted “the family,” as the
particularity, to burgerlich Gesellschaft,

)

CIS,

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

1

77.

Cf. CIS,

similarly has noted that there

p.

is

1

p.

In his

Philosophy of

embodiment of abstract

conceived as a “system of needs.” Within

73, with reference to Orwell.

567. Refer to Rawls, pp. 60ff. David Hall

a tension between Rorty

s

public and private and his belief in a centerless self’ (Hall,

“radical separation of the
p.

167).

96

CIV,

I

society, that welter

of particular

wills,

some persons recognize

particular interests are consonant
with the interests of others.

recognition of common interests,
an association

is

On

that their

the basis of this

formed which resembles

Dewey’s Great Community.

What Hegel
from

calls the political state, as

“civil society;"

1

'’

an “objective organization” distinct

presents itself to the immediate
observer

m the form

of

specialized public institutions and
arrangements that typically are subsidized

through “public funds,” chiefly
a system of such institutions

is

in the

form of tax revenue.

composed of a wide

In

contemporary terms,

variety of institutions, including:

the head of state; the legislature;
the administration (which

now

extends far beyond

the traditional bureaucracy of the
state to take in a large variety of
mimstnes,

committees and other bodies such as central banks,
policy planning groups, and
regulatory commissions); the judiciary;
sub-central, regional, prefectural and

municipal governments; the military, police,
courts, penal systems, as well as such
ancillary setups as postal services, social
services and welfare bureaucracies, public

school systems and so on

The public sphere
conceived as the sum

and

interaction, plus

total

all

'

20

is

sometimes thought of as encompassing the

of these institutions

in their specific global organization

other social institutions not included in the private
sphere.

Recurring to Dewey’s advice, encountered
the trouble to attempt to

state,

draw

a

more

in

Chapter One,

it

might not be worth

precise line between public and private

spheres, before examining particular historical circumstances.

In

any case, we need

not attempt to do so for present purposes.

J 19

)

Hegel,

p.

364, translator's note to remark 267. Cf. Dewey's use of the term

political stale, discussed in Chapter

320.)

Cf. Miliband, pp. 49-54;

One

above.

Therbom,

p.

41; Bendix,

p.

145.

97

Now
we

that

we have

are ,n a position to

at least the

rough contours of the

‘'political state”

compare the preceding sketch of the

m view,

private sphere as a

refuge from political authorin'
to an alternative description
of the relationship

between the system of state

My aim

institutions

we have

identified

and the private sphere.

in the next section ,s to present,
in as brief a space as possible,

terms ol an alternative vocabulary for
conceptualizing

State

Power and

the Private

some key

this relationship

Sp here

Let us begin with an under-acknowledged
but empirically verifiable

observation: In the countries of the rich North
Atlantic,
part of the social surplus

is

among

other places, a large

systematically appropriated by owners and
controllers of

means of production who themselves

are not producers.

term, then, these communities are class-divided.
321.

321

In a

Marxist sense of the

i2

This would not appear to be a terribly difficult
position to defend,
particularly in

view of the enormous and increasing gap between

globally and within the richest countries themselves.
In the

last

rich

and poor, both

quarter of the

A class may be defined as a social group with a common relationship to the
)
production and appropriation of surplus labor, a common relationship
which differs
322.
greatly from or
pp. 50-52).

I

is

opposed

am aware

to

one or more other such social groups

(cf.

Melkoman,

ot alternative definitions of class, including a definition

based on relationship to ownership or control of the means of production (cf.
Miliband, pp. 15-22; Wright, pp. 96-7). These two definitions, of course,
are related
in an obvious way: Ownership and control of the means
of production permits
appropriation of surplus labor or surplus value. Since one effect of class divisions is
great inequalities of wealth and power, both of these class entry points are congenial
to the present discussion.

)

Even

limiting our

view

to the

United States of America—perhaps the most

often-alleged contemporary example of a classless country-there

amount
to:

is

an enormous

of compelling literature linking wealth to class location (refer, for example,

Kloby, Eitzen and Feagin).

98

twentieth century, workers in the
north Atlantic countnes have
witnessed record-

high corporate profits, skyrocketing
stocks and bonds markets, gigantic
mergers and
eight-digit salaries for top

“downsizing,'”

2

CEOs. They have

also witnessed feverish

,

massive capital

flight in search

of cheap labor markets, escalating

324
anti-union campaigns, relative
pauperization,
increasing rates of exploitation, 325

slipping

wages

32 *'

and slumping living standards. 327 Clearly,
these trends are

instances and effects of well-organized
and invigorated capitalist forces wresting

Rcfer for example, to the series on downsizing
that appeared
)ork Times Sunday, March 3, to Saturday,
March
*

’

,

9,

Chase Manhattan’s
$121.2

billion),

New

grew 38% between 1985 and 1995 (from $87.7 billion
work force shrank by 28% (44,450 employees in 1985
1995)(ATT, March 4, 1996). The authors cite this as an

assets

while

33,500 employees

in the

1996. According to the Times

in

to

its

especially clear exemplification of trends with
reference to other corporations and
industries.

324.

Refer, for example, to Berberoghlu,
pp. 99- 1 06, and the

)

Los Angeles Times

articles cited above.

325

)

Crises:

Berberoghlu, pp. 100-101 (the author cites Victor Perlo,
Super Profits and
Modern U.S. Capitalism (New York: International Publishers 1988)
d
’

512).

j 26.

Berberoghlu, p. 101, Table 5.1 (the author cites Statistical Abstract
)
of the
United States for years 1987 and 1988, and Economic Report
the
President for
of
years 1987 and 1990). Also refer to more recent Bureau of Labor
Statistics

figures

cited in the

327.

)

in real

Los Angeles Times (September

According

to the

4, 1995): Al, A20, A22.

New

York Times series cited above, the percentage change
income for four-fifths of the U.S. population from 1990 to 1994 was between

negative one and negative five percent, while the top five percent registered a
fifteen percent rise ( NYT March 8, 1996: A 12). Annual median family income,
,

adjusted for inflation in 1994 dollars decreased from 1990 to 1993, and only slightly

rebounded

authors cite
sources).

1994 to approximately the 1992 level {NYT, March 8, 1996: A 12; the
U.S. Department of Labor, Department of Commerce and Datastream

in

Assuming

a positive correlation of consumption and

assuming furthermore

that

consumption levels play a central

income

levels,

and

role in the

determination of living standards, these figures confirm that living standards for a
large part

of America are slipping.

99

concessions and higher rates of
exploitat.on from disorganized and
demoralized
workers.

Rorty rarely acknowledges the
class-divided character of liberal

democracies, whether utopian or actual.
For him,

we may

understand

it

to be,

must be a class/or

it

seems, a class, whatever else
This interpretation

itself

consistent with Dewey’s view, mentioned
in Chapter

of a commonly accepted ends-in-view
embodied

One

above,

that, in the

in distinct institutions,

earners constitute at best only a potential
or inchoate public.

Viewed

its

absence

wage

in this light,

the only properly identifiable
class that exists in the rich North
Atlantic

business community,” or the monopoly
capitalist class, with

is

is

“the

multitude of active

trade agreements, regulatory commissions,
chambers of commerce, lobbies,

research and policy-planning institutes,
interlocking directorates and so on.
tor

example, when Rorty discusses liberalism as
“the attempt to

the North Atlantic bourgeoisie,”

up with the deployment ot

32 "

political

there

)

no suggestion

By Rorty 's

So,

the hopes of

that these attempts are tied

power against one or another

exploitation of workers or class conflict.

328.

is

fulfill

328

social group, the

lights, the qualifier

bourgeois

Referring to democracies exemplified by the United States,
Tocqueville

wrote:

To

tell

the truth, though there are

does not

nch men, the class of rich men
have no feelings or

exist; for these rich individuals

purposes, no traditions or hopes, in
therefore, but

no definite

class.

common;

there are individuals

(Tocqueville,

p.

160.)

Tocqueville was notoriously insouciant when it came to slavocracy in the South,
and he understated inequalities in the North and the West, too. Aside from the
question ol whether his description was accurate in the 1830s, however,
is not true today.

329.)

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,”

p.

585.

it

certainly

100

in the

term bourgeois liberalism
designates

little

more than unspecified

“historical,

and especially economic,
330
conditions.”
This helps to explain
IS

how

at

times he

may

suggest that talk of class struggle

“clumsy”" or otherwise not worth the
2
trouble." When he has anything
1

about class struggle
Regardless ot

at all,

how class

became of this-and

he typically speaks of it as a thing
of the

past.

"

to say

'

conscious and compact capitalists
are-or, more accurately,

regardless of aggravated social divisions,
there can be no

struggle between classes as long
as only

one class remains the only class

for itself.

This observation confirms the more
general conclusion that Rorty assumes
an

absence of fundamental social antagonisms
330.

Once we acknowledge

that the

in the

nch North

nch North

Atlantic

"4

Atlantic democracies are divided

331.

along lines ot exploiter and exploited,
however, a dark shadow begins to

)

)

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,”

“Review of Spectres of Marx,"

p.

1

p.

fall

over

585.

8.

The End of Leninism,” p 5. If we assume at the outset
that there is a
“harmonization of diverse impulses into common
purposes” in liberal communities,

^2

)

then talk of class conflict

may

problematize this assumption,
for

well be unqualifiedly useless.

we once

whom?

If,

however,

we

again confront the crucial question: Useless

3jo.

For example, he likens “nostalgia” for the class struggle
to nostalgia for les
rois faineants (“Movements and Campaigns,”
p. 4).

)

Haber,

p.

62

class antagonisms.

should be noted that Rorty does not always eschew talk of
His acknowledgment of the need to mitigate “class conflict,
It

social division, patriarchy, racism”

(“Thugs and Theorists,”

p. 567) is, after all, a
other evils. In response to a question from the
audience at a talk at Northwestern University, he even went so far as to endorse

recognition of class division,

Marx and

Engels' formulation,

committee

for

managing

(“Intellectuals at the

January

among

17, 1992).

the

“The executive of the modem state is but
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”

a

common

End of Socialism,”

a talk delivered at Northwestern University,

101

Rom -s liberal
to

vision.

For one thing, assuming that
most workers have not chosen

be exploited, Rorty's Deweyan
picture of a

liberal

multitude of voluntary associations
united by

appear either far-fetched or

trivial,

community composed of a

common ends-m-view

depending on what one wishes

begins to

to

mean by

the

adjective voluntary.
In his justly influential essay,

Apparatuses,”

335

Louis Althusser has noted that the institutions
that

state operate in large part

or symbolic the threat

state is a

classes

[...]

to

make up

the

by violence or the threat of violence,
however attenuated

may

be.

the state from a perspective of

The

“Ideology and Ideological State

Althusser has advanced the following
description of
its

coercive function:

machine of repression, which enables the ruling
ensure their dominion over the working class,
thus

enabling the former to subject the latter to the
process of suiplusvalue extortion (i.e. to capitalist exploitation). 336

This emphasis on the coercive character of the
state has a long pedigree
anarchist literature, as well as such Marxist
classics as the
the Eighteenth

Brumaire Class Struggles
,

in

machine when they represent

Althusser

s

it

formulation, as general as

reformulated in an even more general

way

Communist Manifesto

,

France and Lenin’s State and

Revolution. Even “mainstream” political theorists
as a repressive

in

come

close to certifying the state

as monopolizing legitimate violence.

it is,

to cover

would of course have

some

to

be

non-capitalist states.

A

broader formulation from the same functional perspective might be stated
as

j 35.)

Included

in Althusser, pp.

127-186. I do not want to give the impression that
endorse other well-known writings of Althusser, in particular some of his writings
on epistemology and the sciences.
I

Althusser, p. 137. It will be noticed that I use the word state
narrower range of institutions than Althusser would have it cover.

to

cover a

102

follows:

A

state enables at least

one class

forms of appropriation whtch
tend

to

to subject other classes
to

one or more

mcrease the share of the surplus
product or „s

value appropnated by the former
class or classes relattve to
other social groups.

Thts process of subject, on takes
the form of coercion, both
wtth respect to mental
,

discipline, censorsh.p

and so on within a gtven

projected outwards, beyond the
institution

The

institution, as well as coercion

itself.

of the “political state” mentioned above
play a role

institutions

in

maintaining or extending class domination
by enabling one or more classes to
subject other classes to extortion of the
social surplus.

When

particular classes are

able, thanks in large part to the state,
to appropriate a relatively large
share of the
social surplus, those classes

may be

described as ruling classes™

relationship to the state as a whole,

ruling class

“wield” state power. Accordingly, state power

of political power:

It is

the

power of one

or

may be

may be

more

when he argued

proper aim of government

is

virtue of

its

said metaphorically to

thought of as a special case

classes exercised over other social

groups through the state as a whole. James
Madison alluded
function of the state

By

at the Constitutional

to protect “the minority

to this political

Convention

that the

of the opulent” against the

“majority.”
337.

01 course,
338.

the individual agents

dominance of a given

class typically have

not even for the most part

drama

that

)

Cf.

)

The

whose actions

members of a

remained unaware of their

ruling class.

workers play out hour by hour, day by day

Therbom,

p.

This

is

role,

and are

confirmed by the

in the capitalist

West, and

it

161.

qualifier “as a

Popular administration

directly secure the

in

whole” is important here. As the example of the Umdad
Chile shows quite clearly, one class alliance can control

much of the government and
political state as a whole.

local administrations, while failing to control the

We will

return to this point below.

103

was especially poignant
sacrificed

much

in the

case of Polish workers,

in the early years

who

enthusiastically

of Walesa’s tenure to bnng
to power a

capitalist

regime which has rewarded
them with lower wages, job
insecurity and the
dismantling of social programs
taken for granted in the

When
to

state institutions

on the whole have ensured

more than one mode of appropriating

alhance.

past.

the surplus,

we may

conducive

speak of a ruling class

Slaveholding planters and northern
industnal capitalists, for example,

formed a precarious ruling class alliance
Moreover, certain social
class alliance.

In the

leaders, publishers

strata

in the

ante-bellum United States.

and fractions often may

and other professional intellectuals

classes.

themselves with a given

in the

industrialists.

complicate the picture, but they do not
change the

and subaltern

ally

years leading up to the Civil War,
for example, religious

themselves ever more closely with the
northern

North allied

These considerations

fact that there are ruling classes

339

State institutions often survive
transferal of state
forces.

social relations

power

to incipient class

This observation, needless to say, does
not apply solely to the postal system

and elevator

inspectors.

One may

readily discern this point by considering
the

continuity of a large part of the bureaucratic
and military machinery of the former

Soviet state in the

wake

ot Yeltsin’s Fall 1991 counter-coup

and the

final, full

disenfranchisement of Russian workers started under
Stalin's tenure.
Nevertheless, in order to extend their

incumbent ruling

pushed

339.)

organization and hamstring

alliances, newly-ascendant class forces

to restructure, dismantle, gut

A

own

and destroy old

have frequently been

state institutions

and create

concise defense of the existence of class rule

in the U.S. against the
criticisms of pluralist sociologists appears in Domhoff.
More recent studies of class
rule in the liberal democracies include: Szymanski, Jessup
and

Camoy.

104

new ones

in its

own image™

forego historical ,llustra„ons:

1

take „ the point

When

new

a

is

obvtous enough to allow us to

class alliance achteves state
power,

does not as a rule simply take
over the helm of a pre-ex,
sting

state

i,

which remains

the neutral terrain of class
struggle.
It

is

themselves

also important to note here
that individual state institutions
are
sites

of class struggle, however unequal
that struggle

might suffice as an

waning

illustration

of this point to consider

class rule, even the ranks

representatives of subaltern classes

may

be.

341
It

that in the final hours

of the Praetorian guards may

going over to the side of the insurgency.
Moreover,

may

split, part

of

of them

m less tumultuous times,

capture positions in municipal, regional
and

national legislatures, governments and
ministries.

Indeed,

we have

witnessed

instances— most recently in Japan, Brazil,
Italy and India-m which
representatives

of normally militant working class
organizations have occupied the highest
executive offices in non-revolutionary
periods of political

The
institution

fact that a ruling class

of a

modem

less effective or

state,

does not monolithically dominate every

however, does not imply that

emphatic. For one thing, as

power, though exercised
those institutions.

crisis.

in large part

we have

its

political

is

ranks.

Key

of the

institutions

modem

any

not confined to

here the discipline enforced within the ranks

340.
of a police department to the violence the police force
projects beyond
341.

is

already emphasized, state

through state institutions,

One might compare

power

state

have projected

state

its

own

power ever

further,

over an ever wider array of non-state institutions, including
“private enterprise,” the

church and the family.

)

Cf. Lenin 1932,

)

Althusser,

p.

p.

141

96:

105

It

class

IS

important to recognize, moreover,
that extending the
power of a ruling

IS

not exclusively the function
of state institutions.

institutions,

Many

non-state

both public and private, also
mediate conflicts

among

ruling class

elements and enhance their
coordination, compactness and

agility,

while thwarting,

hamstringing and fragmenting
subaltern classes and

The

include, tor example, such
-private’-

commerce,

As

latter

category

may

economic associations as chambers
of

cartels, interlocking directorates

1

strata.

and lending

institutions

have already indicated, and as should
be clear

in

any case, violence and

repression are not the only forms
that political domination takes.

As Gramsci has

emphasized, even the most repressive ruling
class would not be able to
maintain the
social order for long if it

Without securing

at least

cannot be maintained.
rule,

we need

institutions

were

to rely solely

on violence and the threat of violence.

some degree of consent from

To

gain a

to cast a glance,

subaltern groups, class rule

more panoramic view of political power and

however

briefly, at

class

some of the non-coercive

and practices that have assumed great
importance

in the

contemporary

West.

Gramsci proposed an alternative conception of
the
...which

state,

usually thought of as political society-i.e.,
a dictatorship
or some other coercive apparatus used to
control the masses in
conformity with a given type of production and
economy-and not as
a balance between political society and civil
society, by which
is

1

mean

the

hegemony

ot

one social group over the entire nation,

exercised through so-called private organizations like
the Church,
trade unions, or schools. 342

Elaborating on this train of thought, Althusser has provided
a vivid picture

of the role of a wide variety of institutions

342.)
in

The passage, from a

Gramsci 1989,

pp. 204-5.

letter

in the

of September

reproduction of the social order.

7,

193

1

to Tatiana Schucht, appears

106

He

has noted that such
institutions as spectator sports,
churches and even the

family— forms of association
which

in the secular

North Atlantic are represented
as

paradigmatically distinct from the
state-have in fact played a
crucial role ,n the
reproduction of the skills of labor
power and labor power's subjection
the
established order. 343

With reference
north Atlantic, then,

and non-state

it

to the

complex and variegated contemporary

states

does not appear to be possible to
distinguish between

institutions solely

many

connections between the state and "private
enterprise," another reason for
is that,

state

on the basis of the function of ensuring
the

reproduction of prevailing relations
of production. Aside from the

difficulty

of the

this

as noted, individual state institutions
are themselves strategic

positions in the class struggle,
positions that have been contested and
captured by

opposing class forces even when

state

power and the

whole has not faced a serious challenge.

The observation
the

modem

state

that there

and non-state

is

class character of the state as a

344

no hard-and-fast

institutions

is

line

instructive

of demarcation between

when

it

comes

to evaluating

the conventional paradigm of the
relationship between the private sphere and
the
state.

As Gramsci has noted and Althusser has

repeated,

34 "

the state itself

is

the

precondition ot any distinction between the public
and the private. The distinction

343.)

Althusser, pp. 131-2.

-•>44.

It is

too.

)

increasingly difficult to

As one commentator has
...the

draw other

distinctions discussed in this chapter,

noted,

personal and private have been dissociated from virtually every

institutional setting.

The

traditional distinction

result is a dramatic collapse

between public and private
government and society. (Rosenblum, pp. 66-7.)
345.)

Althusser,

p.

144.

as

of the

between

107

between the public and pnva.e
spheres

is,

among

other thmgs, a distinet.on
between

categones of bourgeo.s law within
what Marx metaphorically referred
to as the
superstructure.

which

in turn is

It is

a distinction, moreover,

always, at least to

some

which

an effect of political power,

is

extent, contested.

In this regard,

one might

consider the early clashes of the
bourgeoisie with the ancien regime
around

demands

for the separation of church

and

nghts, habeas corpus and probable
cause.

state, protection

of personal property

Or one might consider

later struggles

over public education, labor legislation,
regulation of industry and banks,
laws and

civil rights legislation.

We

should keep

in

mind

that the distinction

law does not have an immaterial,
material

anti-trust

embodiments of this

ideal existence.

between categones of bourgeois

On

the contrary,

legal distinction-in legislation

beyond the

and case law,

in public

school curricula, architecture and urban
design, in the institutional practices and
the

normalization techniques which Foucault
346
has described,
of physically

and socially formed subjects-there

ot the realm of theology

public/private

and

of public

does not neatly correspond

economy

in the transition

to,

outside

metaphysics, as an instantiation of the

and private spheres accompanied (but of course

to) the progressive separation

from feudalism to capitalism

347.
Peasants were forced into the cities as land
centralized, as

nothing else to point

discourses

split.

The diremption

346.

idealist

is

in the actual

it

was

of the

in parts

state

from the

of Europe.

capitalized; political

347

power was

shifted from the countryside to the city; labor markets
developed,

the guilds were transformed; constitutional nghts and
obligations replaced

)

See: Foucault, 1979.

)

Poulantzas,

p.

18.

108

traditional

alienees;

the individual's conscience
replaced pnests and confessors,

and simultaneously the private
sphere evolved as a
In the

nch North Atlantic

horizontal partition of a

realm; rather,

much

,t

is

at least, the

community

into a

same

is

not a

lower private realm and a higher
public

and the

others have argued, the public/pnvate
split
the

public/pnvate distinction

present at the “individual” and “primary
group” levels, just as

as at the level of the judiciary

One and

legal category.

human

individual

and pnvate subject, accountable

is

legislature

is

a

348

Indeed, as Althusser and

.

component of individuality

itself;

both legal subject, accountable to the
law,

to her creator, her conscience

and the market.

Unions, chambers of commerce, sports clubs,
fraternal associations, schools,

churches and political parties-each of these
voluntary associations exists by virtue
of constituting or

reproducing individual humans as subjects-that

or reproducing a given

mode of subjectivity

or selfhood-either as mother or father,

union member, alumnus, religious believer or
something
religious believers, of performers of certain
rituals, after

This observation, as far as
already attributed to
groups.
348.

When we

the two views
349.
institutions

Dewey,

it

else.

all,

In the

there

is

absence of

no

goes, resembles the claim, which

that individuals both

religion.

we have

form and are formed bv

social

turn to involuntary associations, however, differences
between

become

significant.

and practices of class

According

to the

rule, including

view presented,

political

wowvoluntary associations, play a

crucial role in reproducing individuals as legal subjects,
on.

by constituting

is,

wage

earners, felons

and so

State institutions, in particular, prescribe not only the character of
public

)

Althusser,

)

Gramsci observed

p.

144.

that

no one

individuals almost always belong to

is

disorganized and without a party;

more than one private association. Indeed, he
asks whether readers of a newspaper constitute an organization (Gramsci 1971
p
265).
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selfhood, but also to a large
extent the character of private,
nonvoluntary
associations, and hence the
character of private selthood.

By enforcing

the

separation of church and state, for
example, judiciaries, legislatures, tax
authorities

and so on have been instrumental
conscience, "
personality,

enhanced the
In

And

this

in

making

religion "purely a matter of

has had a profound impact on the
character of "the religious

1:>u

which
stability

in turn

has bolstered the Jeffersonian compromise
and

of bourgeois social

Chapter One

we noted

relations.

that Rorty has

members of a democratic community could be

abandoned Dewey’s hope

reconstructed to efface the contrast

between private selfhood and community-spirited
public selfhood.
preceding observations,

assumption that there

is

it is

that

easy to agree with the

critic

In

who wrote

view of the

that, “Rorty's

a private self which can be formulated independently
of the

public one neglects the social origins and
implications of the self.” 351 This

of the strong poet as of the decent
In

post-Cold

War

citizen.

eastern Europe, as in the rich North Atlantic, political

power has been reinvested

in private associations

augmenting the power of the new ruling
that the range

and scope of existing

of greater access

to technologies

have emphasized

as true

is

in this section,

classes.

and non-state public associations,

As

noted, one reason for this

is

state institutions has increased as a result in part

and procedures of surveillance and

control.

however, another important reason for

role that non-state institutions play, including

mass media and the

churches, schools, reformist unions and the bourgeois family,

this

As
is

1

the

“free press,”

at least in

some of its

permutations. Even domestic drug trafficking gangs could count as highly

350.)

Weber famously acknowledged

the importance of “political circumstances”

vis-a-vis religious ideas (refer, for example, to

351.)

Haber,

p.

61.

Weber,

pp. 277-8, note 84).

no
“functional” associations in the
latter category, considering
their demoralizing and

demobilizing effect on working
class neighborhoods.

On

the other hand,

should be stressed that discourses
and activities that

it

subvert prevailing relations of
domination are not

public institutions.

workers

To

take

some obvious examples,

parties, unions, national liberation

communities have not been public
“supposed” to do. These

all

the result of dysfunctional
the most consistently militant

movements and Christian base

institutions that just did not

institutions

do what they were

have been characterized by internal

organizational structures and practices
geared for battle against the state and
the
ruling class alliance.

These structures and practices may have
included

clandestineness, democratic or bureaucratic
centralism, abstention from electoral
politics or the use

of elections for merely “pedagogical”
purposes, and a

preparedness to resort to such militant tactics
as general
so on.
state

Such organizations have come

when
It

armed

struggle and

into conflict with coercive institutions

of the

they have done what they were “supposed”
to do.

would seem

that the

demands of a subaltern group cannot be launched

from a platform beyond the sanction of the
the

strikes,

dominant position of the ruling

state,

class force.

without

As long

at least

as

posing a threat to

Jim Crow remained on

the books, police and FBI officials viewed even
the avowedly peaceful civil rights

movement

of the 1950s

when

and extra-legal impediments

legal

removed and the
state surveillance

a playing field
alliance.

and 1960s as a threat

to “national security .”

to the activism

which as a

rule

is

political struggle,

contrast,

of subaltern groups are

political struggle is transferred to terrain within the

and control, the

By

compass of

however heated, takes place on

steeply inclined in favor of the ruling class

1

These observations are
lor the resilience

all

the

more poignant when

of capitalist class rule

in the

it

1

conies to accounting

West. In "the most advanced

states,

Gramsci noted.

...

civil society’

which

is

become a very complex structure,
resistant to the catastrophic
'incursions’ of the
has

economic element

The modem
the

wa y

state

and one
immediate

(crises, depressions, etc.). 352

and what Gramsci referred to as

a P nsm breaks up white

light.

Both

state

civil society

break up opposition

and nonstate

institutions channel

dissent into a myriad of legal institutions
and in this

way

they absorb the shock of

opposition into themselves. Gramsci described
this process well:

The massive

structures of the modem democracies,
both as state
organizations, and as complexes of associations
in civil society
constitute for the art of politics as it were
the “trenches” and the
permanent fortifications of the front in the war of
position: they
render merely “partial’ the element of
movement which before

used

nrUrkl/%"

tr\ r\P

352.
In the East, by contrast (and evidently
Gramsci had Russia foremost in mind), “the

general-economic-cultural-social conditions [and] the structure of
national

embryonic and

loose,

and incapable of becoming

’trench or fortress’.”

life

are

354

Gramsci 1971, p.235. Gramsci did not succeed in finding a single,
)
wholly
satisfactory conception of civil society in relation to
the state. On occasion, for
353.
example, he described the state as political society + civil society,
” and as

“hegemony protected by

354.

the

he wrote that “in concrete

armor of coercion” (Gramsci 1971, p. 263); elsewhere,
and State are one and the same.”

reality, civil society

Gramsci sometimes used the term civil society “in the sense of political and cultural
social group over the entire society, as ethical content of the State...”
(Gramsci 1971, p. 208n). Still elsewhere, he wrote: “Between the economic

hegemony of a
structure

and the State with

(Gramsci 1971,

p.

its

208n).

)

Gramsci 1971,

p.

243.

)

Gramsci 1971,

p.

236.

legislation

and

its

coercion stands

civil society”

It

would seem, then,

Atlantic, both the public
part under the

that within the context

of the contemporary' north

and the private spheres must be brought

sway of dominant

at least in large

political institutions, state or non-state, or the

continuity of prevailing relations of production and class rule will be at
instance, a ruling class attempts to maintain

political

its

risk.

for

If,

domination by proscribing

the contest for control of representative institutions from the arena of legal political
activity, this struggle

is

then,

by

definition,

According

and the public are

may

then take the form of a military' siege by an

opposed

to the

to the state.

account presented so

political constructs.

35

'

The

far,

it

will

be noticed, both the private

private sphere

is itself at least in

an effect of politics, conceived broadly not as tinkering aimed
amelioration of suffering, but as a struggle

which are

enemy which

among

at

part

consensus and

classes, the highest stakes

of

power.

state

Proceeding a step further, one may even describe the self to which the strong
poet recognizes a duty as itself largely an effect of state institutions and other public
institutions.

Thus, one

may

to a large extent an effect

one may accept

this

conclude, pace Rorty, that autonomy, or lack thereof,

of social

institutions.

all

human

to repress them.”

So

far,

I

should be noted, moreover, that

conclusion without thereby subscribing to the view against

which Rorty convincingly polemicizes,
which

It

is

to the effect that

autonomy

is

“something

beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing
3 36

have sketched a picture of the

state as inseparable

from the

reality

of class domination, of state power as a stake of political struggle, of state
institutions as sites

355.)

Haber,

p.

356.)

CIS,

65.

p.

of class struggle and of

61.

political

power

as an effect ot non-state

13

1

institutions, as well as state institutions.

This sketch contrasts sharply to Dewey's

picture ot the state as ‘“the organization of the public effected through officials
for

the protection of the interests shared by

experiments

in

Rorty shares, that “politics

is

institutions as

problems."

its

members,"

co-operation,"

337

and

to

to Rortv's picture of “social

Dewey's assumption, which

a matter of everyone pulling together to solve

common

338

We are now in

a better position to compare Rorty’s account of the apolitical

private sphere, presented in Chapter One, with the account of the state and the
private sphere sketched in this section.

A

convenient

way of doing

this

would be

to

evaluate the very different ways in which the two accounts allow us to compare the

defunct nominally socialist states of eastern Europe with the liberal democracies of
the north Atlantic.

Privatization and Socialism

I

As

will

begin by making hay of headlines

late as 1987,

an admittedly distasteful manner.

Rorty wrote that “...time seems to be on the Soviet side,”

paper
357. published two years
358.
successful”

in

“Communist

later,

Orwell was not the

first

person to suggest that small gangs of

criminals might get control of modem states and, thanks to
3 *'"

technology, stay in control forever.

)

Rorty, in Malachowski,

)

Fraser, p. 104; see also Haber, p. 62.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”
CIS,

p.

171.

'

and

he wrote, with reference to the "spectacularly

oligarchs" in the Soviet Union:

359.

360.)

3

p.

p.

295.

566.

modem

in a

A

mere two years

after disparaging the

impregnable and ruthless Inner Party,” 361

monstrous

regimes

and

scattering less debris in

its

this

"ruthless

Moscow than

“unchanging second World run by an

"world”

its

“intractable,”

leaders, collapsed like a circus tent,

settled

on the

streets

of Los Angeles the

following Spring. Since then, the victorious former dissidents apotheosized by Cold

War

have presided over the impoverishment and disenfranchisement of

liberals

their populations, the worst political repression in

blood baths on a dozen killing
Surely

it

is

bad

fields,

taste to toss

Europe

in half a

century and

from Bosnia to Tajikistan.

an author's political forecasts

the unfair vantage point of six year retrospection. After

all,

in his face

from

Rorty could easily

rally

a legion of equally embarrassing prognostications from the same period authored by
erstwhile admirers of “existing socialism.'
that

Moreover, he provides us with evidence

he was not entirely oblivious to the changes taking place around him:

footnote presumably added for the 1991 republication of a text

first

In a

published

in

989, he acknowledged that what two years earlier he had referred to as “the
361.
unbreakable grip of the KGB in the Russian people and of the Soviet army on a
362.
1

third

of Europe” has been broken, thanks

Abraham Lincoln of Eastern

6

in large part to

Mikhail Gorbachev, "the

'

Europe.”'

363.

)

CIS,

)

ORT

182.

p.

“...the steady

p.

22

1

.

Also refer to “Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

566, with reference to

extension of Moscow's empire throughout the Southern Hemisphere,”

a development which, in 1987, Rorty

felt

was

likely to take place in the next

century.

)

EH,

p.

26n.

One wonders,

was hated as
Gorbachev is by the

parenthetically, whether Lincoln

thoroughly and unanimously by those he freed from

slavery' as

Russians he supposedly freed from totalitarianism.
Gorbachev compares favorably to the inane descant

Still,

in

Rorty's evaluation of

Kolenda, pp. 65-84.

Sometimes, however, distastefulness

why

1

warranted

There are two reasons

permit myself to use Rorty's political prognostications half
a decade ago to

motivate the discussion
First ot all,

play.

is

in this section:

he engages

Not only has he gainsaid

developments
writers

at

in this sort ot

socialist

maneuver himself, and turnabout

tnumphalists retrospectively,

the beginning ot Gorbachev's tenure, but he also has

who, twenty years

and more, clung to the hope

earlier

could have been reformed.

is fair

in the light

of

condemned

that the Soviet

Union

364

Secondly, and more significantly for the present discussion, he shares

something important with
prospect or exalting in

socialism” which was
political

Whether lamenting the

both sides confidently subscribed to an image of “existing

at least in

one respect a projection of the image of the

systems within which they

regime was
control.

it,

socialist tnmphalists in the West:

stable, in control

Non-tnumphalists

and

in

lived:

According to

this

liberal

image, the Soviet

possession of lots of resources to stay in

to the left

of Rorty could also be indicted for the same

offense, including the Frankfurters and Foucault, who, by casting both East and

West

into the

same “technological,”

“post-industrial” or “carceral” pot, greatly

overstated the flexibility and resources of the regimes in the East and in this respect
greatly underestimated the differences

The question we
his critics

on the

so far off the

left:

mark

between East and West.

will raise for Rorty, then,

How could

as late as 1989

a person

when

it

who

must also be directed

“has read

came

lots

to

many of

of books” have been

to assessing the stability

of the

rapidly disintegrating regimes of the Eastern Bloc?

364.)

Refer to CIS,

p.

on the minds of French

170, with reference to the grip of “Bolshevik propaganda”
intellectuals.

tended

A

possible response might be that these cosmopolitan
academics have

to

underestimate the central role that virulent nationalisms
played

velvet revolutions.

Faithful heirs of the Enlightenment, including

in their

Gorbachev

himself, preferred to think of their allies against the old
guard as fellow democrats

with

normal civilized

goals, rather than as the opportunists, obstreperous

megalomaniacs and ethnic cleansers they so often turned out
Another possible response to

this question,

one

that is

to be.

more

relevant to the

present discussion, might entail defending the following claim: Whether or not
the

Soviet leadership was a gang of criminals in

which the leadership

of, say, the

certainly did not exemplify a

some

United States

“modem

special but unspecified sense in
3

is

not,

state,” at least

° the Soviet
Union most

with reference to institutions

which generate the consent of the governed.
This

last

point

is

particularly evident with reference to private forms of

association under “actually existing socialism.” Past claims of the Novosti Press

Agency

to the contrary,

been made public.

On

it

does not appear that

in eastern

Europe private

life

had

the contrary, as a previously-cited source has noted.

Since the late 1950s the Soviet people have gradually but
unswervingly diverted their interests from the state to their primary
groups (family, friends, and lovers) and to semi-legal and illegal civil
(

society as well as to illegal activity inside the public sector.

As
long time,

is

well-known,

this

at the individual,

process of privatization had been taking place for a

family and friendship levels,

at the level

of the

Korporationen (including the so-called mass organizations), and even
the highest aparatchiks.

Ample evidence of this

at the level

of

trend could have been collected by

almost anyone with even casual contact with the woefully inefficient state-owned

365.)

To

Reagan”
366.)

his credit, Rorty also describes the

as a

“shadowy millionaires manipulating

gang of thugs (“Thugs and Theorists,”

Shlapentokh,

p. 13.

pp. 565-6).

industrial enterprises, or the cooperative

functionaries and party officials

who

and

state farms, or the venal state

regularly took advantage of their positions for

personal gain

Because of

their corruption

Europe were forced

augment

to

and inefficiency, the old regimes of eastern

their

more

directly repressive state institutions, even

to the point of resorting to foreign military intervention
to quell popular uprisings,

as in

Hungary

in

1956 and Czechoslovakia

in

1968

Predictably enough, these and

other repressive measures had the opposite effect. As Nicos Poulantzas wrote
at
least thirteen years before 1991:

Not only does authoritarian statism fail to enclose the masses in its
web or to 'integrate” them in its authoritarian circuits; it
actually provokes general insistence on the need for direct, rank-and-

disciplinary
file

democracy--a veritable explosion of democratic demands. 367

These regimes did not just provoke democratic demands, however; they also
created the space both within state institutions and outside them for the formation of

subversive associations.

What rendered

state institutions in eastern

Europe highly

dysfunctional was not just inefficiency within their domains of authority, but also
the limited scope of their operation. In

some

marketeering within state-owned enterprises,
important state institutions,

let

cases, such as widespread black
state

power did not even

saturate

alone private associations. Rather than being

controlled to a great extent by state institutions, as in the West, the private sphere

came

to

be determined

in large part

institutions lacking state sanction.

church, the samizdat,

human

rights

by fissiparous and increasingly assertive

These included organized crime syndicates, the
watch groups, and

later,

unions, nationalist fronts and full-blown opposition parties.

367.)

Poulantzas,

p.

247.

independent trade

118

Even

the

most intimate primary groups were transformed

into subversive institutions.

Surveys conducted

in the final years

at least partially

of the Soviet

period indicate the prevalence of private institutions— including
that sanctum

sanctorum of the private sphere, the family — over public ones, including
institutions, in

state

forming the value system of the respondents. 368 Smaller families, a

growing desire for economic independence on the
and rejection of cohabitation with parents

and many more besides,

part of the

after marriage-all

younger generation
of these developments,

testify to increased “privatization within private life,”

they also provide an impetus for further privatization.

and

36

Similar observations apply to other areas of the private sphere, as well as to
other eastern European states. In one case after another, the private sphere was

first

a refuge from state power, then a fortress, and then a secure rear base for a frontal
assault against the state.

However accurate
state associations

not

fit

this

model of the relationship between the

may have been

state

and non-

with reference to eastern Europe, however,

it

does

well with reference to the advanced capitalist West. In the liberal

democracies, even the most intimate realms of activity play an important role

in

maintaining dominant social relations of production. For example, although the
368.
importance of the nuclear family in this context has diminished in relation to public

369.
schools
and television, Althusser and others have emphasized the role of the family
in

reproducing prevailing relations of class domination.

been too unilateral with reference

)

Shlapentokh,

)

Shlapentokh, pp. 168-9

370.)

p.

164.

Althusser, pp. 143-5

to the

^70

This view

may

well have

French bourgeois family under the Fifth

1

Republic,
'

let

alone the transmogrified family structures of the
contemporary United

1

States.

Nevertheless, to the extent that the institution of the family

democracies have

by

19

'

state agencies,

required

much

ruling class
structure

example,

been spared exposure to

in large part
7

“

it

may simply be because

for any of a

in the

of the continuity of

number of reasons, a

no longer reproduces dominant

and overt incursions

the bourgeois family itself has not

state intervention to function as a guarantor

power When,

United States

direct

in the liberal

particular family

social relations efficiently (as, for

case of France in the closing years of the nineteenth century, or the

of the twentieth century),

in the final years

increased intervention of state institutions. 37

Poulantzas has argued that the
the institutional integration of

power

it

has been subject to the

'

state's ability to

relationships.

reproduce

itself

depends on

Ironically, in the case

of the

highly centralized states of the East these power relationships were far less
371.
integrated than in the liberal democratic states of the advanced capitalist West. In

view of the diminishing power of subversive

institutions in the

advanced

capitalist

372.
)

Many working

class,

poor and black families

in the

United States today

appear to lack the

stability requisite for a well-functioning apparatus of class rule.
At present, for instance, the patriarchal nuclear family, consisting of a male
breadwinner and a female housewife, accounts for only twelve percent of the

households

norm, due

)

in the

United States, while the single parent household

is

becoming

the

in part to a fifty percent divorce rate.

It is

not a foregone conclusion, however, that this has been the case (refer to

Donzelot).

373 .)

Donzelot has reported

that, at the turn

of the century

in France, the state

took

steps in the areas of public assistance, juvenile law, medicine, public schooling,

public housing and psychiatry that reduced patriarchal authority, and hence the

autonomy of the family among the “less-favored”
According to him, the family

in its

guarantor against the encroachments of the

of the bourgeois

state, as

classes (Donzelot,

contemporary permutations
state,

Althusser would have

it

nor

is

it

is

p. 89).

neither a

an ideological apparatus

(Donzelot, pp. 52-53).
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West, Poulantzas' observation carries even more weight
today than when

it

was

first

made:

[There

no limit de jure or in principle to the modem State's
encroachment on the private. However paradoxical it may seem, the
very separation of public and private that is established by the State
opens up for it bound-less vistas of power. 374
is]

If in eastern

Europe the private sphere was continually violated by a handful

of enormous and enormously unwieldy, corrupt and incompetent bureaucracies,
the

West

it is

in

supervised not by one or two centralized bureaucracies, but by

multiple networks of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, public and
private,

which are not limited

to

such narrowly repressive state agencies as the FBI,

the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms. Consider,

employment

for

example, such private sources of information as

records, telephone accounts, academic transcripts, credit reports,

actuarial projections, medical records, psychodiagnostic assessments,

background

checks by insurance agencies and private investigators, and omnipresent electronic
monitors

in the labyrinthine

collar worksites

panopticons of shopping malls, parking

and cyberspace. All of these sources of information

lots,

white

testify to the

pervasiveness of non-state surveillance, regulation and manipulation of private
374.
in
the rich
375.

life

North Atlantic.

To complicate

matters,

it is

not always a straightforward task to distinguish
«

from non-state agencies of surveillance and

state

the West, where, as

)

Poulantzas,

)

In his

we have

p.

control.

This

is

true particularly in

already noted: (a) the administration of the state

72.

book The Naked Consumer Eric Larson describes
,

the formidable

private sector networks that monitor, track and manipulate consumers.
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extends far beyond the traditional bureaucracy,
to encompass central banks,
regulatory commissions, lobbies, nonprofit
corporations, policy planning institutes

and other agencies, each of which has

and control, and

(b) the

Furthermore, as

its

own

resources for information gathermu

power of big business has merged seamlessly with

we have

the state.

indicated, the scope of state intervention, the

compass of state power, has been anything but

drawn from a survey of the labor

fixed.

One

generalization to be

history of the United States

is

that terrain

contested by state power has been one of many flashpoints of class
conflict.

Working-class organizations have fought long and hard to expand
in the areas

of union recognition,

minimum wage

state supervision

laws, corporate taxes, regulation

of industry and commerce, social security, occupational

safety,

environmental

safeguards and social programs. At the same time, some of the same organizations

have fought
restrict the

sphere.

bitter battles for a rigorous

Bill

of Rights, to

operation of state agencies, especially repressive ones, in the private

And

in

each of these

ruling-class forces.
institutions

implementation of the

battles, they

have encountered much resistance from

The character and compass of state and

have been

a

bone

of contention vis-a-vis both

non-state public

Korporationen which are

not state institutions, and the “primary groups” of the private sphere.

The

first

category would include conflicts over regulation, anti-trust legislation, 376 use of
public lands, environmental degradation and corporate
industries, health care, social security

liability,

subsidies to

and so on. The second category would

include contention over freedom of speech, reproductive rights,

sodomy

laws, the

separation of church and state, “family values” and so on. In recent years the battle

zone has expanded

376.)

Which

in

to cyberspace, as

opponents have clashed over the

any case amounted to

little

more than

widespread popular discontent. Refer, for example,
pp. 12-44.

a pro-forma concession to

to the discussion in

Munkirs,

Tel ecommm un cati ons Bill, the future of the so-called
information super-highway,
i

surveillance of the Internet and control of the content
of multimedia programming

These examples underscore the observation already made

between

state

and non-state

institutions

and between the public and private spheres

are blurry, elastic, discontinuous and shifting lines of

though not always, located on

Moreover,

complex,

at the

it

is

the fact that

As

that the border

scrimmage which

political terrain defined

nsk of further complicating a picture

by

are often,

state institutions.

that is already exceedingly

important to keep in mind the class character of the terrain

itself

and

also undergoes constant transformation.

it

the foregoing considerations

would

suggest,

it is

inaccurate to depict the

negative rights embodied in documents such as the Bill of Rights as

somehow

carving a sphere of freedom away from the mechanisms of class rule and political

To paraphrase Michel

domination.

to the private sphere

we

would seem,

1

we must

say no to political power.

The contrast-term
Moreover, as

Foucault,

for “private sphere”

have indicated,

state

power

far

is

377

“public sphere,” not “the state.”

over reaches state institutions.

then, that Martin Jacques’ picture of a

civil society is inaccurate, or at least stated in

not think that by saying yes

power

shift

from the

It

state to

a misleading manner. True,

many

functions which, at least at the official level, used to be reserved for public
institutions

what he
the

of the

state

have indeed shifted squarely to the non-state institutions of

calls civil society,

power of the ascendant

enhanced

and to more intimate realms. Far from detracting from
ruling class alliance, however, this shift has greatly

that power.

Let us recall the instances Jacques cites to illustrate his claim: the

burgeoning membership

377.)

Foucault 1980,

p.

in

environmental groups, the “range of cultural

153.

activities,”

and the massively enhanced role of the media
today. As

it

turns out, each one of

these instances could be turned convincingly
against Jacques' claim

One might

note, for starters, the co-optation and political
neutralization of events such as Earth

Day by

corporations and state commissions, or the political use
of the rain forest

issue by the

economies

I

M

F. to inhibit

in the South.

the development of more independent capitalist

In relation to cultural activities,

monotonous, soporific and demoralizing
sponsored’™ cultural

Edward

Said's

effects of the increasingly corporate-

activities in the rich

Dulles’ prescient observation that culture

one might consider the

North Atlantic, or
is

recall

the leading edge of U

remark might also be relevant

John Foster
S.

foreign policy.

in this context:

would

like to suggest that many of the most prominent
characteristics of modernist culture, which we have tended to derive
from purely internal dynamics in Western society and culture,
include a response to the external pressures on culture from
I

imperium

Moreover, with reference

would do well

to consult

to the

enormous influence of the media today, Jacques

Ben Bagdikian's documentation of the

concentration ol ownership ot the electronic and print media

in

rapid and massive

fewer and fewer

hands, and the ever closer connection between the corporate media and the

government.

^80

378.

These observations bring us back

to the conclusion that in the

379.
capitalist

and

state

West, the private sphere conforms to and bolsters the
capitalist class rule:

Almost

all

domestic

liberal

advanced
democratic

political opposition is loyal

opposition; the content of the omnipresent and increasingly corporate-owned press

)

Refer to Schiller.

)

Said,

380.)

p.

188.

Refer to Bagdikian.
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and entertainment industries meshes ever more finely
with
all

“cultural expression,” including supposedly subversive

and even subsidized by the
in his

is

own way,

a broad

entire

M
state.'

state policy,

art,

has been tolerated

As Foucault and Poulantzas have

surveillance in a “pluralist society”-that

mix of functions of public and

is,

and nearly

indicated each

a setup in

which there

private institutions--reins in nearly the

panorama of life.
Ironically, then, Rorty’s

ominous prognostications about some twentieth-

century states miss his intended target. If there are regimes that have stayed

power thanks

in large part to

modem

in

technology, they were not the member-states

of the Warsaw Pact, but rather the rich North Atlantic democracies, including
Rorty's

own

liberal

private sphere
in the liberal

is

democratic experiment, the United States of America. The

not a realm of freedom insulated from political power-least of all

democracies of the West, where

it is

thought to be

freest.

Like herds

of American bison, “Emerson’s American sense of a new kind of social freedom” 382
survives in a much-diminished form, as a simulacrum of a sentimentalized past,

within a well-circumscribed and controlled domain.

Thus, Orwell's question, which Rorty approvingly repeats,™'

hundred and eighty degrees

in the

wrong

direction:

381.
remain free inside should be directed in the
382.
where
the private sphere functions very

minority of exploiters.

)

Refer to Schiller.

)

EH,

383.)

CIS,

p. 4.

p.

176.

first

is

aimed one

The question whether one can

place to the rich North Atlantic,

efficiently to ensure the

hegemony of a

Leninists frequently have been accused of
postulating the absence of civil
society.

Indeed, the apparent reassertion of civil society,
and the intractability of the

private sphere in eastern
leftists

Europe seem

to

be chief reasons why Jacques and other

have claimed that Leninism “has had

distinguishes the Leninist view ot state

its

day.”

It

may

well be true that what

power from other perspectives

is

the

repudiation in theory of the notion of civil society, as well
as skepticism as to

whether
state.

it

is at all

What

meaningful to speak of a private sphere

has been said so

possible interpretation, Lenin

Bolsheviks, he once said

far,

a great truth

at least

not recognize anything 'private'.” 385

To

the extent

ownership of the

to the extent that (except in the imaginations

political philosophers, their

one

when, speaking of the

that the private is a legal category instantiating the system of

means of production, and

the absence of the

however, would suggest that by

was affirming

“We do

in

of some

populanzers and the many under their sway) the

state

stands above the law, Lenin’s rejection of the notion of a nonpolitical private sphere

may

well be an advantage, for descriptive purposes other than apologetics for

bourgeois liberalism.
This, however, does not imply that, despite appearances, everything

public “deep down.”

I

have presented a case for concluding

that nothing

naturally or intrinsically either public or private. Nevertheless, as

emphasized, the private sphere
consciousness, either.

384.)

It is

It is,

is

1

is

really

is

have

not a pure illusion produced by false

rather,

interesting to note that

an important component or aspect of

nowhere

in

volume

thirty-eight of Lenin's

Collected Works will one find a conspectus of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, and a
perusal of the index to the Collected Works reveals little evidence that the founder

of the Bolshevik Party ever read the book. For Lenin, who
great admirer of the

German

idealist, Hegel's

and antiquated” (Lenin 1976, p 312).
385.)

Quoted

in

Therbom,

p.

69

in

other respects was a

philosophy of history was “obsolete

126

contemporary social

own

relations, an

element that public policy-makers ignore

at their

risk.

The proposals advanced during
that Soviet leaders

were compelled

private sphere had long ago

to

the period of perestroika confirm the view

acknowledge

become an

instructive to consider several of their

that a pervasive

and vigorous

established fact in the Soviet Union.

more sweeping

It is

proposals, with reference to

public institutions of the state:™ 6

Dismantle the unwieldy central planning bureaucracy and attempt to develop
sort of market mechanism to conform costs of production more closely

some
to

consumer prices—hopefully, within the context of economic planning (as
Gorbachev's economic initiatives terribly undermined

we know, however,

the well being of direct producers, while at the

same time depriving workers

of the old mechanisms for redress of grievances);
Decentralize production by eliminating state subsidies to inefficient
enterprises and legalizing forms of “personal property” and cooperative
enterprises which effectively amount to private ownership of the means of
production (though not necessarily to large-scale exploitation, as long as
cooperatives are prohibited from hiring large numbers of direct producers);

Foster independent workers’ unions and legalize the right to strike;

386.

Scrap the scores of prohibitions and security measures obstructing access to

new

technologies, information, foreign travel and resource allocation;

Separate the Party structure from that of the

state,

and inaugurate a multi-

387.party candidate-selection system;™ 7

Granted, this

)

demands which were
this

list

may

be,

selective; various constituencies

list is

compatible with the point argued here. However

less

however,

1

believe

it is

)

On

February

7,

partial

representative of one dominant trend within

the C.P.S.U. in the late 1980s, a trend which

Mikhail Gorbachev (cf

advanced other

was associated with

the

name of

Gorbachev).

1990 the Soviet

Party's Central

Committee voted

to repudiate

Article Six of the 1977 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. This article guaranteed that the

Party

would determine

“..

.the general perspectives

of the development of society

and the course of the domestic and foreign policy of the
great constructive

work of the Soviet people

”

U

S S

R

,”

as well as “the

127

Distinguish sharply between the property, rules, norms and
organizational
principles of voluntary political organizations and those of
state institutions;

Develop an

framework of representative democracy— preferably,
upon which to build some form of participatory democracy^

institutional

as a foundation

workers' and consumers' councils and mass organizations; 388

Develop more effective guarantees for the negative rights of liberal
democracy, and de-emphasize such "positive rights” as workers’ self-

management and
Institutionalize
legality,

the right to a job;

mechanisms

for oversight

and accountability

to enforce strict

both within state institutions and within the Party;

Inaugurate a looser All-Union federal arrangement (perhaps along lines
proposed in the democratically ratified March 17, 1991 referendum),
granting a greater degree of self-determination to nations within the multinational state, and permitting

and

much

greater latitude for economic, cultural

political initiatives at the republic level.

It

would be accurate

389

to characterize the proposals

on

this list as part

of a

388.

movement towards
would be

privatization.

As

I

have attempted to indicate, however,

incorrect to conclude from this that they

amount

to

moves

it

to diminish the

extent of state power. True, most of the proposals listed involve expanding the

389.
)

Gorbachev was correct

at least in the

view

that this

proposal-and for that

matter, every other proposal on this list— is compatible with Leninist political
practice.

Referring to the Pans

Commune, Lenin

wrote.

We cannot imagine democracy, even proletanan democracy, without
representative institutions, but

we can and must imagine democracy

without parliamentansm. (Quoted

in

Wnght,

p.

201.)

Ronald Suny Has argued a point analogous to the present one, with reference
to nationalism in the Transcaucasus. "Not without its own contradictions and
paradoxes,” Suny writes, "the Soviet experience resulted in stronger, more coherent
)

and conscious nationalities than entered the federation at its inception” (Suny, p. 22;
also see; Langman). Similarly, I have argued that instead of making the private
public, “actually existing socialism” continued the production and expansion of the
private sphere inherited from the pre-revolutionary pasts of the Soviet nationalities.
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private sphere at the expense of the public sphere, and state
institutions in
particular; nevertheless,

private sphere.

On

none of them requires a

retreat

of state power from the

the contrary, implementation of some of these proposals has

arguably intensified and expanded the terrain of political domination by giving state
sanction to large areas of private

life

previously ignored on the official level, while

simultaneously bringing these areas under the authority of the

state.

Consider, for

the sake of illustration, the myriad enterprises which constituted the so-called

shadow economy of Russia: As

these enterprises have been forced to function

above board, they have become subject to greater

From

the fact that these

economic and

too late for the Soviet Union,

little

it

to this sort of privatization

would appear

workers are

power

will

political

after

1

and taxation.

reforms proved to be too

does not follow that they are

incompatible with socialism. Indeed, as

to retain state

state regulation

in principle

have suggested, prospects of alternatives

to be poor in the foreseeable future: If

winning

it

through political struggle, they

have to transform private forms of association into mechanisms of workers'

power, instead of attempting to proscribe them by means of repression.'

390.)

With reference

to multi-party

90

democracy, for example, one well-known

“culture critic” has noted that:

The one-party

totalitarian

political scene,

it

the minimal flux

regime

is

an unstable form— it defuses the

no longer assures the feed-back of public opinion,
in the integrated circuit

which constitutes the

transistorized political machine. (Baudrillard,

might be suggested

It

institutions within the

that, rather

p.

131.)

than seeking to bring

all

subversive

compass of state sanction, democracy and workers' power

by maintaining the existence ol oppositional institutions in
tension with state institutions. Holding the latter accountable even to the most
hostile criticism might actually strengthen them by enhancing their efficiency and
stability. Paradoxically, however, once the ruling class is confident enough of its

would be

better served

possession of sufficient resources to sanction the existence of
oppositional institutions, this gesture itself has amounted to the co-optation and
political

power and

in

effective transformation of them into reformist institutions.
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In the next section

I

will bolster the case against Rorty's account

of the

inviolable private sphere by elaborating on the point that social institutions
and
practices, including

voluntary associations and state institutions, play a crucial

role in defining not only the character of public selfhood, but also to a large extent

My

the character of private selfhood.

preempt as a

how even

fruitful topic

aim

of conversation

clear

is to

away

how one's

obstacles that he claims

notions of community and

private self-descriptions conduce to or inhibit prevailing relations of

exploitation and political domination. In the course of doing this

conception of ideology which

is

immune from

I

will argue for a

his criticisms of Ideologiekritik.

Private Selfhood and Ideology

David Hall has noted
hopelessness

lie in

that

“The grounds

for Rorty's

the different attitudes of these

of the public and private sphere.”

391

Hall

is

hope and Foucault's

two thinkers toward the

relations

repeating a theme of, for instance, the

two-thirds of CIS, as well as the final section of “Method, Social Science and

last

Social Hope.”

39 "

He

continues.

391.
Insisting upon distinguishing the public and private spheres risks
begging what for both Rorty and Foucault is the essentially empirical
question of whether there is an efficacious private life for
individuals, in liberal democratic societies.

392.

)

Hall, p. 156.

)

CP,

393.)

pp. 203-8.

Hall, p. 155.

130

Rorty answers this essentially empirical question
course.

from

As one might guess by now, however,

his definition

inviolable private
In this

sphere.

1

of a

liberal society as

this

in the affirmative,

answer follows almost

one which guarantees Kundera's

of

trivially

right to an

life.

chapter

we have

have suggested

encountered a very different view of the private

that the state

and the private spheres, and

is

a condition

of actuality of both the public

that private institutions as well as public ones play

crucial roles in bolstering relations of exploitation consonant with capitalist class

While

rule.

I

have pointed out good empirical reasons for rejecting Rorty’s picture

of an apolitical private sphere,

I

also have indicated that the private sphere

is

not a

pure illusion of false consciousness, either.

So

if Hall

takes the modifier efficacious in the passage just cited to signify

that the distinction

between public and private

difference, then his “empirical question"

course there
After

all,

is

an efficacious private

the sphere of private

life

life

makes

a big nonlinguistic

may be answered

life for

as follows:

Yes, of

individuals in liberal democracies.

and private property

is

instantiated in architecture

and urban planning, individual behavior, patterns of consumption and production,
and so on, as well as thousands of constantly re-enacted
institutional routines

It

seems more

holds that private
is

and norms and so
likely

life is

on.

from the context of Hall's passage, however,

efficacious to the extent that

prior to politics or separable

from

interpretation of his view, then, as

answer

legal procedures,

I

institutions

it is

of the

somehow

state.

that he

self-sealing, or

If this is a correct

have indicated, there are good reasons not to

his question in the affirmative.

If

we

take “efficacious" in this sense, then

apparently Hall has failed to distinguish between the public sphere on the one hand

and

institutions

categories.

of political domination on the other hand as

distinct analytical

This would account for his and Rorty's assumption that wherever there

131

is

an

efficacious

private sphere there

is

also freedom and the possibility of

autonomy, as they use these terms.
For Foucault and
private sphere

not

is

many

Marxists, by contrast, extensive state recognition
of a

synonymous with

opportunity to achieve autonomy.

On

the expansion of negative freedom and the
the contrary, if private associations and

practices play such an important role in securing near-total
submission to the

established order in existing liberal democracies, then acknowledging
the

efficaciousness of the private sphere enables Foucauldians and Marxists
to say
nasty things about “actually existing liberalism,” not fewer.

add a new chapter

instance, to

to their stories

a chapter that could be entitled

“How the

It

more

allows them, for

of class rule or disciplinary practices,

Private Sphere

Enhances the Domination

of the Bourgeoisie.”

do not propose

to write that chapter here.

Rather,

I

want

to scrutinize

of Rorty’s objections to such an undertaking. In particular,

1

want

to

I

disparagement,

CIS and subsequent works, of the very attempt

in

examine

some

his

to describe the

private sphere and private selfhood in a political light. This requires turning our
attention to his disparagement of the use of the

word “ideology” and

its

cognates.

Rorty would like to convince his readers that “the” notion of ideology
3

useless.

M

In the

following pages, however,

criticisms miss the

which

I

will

mark when

it

comes

it

should become clear that his

to at least

recommend. Although we may grant

one conception of ideology,
that the proffered conception

be worse than useless for Rorty's apologetic purposes

Chapter Six),
apologetics

394.)

CIS,

it

may

p.

should become clear that others
well find

59n.

it

is

who

(to

which we

may

will return in

are less prone to such

useful not only for private purposes of “tracing the

blind impresses our behavings bear,

way

in a

that

but also for redescnbing personal behavings

conducive to quite different

is

political purposes.

Let us review Rortv's objections to Ideologiekritik 3% There are several
,

related criticisms:

Speaking

in the

most general terms, he associates disquisitions about

ideology with representationalist accounts of knowledge.
Ideologiekritik as an attempt to strip

away systematically

of a thing, to unmask the one true description of it,
Thus,

if

its

He

characterizes

distorted representations

underlying dynamics.

397

representational ism goes, so does Ideologiekritik.

As noted

in the

Introduction above, Rorty has convincingly argued that

He

representational ism should go.

congratulates Wittgenstein for diagnosing the

urge to ask “...questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought,”

and concluding

that

hidden from view.”

we must

cure ourselves of the fixation that “the essence

is

398

395.

Rorty also ascribes to some Ideologiekr Hiker, namely Marxists,

“...a

fuzzy

396.
distinction

between

'ideology'

escapes being 'ideology.

'“ 399

and a form of thought (the Marxists' own) which

With a

little

help, perhaps,

from Kolakowski and

397.
)

Rorty discusses Philip Larkin's trope

CIS, pp. 23-43.

in

398.

Geuss clearly has informed Rorty's discussion of Ideologiekritik (CIS, p.
the word Ideologiekritik to designate “a reflective
59n;
399. Geuss, pp. x, 3). Geuss uses
theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive ot
)

enlightenment and emancipation,” where enlightenment involves attainment
“

knowledge of one's true interests'\Geuss,

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

)

EH,

p.

60.

Some key

essences have been glossed

)

CIS,

p.

pp. 569-70;

of

p. 2).

EH,

pp.

1

87-8.

points in Rorty's case against searching for such

in the first section

59n. This description,

it

will

of the Introduction above.

be noted, does not square easily with

Castonadis, he interprets Marx, a

man whose

duhitandum

long

,

to

have held

that, at

Science,

it

account,

Marx would appear

is

possible to cast

all

to

last

favorite motto

1

•> *>

1

->J

was De omnibus

having ascended to the heights of

previous knowledge

at

once into doubt. By

this

be one of those ‘'committed to the construction of a

permanent neutral framework for enquiry, and thus

for all culture.”

400

Further on, Rorty provides an important clue as to what he means by

“ideology”

when he

writes:

The question

[of whether or not the critique of ideology

philosophy, as

Habermas and

others

would have

it]

is

central to

turns on whether

one thinks

that one can give an interesting sense to the word
“ideology”-make it mean more than “bad idea.” 401

Rorty, of course, does not believe that one can

more

time and

To

“bad idea.” Presumably, a bad idea

interesting than

warranted

in declaring to

in a variety

be

is

false, evil, unjust or

is

an idea which one

clumsy, because

it

has proven over

is

the

bad

in the

way of belief,

then, Rorty's “deflated”

truth-functional.

.the idea Havel mocks when he says that a mark of the good
communist is that he “subscribes to an ideology and believes that
anyone who doesn't subscribe to it must therefore subscribe to
.

.

another ideology, because he can't imagine anyone's not subscribing
to an ideology.” (“The End of Leninism,” p. 10; Rorty cites Havel's
collection of interviews published under the title Disturbing the

Peace
400.)

PMN,

,

p.

80.)

p. 8.

Cf. Castonadis' similar claim that

Marxism

of history to categories [including relations
ofproduction which are determined “in the last instance” by the
productive forces, as well as “politics” and other “autonomous”
fields of activity within the “superstructure”] that have a sense only
for capitalist society in developed countries. (Castoriadis, p. 29.)
...attempts to submit all
,

401.)

CIS,p. 84n.

is

of cases to be useless or detrimental for a particular purpose.

the extent that the false

notion of ideology

make “ideology” mean anything

134

Ideologieknt iker claim super science status
beliefs in

vocabularies for

all

all

when

they aspire to adjudicate

time and when they deny they are using a

“particular historically conditioned and temporary vocabulary.”402

claimed to

fulfill

the latter role in at least one of at least

They have

two ways.

(1

)

by

permitting us to escape “class subjectivism,” thus providing us with a putatively
objective or scientific knowledge, something of a “view from nowhere”; or
(2) by

assuming the standpoint of the

proletariat, thus allowing us to transcend the class

subjectivism of those who, having a great deal more to lose than just their chains,

have a vested

interest in

remaining blind to the sources of their privilege, the

ignominious origins of the present regime and the

irrationality,

contingency and

transitoriness of the status quo.

Both of these ways of claiming super science

status involve revealing the

economic-class determinants of beliefs, determinants which Marx described

famous passage from
“real foundation” to

his

1

859 “Preface

to

A

Critique of Political

Economy ”

in a

as the

which “definite forms of social consciousness” correspond.

Lukacs' proletariat, for example,

own debasement and

is in

a position to gain scientific knowledge of

its

the possibility of redemption because, as the objectified

402.
subject of history,
403.

it is

the most thoroughly disillusioned subject heretofore.

4"

'

Rorty might have had some such formulation in mind when he wrote that
Ideologieknt ik
404.
science can

is at

tell

the center of “the Marxist idea that a philosophical super-

the working class their true situation

”4 " 4

)

CIS,

)

Rorty approves of Habermas' rejection of “Lukacs's idea that the working

p.

48.

class-the Marxist version of the transcendental subject--is
privileged position” (“Posties,”

)

The

quote, from Rorty’s

Hall, p. 177.

in

an epistemologically-

p. 12).

“From Logic

to

Language Play”

(p.

753), appears in

135

Against the view that those

who remain

prisoners of bourgeois class

subjectivism remain blinded by ideology, Rorty protests that performing
such tasks
as sensitizing an audience to cases of suffering

noticed

is

which they had not previously

simply a matter of “redescnption.” 405

One way

being blinded by ideology differs from “redescription”
the former,

is

is

in

which the notion of

that the latter term, unlike

truth-neutral.

By Rorty's

lights, then, “the”

notion of ideology opposes false imaginings to

the real. Accordingly, he criticizes a notion of ideology

as:

(a) False consciousness, mystification (Condorcet), socially necessary
illusion, Althusser's

discourse,”
literature

406

“imaginary version of a

real relation,” “distorted

Geuss' “ideology in the pejorative sense”

sometimes used

407

or

what Novosti

to refer to as “illusory ideology,” in contrast to

“scientific ideology.”

The

literary output

of the vulgar economists exemplifies

this

meaning of

“ideology,” as do (arguably) the fetishism of the commodity and the

This pejorative sense of ideology however,
,

is

wage

form.

only one of several uses to

405.
which Marxists and others have put the word. Consider

some

other meanings of the

406.
word, to be found in the works of Marxist writers:

(b) Constellations
to

“mask

of beliefs,

attitudes, dispositions

and so on which serve

400

social contradictions”;

407.

)

CIS, pp. 173-4.

)

The obvious reference here

is

to

Habermas. Also see Nielsen,

p.

213.

Nielsen invokes the notion of “seeing the world rightly” to sustain his conception of
ideology as distorted discourse (Nielsen,

p.

214). Rorty, of course,

would dismiss

such a formulation as useless for anything but registering approval of a description.
This presumably would include Gustave Bergmann's
definition of an ideological statement as “a value judgment disguised as or mistaken
)

Geuss, pp.

1

2ff.

for a statement of fact” (cited in Geuss, p. 14n).

408.)

Cf. Geuss, p.

1

8.
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(c) Juridical, philosophical

the phrases

embodied

and technical principles of state power, as
and “the ideology of the state,” or as

in, say,

Roman

law, Shari’a or the orthodoxy of Stalin’s Russia;

Conscious or unconscious

(d)

in

official ideology’

rules,

based on principles for morality and

conduct;
(e) * Patterns

of behavior (prominently including linguistic behavior), as

in

Althusser's formulation, “a lived relation to the world”;

Systematic ways of viewing things, in the broadest sense of the word;
409
Weltanschauungen
bodies of widely-shared, important and in some

(f)

;

sense highly coherent perceptions or beliefs, as in “the

German

ideology”;

(g) Ideals; Plekhanov’s “ideology of the higher sort,” consisting of science,

philosophy, the arts and so on;
*

Noncoercive practices, prominently including linguistic practices,
which support the economic system or reproduce dominant relations of
(h)
(j)

production;

A

(I)

social or collective practice distinct

from but concerned with

(nonlinguistic) action; a collective practice

philosophy;

*

A

which

is

“more

practical” than

410

relatively noncoercive field of class conflict or competition for

cultural

and

political

hegemony

(as in Gramsci);

409.
(k) *

A

which implies a cause though not a

social determination

410.justification

,

411
,

411.

)

Refer to the discussion of ideology as world-view

)

Cf. Geuss' “ideology in a

in

Geuss, pp. 9-11.

programmatic sense” (Geuss,

p. 11).

Rorty comes close to this formulation when he approvingly cites Davidson's
view that “...new metaphors are causes but not reasons for changes ot belief’ (CIS,
merely causes
p. 50), and when he notes that when metaphors die they cease to be
)

and become reasons

for beliefs

(ORT,

p.

171

).
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This
bring

home

list is

not intended to be exhaustive. 4

It

should suffice, however, to

the point that various interpreters and
different traditions or schools,

Marxist and non-Marxist, have subscribed to different
notions of ideology. Rorty
certainly nght to observe that

many

writers have used “ideology” to

idea.” Others, however, have provided accounts
of ideology

the Marxist classics,

which are prefigured

or for that matter, in the works of, say, Karl

same time avoid

contending vocabularies but their

own

are

bad

following variation on “functional” definition

An

mean “bad
in

413

Talcott Parsons, and which at the

(fo)

is

attitude, ritual or set

viewed with an eye

to

its

Mannheim

the assumption that

ideas.

or

all

Consider, for example, the

(h):

of beliefs, dispositions or linguistic practices
of dominant relations of

role in the reproduction

production, or alternatively, to

its

inhibition or subversion of those

relations.

This definition appears
list

marked with an

with (a)
412.

is that,

thus, at least

warranted

facie to

would thereby serve

any obvious way

of dominant social

the purposes of the dominant social group,

from a pragmatist's perspective, the dominant group would not be

in asserting that

It is

in

in the

(The reason the recommended definition conflicts

(a).

it

is

false or illusory.)

413.

)

comport with the items

in order to fulfill its role in the reproduction

relations, a belief

and

pnma

and does not appear to conflict

asterisk,

with any other items except

at least

not clear to me, for instance, that

it

By

contrast, Rorty's

can accommodate a view Rorty

Marx and Habermas, according to which “ideology” is contrasted to
mode of thought which, because it represents ‘human freedom’ rather than any
ascribes to

“...a

‘external constraints,’ succeeds in being non-ideological” (“Habermas, Derrida, and

the Functions of Philosophy,”

)

It

will

be noticed that Marx’s treatment

commodity and
at least

p. 20).

the

wage form

one of meanings

(c)

is

in

Capital of the fetishism of the

compatible not only with

through

(j).

(a)

and

(b),

but also with

138

characterization of Ideologiekrilik does not comport
terribly well with any of the

items on the

list

except

and possibly

(a), (b)

414
(f).

Ideology, according to definition (In), or in the
sense of what Geuss called

“ideology

a purely descriptive sense,” could include both implicit
and explicit

in

discursive elements such as beliefs, concepts and so on, as well
as non-discursive

elements such as

Dewey

rituals, dispositions, attitudes, gestures, artifacts 41

^

and what

has referred to as “the habits of loyalty and obedience” which permit
a

government

to rule.

life,” referred to

410

Thus,

it

does not appear to be too

far

from Roily's “forms of

above, which “...have been used to justify the systematic

administration of pain and humiliation.” 41

Ideological attitudes, rituals, beliefs

and so on constitute and typically are embodied
practices, both public

and

and

in institutions

institutional

private.

It will be noted that this conception of ideology trivially
proscribes what
414.
Nielsen refers to as nonideological legitimating beliefs To view a belief as
:

legitimizing an institution or political practice

)

With reference

economic practices

to (c)

and

(h):

To

is

to

With reference

are “efficacious," they likely

to (d):

To

it

as ideology.

And

the extent that principles of state

of state power or economically dominant groups.
415.
(i).

view

would not be

A

the

power or

injurious to holders

similar remark

would apply

to

the extent that the rules in question are “efficacious,”

416.
they likely would not be injurious to those like Rorty

who wish

to efface the

morality-prudence distinction. With reference to (e): Unqualifiedly injurious
417.
behavior is not likely to be repeated by enough agents to constitute a pattern or lived
relation to the

formulations
ideas,” they

world

is

With reference

to

(j)

and

(k):

While neither of these

obviously incompatible with Rorty's notion of ideology as “bad

do not appear to have any special relevance to

it,

either.

)

Refer to the discussion

)

Dewey

)

“Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,”

1984,

p.

in

Geuss, pp. 5-6.

277.

p. 15.
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same may be

said of a belief that problematizes or
challenges prevailing forms of

exploitation and domination.

Even the most uncontroversially

true, pragmatically

confirmed axioms can

be viewed with an eye to their function vis-a-vis the
reproduction of relations of
production. Thus, for example, both vulgar political

economy and Capital could be

viewed as ideology, without prejudicing the claims of either to

truth, scientificity or

usefulness for a given purpose. If the literary output of the vulgar
economists, or
the fetishism of the
than, say, Boyle's

Law

dominant

vis-a-vis

commodity

or the

wage form

are

more obviously

or Euclidean geometry, then this

is

because of their function

social relations, not because of their alleged cognitive inferiority.

Moreover, as Kai Nielsen has pointed out with reference to
functional conception of ideology, Davidson's observation about

mundane

beliefs

ideological

must be true does not impugn the claim

his

how

own

truth-

mass of

the

that there are systems

of

legitimating beliefs or discourses that underwrite repressive social orders and

reproduce existing relations of exploitation and

remarks on ideology are instructive

here.

The

political

Italian

domination.

4 1K

Marxist viewed

Gramsci's

common

sense as comprised of bits and pieces of the ideology of a ruling class 41
418.

moment

in its career.

At the same time, he recognized

that

at a

some— though

419.
not all— widely held beliefs have been pragmatically confirmed by

many

given

certainly

agents over

a long period of time. Gramsci referred to the latter sort of truisms as beliefs of

420.

good sense™

)

Clearly, there

Nielson,

p.

is

an overlap of beliefs of good sense and

213. For the relevant views of Davidson, refer to

Theory of Truth and Knowledge,”

)

For our purposes,

we can

in

Malachowski,

common

“A Coherence

pp. 120-138.

understand the ideology of a ruling class to be the

constellation of beliefs, dispositions and so on which bolster prevailing social
relations, chief

)

p. 174.

among them economic

relations.

Refer to Gramsci 1971, pp. 419-25. Also refer to the discussion

in Nielsen,

140

sense.

Thus,

we may

readily admit that

still

be warranted

and

political domination.

in asserting that

common-sense

beliefs are often true, yet

they underwrite existing relations of
exploitation

Ideology, viewed as a social practice along the
lines of definition (h
2 ), looks
like “a pluralism

dispositions.

of power/discourse formations,” 421 as well as

attitudes, ntuals

Thus conceived, the study of ideology would involve producing

and

lots

of

“detailed historical narratives of the sort Foucault offers us,”
without positing

noncausal conditions of possibility, 422 or constituting the

Lyotard and Rorty abhor. 4 ~

To view

ideology this way

of metanarrative

sort

is

not necessarily to

subscribe to Rorty’s picture of Ideologiekritik as “...penetrating to the
'repressed'
reality

behind the 'ideological' appearances.” 424 Nor need the examination of

ideology depend in any obvious
421.

way

(or, as far as

I

can

tell, in

any unobvious way,

either) on the opposition between “true consensus” and “false
422.
consensus,” or
validity
423.

and

)

EH,

)

Cf.

p.

power,”

173.

4

either.

“

Rather,

it

could be described simply as a

Rorty quotes Habermas' description of Foucault.

424.

EH,

p. 55.

Cf. EH, p. 166. With reference to Rorty's own “Grand Narrative” about the
)
vicissitudes of Western philosophy, see: Hall, pp. 8, 15, 245-6 note 19. Charles

Taylor believes the result

is

a metanarrative of the sort Rorty professes to abjure

(Taylor, in Malachowski,

p.

257).

)

cases

EH,

p.

1

85.

Reviewing the

list

and possibly

of definitions above,

and

it

will

be noticed that

in

study of ideology need not
),
pose or pretend to solve any heady epistemological problems about the appearance(c), (h), (j), (h 2

reality distinction.

After

all,

in (i)

(k), the

to cease opposing appearance to reality as mutually

exclusive categories does not require us, absurdly, to deny the appearance/non-

appearance distinction

in first-order discourses.

Since appearances presumably

have causes, we could always think of them as part of a larger
appearances.

425.)

EH,

p.

165.

reality not limited to

141

particular sort of first-order descriptive activity,
one

claims about the effects of discourse,

rituals

which consists of generating

and so on, as well as the purposes, and

hence communities, which are served or frustrated
by our ways of talking. 426
Students of ideology so conceived would qualify as
naturalists
the

word

actual,

as those

and

who

that there

believe that

is

all

explanation

is

,

in Rorty's

sense of

causal explanation of the

no such thing as a non-causal condition of possibility. 427

Rorty has written that the genre of literature concerned with
“unmasking

bourgeois ideology” “has long been overworked.” 42 *

It is

hard to disagree with his

derogatory assessment of the impenetrable and pretentious jargon of many
“Cultural
Leftists,”

and he

is

probably right to doubt that they create so

much

as a ripple

outside the increasingly rarefied atmosphere of university Humanities
departments.

Nevertheless, a great deal remains to be said about how, say, public school
curricula,

packaged news or

clinical

psychology have either helped to reproduce

prevailing social relations or have been appropriated by social forces in opposition
to those relations.

a

The same observation

applies to religious and nationalist creeds,

wide range of technical discourses, common-sense

Marvel Comics. So when

in a rare

as an occasionally useful tactical

moment Rorty

weapon

426.

427.

)

Cf. Kolenda,

)

EH,

428.)

p.

p. 8.

55.

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

569.

platitudes, and, yes,

even

describes “...’critique of ideology'

in social struggles,

but as one

among

142

many

others,"'-''

we may

dispute his use of the adverb occasionally,
but otherwise

agree with him.
*

In this chapter,

I

institutions in the liberal

*

*

have sketched a picture

in

which both

state

North Atlantic, on the whole, function

to

and non-state

reproduce

prevailing economic and political relations by
producing individuals as private, as
well as public, persons or selves.
noticed,

I

course of sketching this picture,

have not invoked a picture of repressed

universal autonomy.

I

have made

forms of state power within the
notably

In the

in

my

rich.

potentialities,

case, rather by

to

own

pursue their
In the

suffering

I

ol the richest

fare

no

better

if

we

p.

is

on

target, then

embody one of Rorty’s

liberal

higher, namely, the ideal of leaving people alone

of ameliorating

give proper attention to the policies and practices

North Atlantic democracies beyond their cartographic borders, they

when

it

I

comes

to this ideal than they did with reference to the ideal

also will advance an alternative political setup which,

believe, holds greater promise

EH,

account

will turn to Rorty’s public ideal

1

argue that

individual freedom

429.)

is

essences or

idiosyncratic visions of perfection.

next chapter

will

ideal

be

comparing the scope, scale and

If this

existing liberal democracies could hardly be said to

which no other

will

North Atlantic democracies to other cases,

Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

ideals than

human

it

135.

Also refer

when

to

it

comes

to ameliorating suffering.

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

577 note

16, with

reference to feminism as “...the one area of Ideologiekritik where people are
actually having

some new

ideas.”

I

of

CHAPTER

3

THE ILLUSIVE IDEAL OF DECENCY

If

we

are to believe Rorty,

more than any of the
cause of “enlarging

heading

the

will

go down

human freedom
4 '"

medium-run

in a

This prognostication, of course,

As Rortv reminds

in the right direction is just to say,

us,

“To

say that

with Kuhn, that
'

perfunctory gesture that

may accompany

the blood of innocents.

The

Judging from the context
to

probably on target,

is

we

we

think we’re

can, by hindsight,

tell

is little

more than

a

indefinitely large volume-displacements of

historiographies to which most people are exposed,

and scribes are the “we" who spin

it

called the

Judging from more than ample

after all, are written for, if not entirely by, the victors:

431.
Rorty intends

Hook

1

evidence past and present, however, telling such a story

430.

havinu done

precarious and tragic world by the arts of

the story of the past as a story of progress" 4

heirs

in history as

“great empires” so far to promote what Sidney

intelligent social control."
at least in

America

in

stories

As

a rule, the victors, their

of the past as histories of progress.

which the passage quoted appears, however.

be taken not as an observation about the politics of

432.
historiography, but as a congratulatory statement about the exemplary' moral status

of the United States of America and other “rich North Atlantic democracies.” 432 By

)

CP,

)

ORT,

p.

)

ORT,

p. 15.

pp. 69-70.

27.

This

may be

the place to note that Rorty--the advocate of

abandoning the fact-value, scheme-content and science-culture distinctions—
suddenly bolts from this position when it comes to justifying his preference for
Unger's awkward and misleading circumlocution. Rorty claims

North Atlantic democracies
presumably

in the

sense that

is
it

that the

term rich

“more neutral” than other widely-used terms,
is

less laden with value or

Here as elsewhere, Rorty has advanced a claim

that

is

emotive connotations.

incompatible

in

both tone and

implication with other points he has labored to establish. (Refer, for example, to

144

his lights, these countries represent the
best

freedom from the constraints ot the

state

hope

for propagating the ideals of

and amelioration of suffering. As we have

seen, these are the highest private and public aims
of strong poets and decent
citizens, respectively.
liberal

community

liberal as a

In

As

ideals they figure prominently in Rorty's definitions
of a

as “one

person for

which has no purpose except freedom,” 433 and of a

whom

cruelty

Chapter Two, by contrast,

is

the worst thing

we saw

we

434

do.

that in actual liberal

democracies such

as the United States freedom from the supervision and sway of
state institutions

is

narrowly circumscribed. This consideration casts serious doubt on the claim
that
the United States has contributed notably to the cause of enlarging

within

its

human freedom

borders.

In this chapter,

1

will dispute

Rorty

s

claim that the

done a notably good job of ameliorating suffering beyond

liberal

democracies have

their borders.

This will

complete the negative side of my indictment of his description of actually existing
liberalism.

To make

the case that contemporary liberal democracies continually

promote tyranny and suffering abroad-even massive tyranny and suffering—
however,

is

not sufficient to

compromise Rorty’s paraphrase of Churchill,

to the

effect that the existing liberal democracies are the worst political setups imaginable,

433.

with the exception of all the other candidates.
434.
relevant remarks
435.

in:

In the last citation,

that there are

no

CP,

435

Defenders of these

pp. 37,74, 195, 196; CIS, pp. 54-5;

and ORT, pp. 25, 62.

Rorty acknowledges that “...my holist view of inquiry suggests

politically neutral instruments to use for defending political

positions ”) In any case, he drops his preference for

comes

liberal

“more neutral” terms when

to adopting such expressions as Soviet imperialism.

)

CIS, pp. 60-1.

)

CIS,

)

Rorty, in

p. xv.

Rajchman and West,

p.

1

1

it

145

democracies could always claim, as they have done,

democracy

to liberal

in its

that

any realizable alternative

present form would result in even

more tyranny and

suffering.

Rorty emphasizes that public criticism gams force
by virtue of contrast-

The

effects.

effect

may be

achieved by comparing a past or present state of

affairs invidiously with another actual state

of affairs, or a past or present

affairs invidiously with a particular utopian vision, or

another.

The case of Foucault may serve

state

of

one utopia invidiously with

as a negative illustration of this point.

Rorty appreciates the late French author as an ironist theorist

who

is

useful for

tracing the blind impresses our individual behavings bear. However,
he dismisses

Foucault as a public thinker, in part because the author of Survei/ler et

pumr was

unwilling or unable to offer an alternative vision to the pervasive disciplinary

regimes he described.

Acknowledging Rorty
end of the

first

s

challenge, then,

section of this chapter that

which would be more conducive

to the

it

is

1

will

make

the case towards the

possible to imagine a political setup

aim of ameliorating pain than mere

preservation and piecemeal reform of existing liberal institutions and practices. In
the second section,

1

will argue that ,pace Rorty, existing liberal

contain the institutions necessary for improvement along these
is

on the mark,

it

will cast a

bad

light

democracies are conducive to the

436.)

on Rorty’s claim

liberal ideal

As, for example, Geras notes (Geras,

p.

).

lines.

If

my

that existing liberal

of ameliorating

81

democracies do not

suffering.

account

146

Liberalism and Suffering

of course,

It is,

committed

too easy to compile a long, long

by, for and in the

Eduardo Galeano and
liberal

all

lots

name of liberalism.

list

of atrocities

Basil Davidson,

Noam Chomsky,

of other writers have described the emergence
of the

democracies as a long litany of slavery, pillage and genocide
perpetrated

Asia, Africa, the Americas and elsewhere.

accounts

And even

if

we purge from

in

these

depredations committed during the course of primitive accumulation

all

and high colonialism and concentrate only on the present and the
recent

past, the list

of horrors remains very lengthy indeed.
Rorty certainly does not emphasize the causal connections
between these
depredations and the existing liberal democracies. But he does not
dispute the

claim that genocide, pillage and slavery were conditions of actuality of
liberalism as
it

has

come down

that claim.

to us today, either.

4

Nor does he provide any reason

Moreover, he acknowledges that

liberal ideals

to

doubt

of universal freedom and

equality continue to be betrayed in contemporary liberal democracies

He

is

even

prepared to concede that they are constantly betrayed. 438

He

also

acknowledges from time to time

437.

governments

that

promote tolerance and

that the

liberty at

same

liberal

democratic

home may promote

tyranny

438.

)

He acknowledges,

for instance, that “the desire for gold

bigoted and fanatical sixteenth-century monarchs

[...]

in fact

on the part of

contributed to an

admirable result,” namely the United States of America (“Dewey between Hegel

and Darwin,”

)

p.

65).

Correspondence with the author, dated August 29, 1995.
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abroad, and in fact have done

premise

in the

P]

:

F*2

:

so.™ Thus, he would

not subscribe to the

first

following simplistic but familiar argument

Any

political system which pursues a brutal and
exploitative foreign policy cannot be liberal;

The U.S.

political

system

Modus

Therefore, by

is liberal;

Tollens, etc.

Yet he remains unflinchingly committed to both liberalism and
existing
liberal

democracies.

Rorty remain a
cruelty

is

In

liberal, in Shklar's

the worst thing

institutions

view of these observations, the question

we

do,

sense of the word as “one

who

arises:

How can

believes that

while remaining unflinchingly committed to the

and practices of actually existing liberalism 9

Rorty avers a response to

this question:

In addition to the horrors they

have

produced,

.

.

.the liberal societies

people

who

of our century have produced more and more

are able to recognize the contingency of the vocabulary

in which they state their highest hopes—the contingency of their own
consciences-and yet have remained faithful to those consciences. 441

439.

Such recognition, he adds on the same page,

up a

liberal public.

Over the

past

two

is

the chief virtue of those

who make

centuries, these people have created

440.
institutions

)

He

and practices--free presses, independent judiciaries,

admits, for example, that poverty

in

Latin

America

the deals struck between local plutocracies and North

governments” (EH,

)

CIS,

p.

46.

441.)

CIS,

p.

46.

p. 135).

is

legal assemblies.

“partially

American banks and

Also refer to “Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

566.

due to

148

representative political institutions, free
universities and so on 442 ~which have
been

instrumental in successful campaigns to abolish
such practices as chattel slavery,
child labor, direct colonial domination
and racial segregation

To advocate
practices

the destruction or supersession of these
liberal institutions and

would amount

to

condemning instruments which have proven

effective in mitigating cruelty
exist in

some

and humiliation. Because the

liberal institutions that

parts of the globe (preeminently in the countries that
benefited

from genocide, slavery and pillage

in the past) are a

means of ensuring

going horrors will be ameliorated, their continued existence

compensation

to be

for the horrors

of the

the magnitude of those horrors, but

past.

it is

It

may be

most

that on-

may be viewed

as a

small compensation in view of

compensation nevertheless.

This line of defense of liberalism comports with the following
two

assumptions about
(I) First,

liberal institutions:

free presses, independent judiciaries, legal assemblies,

representative political institutions and so on are compatible with any of a
of different political

and economic

without the horrors committed by, for and

“deep

link

that matter

442.
(ii)

We can have these

setups.

in their

number

liberal institutions

name. Furthermore, there

between capitalism and democracy” or other

liberal institutions,

is

no

nor for

between “central economic planning and tyranny.”443

And

secondly, not only are liberal institutions useful as a means of

443.
ameliorating these horrors, but they are the best

means

at

hand for doing

so.

Neither opponents of liberalism nor anyone else have provided an alternative to
extant liberal institutions that realistically could be expected to do a better job of

)

Refer, for example, to Rorty's

Theorists,”

)

p.

list

of liberal

567.

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

576, note

7.

institutions in

“Thugs and

149

ameliorating these horrors. 44 ' Again: Liberalism
setu p, but

it

more

is

If these

attractive than

two assumptions

may

be an unattractive political

any other candidate.

stand, Rorty has

actually existing liberalism against

its

produced a compelling defense of

detractors to his

At

left.

best, “radical”

opposition to liberalism would appear to be a pointless
exercise in ressentiment.

And

at worst,

it

could under some circumstances

endangerment of fragile

institutions than

As one might have guessed from

of liberalism succeed

in

close to reckless

which nothing

is

more

precious.

the discussion of socialism and

privatization in the previous chapter, assumption
if critics

come

(i)

appears to be well-taken. Even

showing the dependence of actually existing

liberalism on betrayal of liberal ideals, they have not succeeded
in showing

countertactually that

if this

The observation

sustained.

connection were broken

powers such as Great

that ex-colonial

Netherlands and France managed to retain their
colonial era might cast additional doubt on

With reference

to the

liberal institutions

could not be

Britain, the

liberal institutions in the post-

this.

acknowledged

evils

of existing

liberal

democracies,

Rorty writes: “Whereas liberals think of these evils as eventually reformable,
444.
radicals are concerned to

445.

society .”

44

changed

utterly,

"

show

that they are

If the radicals are right,
44 '’

somehow

removing these

'integral' to liberal

evils will require things being

including replacing rather than reforming

some important

446.
institutions in the liberal West, such as electoral systems that favor pro-capitalist

)

)

persons

“The End of Leninism,” pp
“Thugs and Theorists,”

who

p.

16-17, note 15.

568.

Rorty uses the word radical to describe

harbor no hope of improving actually-existing

piecemeal fashion.

)

“Movements and Campaigns,”

p. 6.

liberal

democracies

in a

150

candidates and, of course, “the market
economy’-that
the sorts of sweeping aims of

what Rorty

refers to as

campaigns focusing on piecemeal reform of specific

The

is,

capitalism.

movements,
institutions

radicals hold that, as Richard Berstein has
put

447

These are

in contrast to

and practices

it.

There are forces and tendencies

at work, (e g., class conflict, social
division, patriarchy, racism) that are compatible
with liberal political
practices but nevertheless foster real inequality and
limit effective

political

Rorty

s likely

freedom.

44 *

response to this might be to agree with Berstein's claim, but
to point

out that other forces and tendencies compatible with liberal
practices are in place,

too— forces and tendencies such as those already noted, which

expand

political

foster equality

and

freedom.

For reasons already mentioned,

however, has raised the stakes:

It

is

this is a plausible response.

Bernstein,

not merely that the institutions and practices of

actually existing liberalism are compatible with inequality and political
unfreedom;

nor

is it

merely that the former are results

at least in part

of past horrors. Rather, the

former continue to foster inequality and unfreedom as a condition of their

As Bernstein has put
447.
undermine and belie

it,

“the structural dynamics of bourgeois society systematically

liberal ideals.”

With reference

448.

actuality.

to the

449

manner

in

which

liberal ideals are betrayed, the

difference between Bernstein's adverb “systematically” and Rorty's “constantly”

)

Rorty does not explicitly claim that capitalism

liberalism.

replace

it

As we

will see,

with something

)

Berstein,

p.

553.

449.)

Berstein,

p.

552.

is

is

a necessary condition for

however, he has come to advise against the attempt to

else.

151

pivotal.

ot

Bernstein's adverb implies a logical, transcendental
or causal relationship

some

sort,

whereas Rorty's need imply

little

more than frequent occurrence.

Rorty evidently takes the adverb “systematically" to
designate a relationship

of final causality or transcendental conditionality. He might
well view the
“structural

dynamics" allegedly responsible

synonymous with “essence," and

for the systematicity of the betrayal as

as yet another

example of the spurious discovery

by theoreticians of “underlying structures" 4 -" or “something deep down,"
a taproot
to be eradicated.

Rorty

is

likely to dismiss the notion

of any “dynamics of

bourgeois society" as yet another “large theoretical construct" purporting to
unmask

what

really

is

provide.

451

going on,

By inveighing

a construct ot the sort that Ideologiekritik

make no

alleged to

against exploitation, class conflict and imperialism as

examples of “deep processes" which theoreticians
allegedly

is

like to invoke, but

which

discernible difference to the conduct of public affairs, he thereby

preempts consideration of the hypothesis

that there is a causal connection

between

exploitation or imperialism on the one hand and actually existing liberalism on the
other.

This makes

it

easier for

him

to

acknowledge

freedom and equality are constantly betrayed
Bernstein put
450.

raises)

451.

it,

in

that “liberal ideals

of universal

bourgeois capitalist societies,” as

while ignoring the question (which David Hall notes Rorty never

whether his goals of social justice and amelioration of suffering are

likely to

4
be attained under capitalism. ^ Rorty can lament the shortsightedness of

high office-holders in the rich North Atlantic and the greed of middle-class

Rajchman and West,

)

Rorty, in

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

452.)

at all

Hall, p. 47.

p.

p. 5.

568-70.

suburbanites, while never raising the question
whether his utopian hope for

capitalism with a

human

face

is

anything more than a will-o'-the-wisp

For Rorty the historical nominalist, each individual
instance of betrayal of
liberal ideals has (efficient) causes.

It is

the task of the social engineer and the

piecemeal reformer to identify these causes on a case-by-case
basis and to eliminate
or modify them one by one. 4 "'

An

independent judiciary, a free press, free

universities and other liberal institutions play a crucial role in
the performance of
this task.

In this way, liberal institutions gradually mitigate the
betrayal of liberal

ideals.

These considerations, even stated as sketchily as they are here, bolster the
second assumption mentioned above, that

hand
this

is

for ameliorating the horrors

assumption stands,

more important than
There

is

it

committed by and

)

means

for actual liberal regimes.

at

If

serves as a strong support for Rorty’s claim that “ Nothing

the preservation of these liberal institutions.” 454

a parallel here between the institutions and practices of liberalism

on the one hand and “technology,” on the

453.

liberal institutions are the best

Similarly, a

other.

In

response to a correspondent's

well-known anti-”histoncist” writer has contrasted “piecemeal
“Utopian social engineering,” explaining that,

social engineering” to

The piecemeal engineer

will, accordingly,

adopt the method of

searching for and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils

of society, rather than searching

for,

ultimate good. (Popper 1963,

158.)

p.

and fighting for

its

greatest

perhaps a measure of the fatuousness of this formulation to note that some of
most sweeping movements of the Twentieth Century-movements of which both
Popper and Rorty presumably would disapprove—have been preeminently struggles
It

is

the

against great and urgent evils, whether they be wars of aggression, the denial of land
to the tillers, foreign occupation or massive poverty exacerbated by
conditionalities.

454.)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

567 (Rorty's emphasis).

IMF

153

observation that

“much of the poverty of the

Rorty impertinently writes:

technology

is

“My hunch

is

third

that

world

is

caused by the West,” 455

more Western science and

about the only thing that can cope with the results of
prior Western

science and technology.” 4 "'' Only

more modem “technology,”

not less, will remedy

environmental pollution, diminishing resources, toxic waste disposal
and other evils
regularly laid at the door of the rich north Atlantic democracies.

Rorty acknowledges that

liberal institutions often function as tools

of local

oligarchs. Nevertheless, he claims, if the conditions of actuality of
liberalism have

so far undermined and belied liberal ideals, then these conditions can and should
be
identified

one by one, and either reformed or replaced. This replacement, however,

need not and should not involve the rejection or abandonment of liberal

As Rorty

already in place.

puts

it,

“. .the
.

institutions

principal institutions of contemporary

1

democratic societies do not require unmasking’ but rather strenuous

utilization,

4 7
'’

supplemented by luck.”
455.

Unfortunately, liberal institutions are prey to a number of dangers, including
456.
the dangers of bureaucratization Weber discussed in Wirtschafl und Gesellschaft,
Part

III.

In addition, in

times of sweeping social change liberal institutions have

68, quoting

)

Balslev,

)

Rorty, in Balslev,

p.

p.

78

Roger Garaudy.
chime with

Rorty's techno-panacean views

GATT

maneuvers to tie access to the latest technologies to the production of “favorable
457.
investment climates” in the South He hardly dispels this impression with such
revealingly confused remarks as:

The

Marxism on the part of the people trying to
overthrow Third World oligarchies seems to me potentially
reliance on

dangerous as their grandparents' reliance on the United

Company

or

Anaconda Copper. (“Thugs and

as

Fruit

Theorists,”

p.

577, note

18.)

)

“Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,”

p.

2

1
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been among the

first

things to be swept away. Liberal institutions
and practices

have been easy targets for demagogues,

who

of abuse and inefficiency to transform these

in

times of crisis have focused on cases

institutions

and practices into targets of

popular discontent. By inhibiting their operation,
demagogues thereby have

removed obstacles

to their

own unchecked

authoritarian rule.

These observations only underscore the preciousness of these
flawed

institutions.’

Their fragility and preciousness only

to take care to preserve them.

make

“fragile,

more imperative

it

Thus, nothing prohibits Rorty from recognizing

like the public/pnvate split, liberal institutions also are
fortuitous accidents

and chance, while

at the

same time he holds

that nothing is

that,

of time

more worthy of our

unflinching allegiance.

Without wishing to dispute Rorty's characterization of liberal
precious,

I

believe nevertheless that Judith Shklar’s liberal could plausibly deny his

unqualified assertion that nothing

is

course of making this point

balance of this chapter,

in the

institution, liberal or otherwise,

context.

institutions as

In order to evaluate

do ameliorate

suffering,

we

more important than

should be viewed

their preservation.

1

will

in isolation

whether or not contemporary

assume

from

its

that

In the

no

larger social

liberal institutions in fact

should take special care to examine the larger context

of state power and global capitalism.

The Solemn Complement of Liberal

Ideals

Another reason Rorty cannot accommodate the suggestion
institutions

has

made

be recast within the context of working class

clear in

more

liberal institutions

economies.”

recent wntings, he

is

mentioned above, but also

In this,

he

is

state

that liberal

power

committed not merely
to “the institutions

is that,

as he

to the several

of large market

once again backing away from Dewey’s

New Liberalism

155

to a position closer to that

of the English classical

liberals

who

associated liberty

with laissez-faire economic policies.

Thus, Rorty
is,

capitalism in

its

at least tacitly

recognizes that “large market economies”~that

contemporary monopoly form-constitute the “economic

determinants” of liberal democracies. The North Atlantic
has achieved
of

decency and equality, he claims, by relying on “a free market

measure

its

in capital

and on

compromises between pressure groups.” 458
Although Rorty sidesteps questions about exploitation, class domination
and
managerial despotism

at the

work

site,

he does identify other drawbacks of

capitalism. Capitalism, notably, breeds greed and inequality. Rorty
has found no
better

way

to mitigate the greed

institutions

and the welfare

muddle through campaigns

As luck would have

and inequality

state,

that capitalism

spawns than

liberal

together with good will and the patience to

for piecemeal reform.

it,

the liberal democracies themselves have produced

decent public citizens with the requisite patience, toleration and good

459

will.

The

allegedly greater ability of members of liberal democracies to enlarge their
458.

conception of “us

is itself

the result of institutions internal to liberal democracies.

The

greater freedom and decreased pain for which liberal institutions and practices

may

take credit compensates for the greed and inequality they spawn, as well as the

459.
constraints Foucault associated with them

)

EH,

p.

1

80.

460
.

Indeed, the existence of these

These views are consistent with a pluralist approach to political
Seymore Martin Lipset or Robert Dahl.

sociology, represented by, say, Arnold Rose,

According

to pluralist theory, the state arbitrates the interests

competing pressure groups which vie
playing

field.

for limited resources

C. Wright Mills, Grant McConnell, William

Parenti have raised serious objections to pluralist theory.

)

460.)

ORT,
CIS,

p.

213.

p. 63.

of a multitude of

on a more-or-less

level

Domhoff and Michael
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institutions

prefigure

reason enough to hope that the rich North
Atlantic democracies

is

the utopian world

community envisaged by

may

the charter of the United

Nations and the Helsinki Declaration of Human
461
Rights.”

Lamentably, bourgeois capitalist society

is

“irrelevant to

most of the

problems for most of the population of the planet.” 462
Rorty decries
...the impossibility of feeding countries like
Haiti and Chad except by
massive chanty which the nch nations are too selfish to
provide, and
the unbreakable gnp ot the rich or the military
on the governments of
most of the Third World. 463

Continuing

in this vein,

he invokes Robert Kaplan’s “memorable” image of “people

like ourselves-middle-class

[Dissent]" riding in

“.. .a

Amencan and European

stretch limousine,

and desperate people moving

in the

making

readers of magazines like

its

way through

opposite direction.” “Kaplan’s

a

mob

of ragged

way of

describing our situation,” Rorty goes on to explain,

...amounts to saying that while Europe and America have been

worrying about how to go forward from capitalism, a lot of the
of the world has been hoping to advance to feudalism.” 464

With a

bit

of nominalism

at this point,

461.

one might conclude

rest

that there are

plenty of ragged and desperate people in Europe and America, too. Surely
462.
significant,

463.

moreover, that

among

the

Europe and America are those subjected not

to

Europe and America’s neo-colonial surrogates,

)

“Relativism: Finding and Making,”

)

CP,

)

EH,p.

)

“Movements and Campaigns,”

210, note

is

most ragged and desperate people outside of

464.

p.

it

16.

26.

p. 4.

p.

some
I

26.

M

pre-feudal regime, but to

F.

conditionalities

and super-
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exploiting megalopolies. Kaplan's image,
conjuring up as
affluent “us”

it

does a homogeneously

and a homogeneously ragged and desperate
“other,” does

little to

advance Rorty's professed aim to de-essentialize the
West, “to break up the
lump.”

465

Rorty's (rather selective) disparagement of those

who, he

says, are constantly

on the lookout for “something 'deep down'-something
ahistoncal and
international,”

46 '’

together with Kaplan's image of limousines and ragged

mobs

passing each other in opposite directions, complement the claim
that bourgeois
capitalism

irrelevant to

is

most of the globe.

view, of course.

One might

World Bank and

the

It

would be easy

to challenge this

point out, for example, that the I.M.F.,

World Trade Organization--G-7 -dominated

GATT,

the

institutions

which

advertise themselves as advancing the ideals of liberal democracy-explicitly
have

planetary projects” of their own. These projects, under which top executive
465.
officers of the largest oligopolies and strategic planners in the leading
capitalist
466.
centers most assuredly subsume their hopes, 467 include centralized economic
467.

planning on a global scale.
468.

)

Rorty, in Balslev,

)

EH,

)

Cf.

)

And,

p.

46 *

p.

Rorty’s insouciance

this point has

prompted one

90.

182.

“The End of Leninism,”

economies,

on

to a large

p. 9.

and increasing degree, centrally planned domestic

After taking care to distinguish his centralized private sector

too.

planning model from the Soviet-style centralized public sector planning model,

Munkirs claims

that fifty-five to sixty percent

of the U.S. economy

is

centrally

planned and controlled, with administered prices (Munkirs). Munkirs’ thesis
the richest economies in the

planning

may be

West

that

are characterized by centralized private sector

simplistic, largely ignoring as

it

does the inextricable

interconnectedness of corporate and state institutions; nevertheless,

it

casts serious

doubt on the supposed lesson of 1989 that “...complex societies cannot reproduce
themselves,

if

they do not leave intact the logic of self-regulation of a market

economy” (“The End of Leninism,”

p. 6).
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commentator

to score his "skepticism

movement of world
world capital.”

spirit but that

concerning 'metanarratives' that disavows
the

seems

willfully ignorant

of the movement of

469

These considerations notwithstanding, and
inadequate “foreign assistance”
aside, Rorty praises the liberal

West

for

its

readiness to embrace an ever-more-

mclusive conception ot community. By his

lights,

“...contemporary democratic

societies are already organized around the need
for continual exposure of suffering

and

injustice.”

47

'

1

As he

explains

it,

the liberal culture of recent times has found a strategy
for avoiding
the disadvantage ot ethnocentrism. This is to
be open to encounters
with actual and possible cultures, and to make this
openness central
to its self-image.

469.

By
470.
institutions

)

fostering an ever-broader recognition of suffering
and injustice, liberal

make

possible the sort of dialogue with foreigners that helps extend

Martin, pp. 65-6.

EH, p. 25; “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,”
)
p. 21. A
number of commentators might have had this sort of claim in mind when they have
scored Rorty

and Haber,

s political

naivete (Comay,

p.

126; Burrows, in Malachowski,

p.

324,

p. 66).

ORT, p. 2. Edward Said, by contrast, has observed that the amazing thing
)
about the fact that the United States “...continues to try to dictate its views about
471

law and peace
...is

all

over the world,”

not that

it

is

attempted, but that

it is

done with so much

consensus and near unanimity in a public sphere constructed as a
kind of cultural space expressly to represent and explain it. (Said, p
286.)

Rorty does not disrupt this consensus (refer, for example to: “Thugs or Theorists,”
Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” (in Malachowski), “The End of
Leninism,” much of EH and the papers in Part III of CIS). Even when directly
challenged by Balsev, Bernstein and others to take measure of the demonstrable
connection between the domestic political stability of the liberal democracies and
the brutality they engender abroad, he has demurred.

“The

159

solidarity

beyond the borders of existing

liberal

democracies.

472

This ever-more-

mclusive conception of a public “we"
increases with education, just as the
number

of communities with which an inhabitant
of a nch North Atlantic democracy may
identify increases with civilization. 477

Unfortunately, liberal intellectuals do not always
exemplify Rorty’s

professed concern to
occurs.

make

sure that one’s fellow citizens notice suffering

when

it

474

Referring to his colleagues in university humanities
departments, Edward

Said has written that

There is, believe, a quite serious split in our critical
consciousness
today, which allows us to spend a great deal of time
elaborating
Carlyle and Ruskin s aesthetic theories, for example,
without giving
attention to the authority that their ideas simultaneously
bestowed on
the subjugation of inferior peoples and colonial territories. 475
I

Rorty has enjoined us to stop worrying about “which theorists
to pair off
with which thugs."

476

When

however, he appears willing

it

comes

to the Suslov’s

some

to accept that

472.

of the Cold

War

East,

theorists are thugs, not merely

contingently , in the manner perhaps of Eleidegger

at

the University of Heidelberg,

477

but in their very capacity as theorists.
473.

It

should be noted, however, that

if

we

substitute “moral and political" for “aesthetic" in the passage just cited, Said's

474.

475.
not clear

It is

)

why

476.

“conversation with foreigners" should exclude conquest

of them, as Rorty appears to

Comay,
477.

p.

assume (ORT,

p. 25).

129.

)

ORT,

)

CIS,

)

Said, p. 12.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

574.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,"

p.

576, note 13.

pp. 200-1.

p.

93.

Refer to relevant remarks

in

160

observation applies equally well to Carlyle
and Ruskin’s contemporary,
Mill’s admirer, Isaiah Berlin.

dissolution of the East India

Government more than

According

Company because

the paternalist

younger Mill opposed the

“...he feared the

and not inhumane

dead hand of

rule of the

Company’s

,478

officials.

It

should be noted that a number of writers have
presented a rather

different picture of East India
to the

to Berlin, the

Mill and

J.S.

Company

rule.

47 "

If the latter writers are

even close

mark, Berlin and Rorty have spent time elaborating
Mill and Berlin's

political

views while overlooking the authority that their ideas
simultaneously have bestowed

on the subjugation of inferior peoples and colonial territories. 480
This
478.

is

not exactly

a resounding testimony in favor of Rorty’s views on
the salutary effects of liberal

479.

democracy when

it

480.

Berlin,

)

comes

to recognizing suffering.

481

180.

p.

Refer, for example, to Mukherjee, especially
pp. 299-392, and Keay.

)

As Rorty recognizes with reference to Jefferson (Geras, p. 97), other liberal
)
luminaries have bestowed authority on the subjugation of inferior
peoples closer to
home. Similar criticisms could be leveled against some of Rorty’s more
contemporary

liberal luminaries.

alive

among

not only to a

U

S.

to the persecution

(Novack,

p.

To

cite one instance from a multitude that rush to
Rorty praises for having “kept political morality
the intellectuals” during the Depression (CP, p. 63 lent his authority
)

mind, the same Sidney Hook

276).

mentor, Dewey,

who

war against Vietnam
of “conspirators”
In this

who

in

that claimed over two million dead but also
academia during the McCarthy years

and other respects Hook compares unfavorably to his
immediate post-War years opposed the exclusion of so-

in the

called subversives from public teaching positions.

481

)

played
history,

Surely
in

it

is

relevant also to point out the role one leading liberal democracy

helping to whitewash one of the greatest planned holocausts

measured

usefulness in the

in absolute

War

against

numbers of victims.

Communism,

In consideration

in

recorded

of their

U.S. officials and more than one

administration for decades protected from prosecution high-ranking Japanese
military and political leaders, up to and including

Emperor Hirohito

himself. These

leaders were responsible for the deaths of over thirty million people in China
between the years 1931 and 1945. (Cf. Hams.
wish to thank Mr. Kuo-Hou
Chang, of the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino-Japanese War, and Ms.
1

Iris

Chang

for helping

me

to identify English-language sources dealing with these
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More
thin

seriously,

notion of

In

community

this

example highlights

a

problem with Rorty's

as a voluntary association, “one

more of Nature's

4x:

experiments.
than with

however,

This problem has less to do with

its

alleged thinness or thickness

broadness or narrowness.

its

one respect, Rorty's notion of community

is

too broad: As

we have

already noted with reference to class divisions within
the North Atlantic

democracies, he runs roughshod over existing conflicts, predatory
relationships and
political

domination within the formations he defines as communities. He
assumes

not only that the diverse impulses which animate the liberal
democracies can be

harmonized
purposes.”

into

common

purposes, but that they can be identified as “our European

483

Noting

this,

Fraser asks

why we

should assume, as Rorty does, “a quasi-

Durkheimian view according to which society

is

integrated by

way of a

monolithic and all-encompassing solidarity?” Why, she asks, should
instead “a quasi-Marxian

view according

to

which

modem

of course, Rorty would agree that the

plurality

of overlapping and competing

482.
referring

to

competing

solidarities

liberal

solidarities.

we

not assume

capitalist societies

contain a plurality of overlapping and competing solidarities?” 484
pluralist,

single

As

a good

democracies contain a

Clearly, however, Fraser

is

which are distinguishable on the basis of a

483.
events. It took five decades and a shift in U.S. policy towards China for these
484.
sources to become readily accessible to scholars in the U.S.) This case alone casts

serious doubt on Rorty's claim that “...contemporary democratic societies are
already organized around the need for continual exposure of suffering and
injustice”

(EH,

p. 25).

)

CIS,

)

Rorty’s formulation

)

Fraser, in

p.

60.

is

quoted

Malachowski,

p.

in

308.

Connolly,

p.

129.

162

predatory relationship, such as that between
exploiter and exploited or perpetrator

of violence and target of violence.
Perhaps the most obvious response to Fraser's
question
Rorty's

“we ’s,”

up with

tied

discussed above. The reason “we” should not
assume Fraser’s

“quasi-Marxist view”

bourgeois

is

liberal

is

that

it

makes

it

more

difficult to

mount apologetics

for

democracy. As Edward Said has noted, with reference
to the

all-

important “we,”

pronoun, almost more than any other word, fortifies the
somewhat illusory sense that all Americans, as co-owners of the
...this

public space, participate in the decisions to
48:1
far-flung foreign interventions.

In

commit America

another respect, Rorty’s notion of community

in the rich

done so by

North Atlantic which establish
first

expanding

their sense

ties

is

to

its

too narrow: Communities

of solidarity abroad have not always

of solidarity

to all or

even most of their

fellow citizens. Often, a community will demonstrate greater solidarity
with
“foreigners” and groups abroad than with their fellow citizens. 486 This

is

not just a

matter of small solidarity groups within the rich North Atlantic joining hands with
the wretched of the Earth, in opposition to “our European purposes.”

More

consequential contemporary scenarios include corporate officers and top
485.

managements of G-7 -based

486.

the South to

move

transnational corporations joining with their brokers in

production

facilities to

cheaper labor markets, and foreign policy

officers in the North collaborating with their counterparts in the South to create

“favorable climates for investment” that result in higher unemployment and lower

293.

)

Said,

)

Refer also to the interesting discussion

p.

to “the righteous

central

of the nations”

and eastern Europe.

who opposed

in Part

One of Geras,

with reference

Nazi atrocities against “foreigners”

in
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wages

in the

North and deeper burdens of debt,
poverty and pollution

in the

South

This example might suffice to indicate
that Roily's "quasi-Durkheimian
view"

is

not

well-suited for descnbing the reality
of global, transnational capitalist class
solidarity at the close

of the American Century.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty noted
the liberals have in

beyond

its

mind but what

frontiers/’

that “It is not just a question of
knowing

in reality is

done by the

liberal state within

what

and

4'7

Rorty the pragmatist might well have endorsed
Merleau-

Ponty's statement if the words “Marxists”
and “socialist” were substituted for
“liberals”

and

As one

“liberal.”

critic

has noted, however,

when

it

comes

to

evaluating liberalism, Rorty

downplay what has become a major problem for liberals,
between the ‘ideals’ of liberty and equality that
profess and the actual state of affairs in so-called
liberal

...tends to

viz. “the disparity

liberals

societies."

48 '

As we have already
democracies constantly
that, unfortunately, as

fall

noted, Rorty concedes that the existing liberal
short of their ideals.

he writes

in a

One

paper published

important reason for this

in the

waning years of

Gorbachev's tenure,
487.
...the social

democratic scenario of steady reform along increasingly
[...] has been stalled for decades, largely because the

egalitarian lines

488.

political right within the First

World (made up of the people who
have no interest in increasing equality) diverted public attention,
money, and energy to combating Soviet imperialism. 4 '

489.

;

)

Merleau-Ponty,

)

Bhaskar 1991,

Bernstein,

)

p.

p. xiv.

p.

104.

The passage quoted within

552.

“Thugs and Theorists,”

pp. 565-6.

the citation

is

from

is
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"Soviet imperialism,” Rorty hastens to
add. “is indeed a threat." 490
If this

and

threat,

Rort>
the
in

s

is at all in

the ballpark, then with the disappearance
of this

other things being equal, one would have
expected to see

all

moderates
initiative:

account

or "the political center” within the victorious
First

One would have expected

at

minimum

to see signs

World

seize the

of the resurrection of

social democratic scenario, ot the expansion
of the welfare state.

enormous

In

view of

military buildup in the 1980s, for example, one might
have expected

the post-Cold

War

era to have seen deep cuts in military spending, and
perhaps

the reallocation of tax revenue from “defense" to education,
health care,

environmental protection and so on.

One would have expected

some

“peace dividend.” One certainly would not

sort

of more or

less substantial

have expected hundred-billion-dollar contracts

for a

new

at least to

have seen

generation of weapons

systems, even greater spending on the CIA, cuts in non-military “foreign
aid” and
the sweeping dismantlement of domestic social programs in the
United States, as

well as England,

Italy,

France and other leading

What we have witnessed

in the

liberal

democracies.

wake of the Cold War, of course,

is

not a

decrease but an increase of inequalities of wealth and opportunity within the U.S.

and other

liberal

democracies, along with exacerbated inequalities between North

and South. These developments, moreover, have taken place despite propitious
circumstances for Rorty's social democratic scenario, including a

490.)

MM]”

Rorty has decried “graduates of Patrice

who, he

fears, are likely to

(“Thugs and Theorists,"

p.

discommend

566).

Lumumba

far as

I

am

democratic

University [now defunct—

head up “ruthless oligarchies”

As

liberal

in the

Third World

aware, however, he has never gone

down the road
name of the democracy and freedom Rorty so
regularly invokes, and with his tax money, this institution has so far graduated some
50,000 alumni, among whom may be counted some of the most prodigiously
on record

to

the School of the Americas, located just

from Charlottesville, Virginia.

In the

murderous tyrants since Cortez and de Soto.
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administration

Washington

in

subservient regime in
It

D C., quiescent

leaders in the South and an
abjectly

Moscow.

should be stressed that these trends
do not appear

to

have been caused

because the institutions ofliberal democracy
are fragile or vulnerable.
contrary, liberal

democracy has been

4
lines Rorty suggests "

precisely

when

it

least

amenable

to

itself

the

self-improvement along the

and has diverged most sharply from Rorty's

has found

On

liberal ideals

without threats from either the Evil Empire
or the

Militant Tendency.
It

might

strike

one as strange

that, at a

time of almost undisputed U.S.

world leadership,’ hundred-billion-dollar weapons
systems and far-flung military
interventions on four continents, Rorty has
lamented “the postwar failure of

American nerve and

“...the loss

of America's hope to lead the nations.” 492

long been conceded even by observers

in the

retaliation served to chasten U.S. leaders

to launch nuclear strikes against Korea,
less controversial that the fear

West

when

it

America and helped

has

that the prospect of Soviet

came

to decisions

whether or not

China and North Vietnam. And

it is

hardly

of expanding Soviet influence spurred the Marshall

Plan and a host of other ambitious foreign aid projects
Latin

It

to accelerate the

in Asia, the

Middle East and

post-War decolonization of Africa and

much of Asia.
Turning to the domestic scene, a convincing case could be made
of the most important
liberal

initiatives benefiting the

democracies themselves were

militancy on the

home

Bolshevism. These initiatives included the

491.)

CIS,

492.)

ORT,p.

p.

63.

77.

some

most disadvantaged within the

at least in large part

front as well as fear

that

responses to the threat of

of the expanding influence of

New Deal,

social security, corporate

166

income

tax, publicly-funded liberal
higher education, civil rights legislation,
the

reveal mgly-ent, tied National
Security Education 495 and National
Security

Highway

Acts, affirmative action and so on.

Rorty has written that

We should concede Francis Fukayama's point
long tor total revolution, for the Radically

[...] that if you still
Other on a worldhistorical scale, the events of 1989 show
that you are out of luck
Fukayama suggested, and should agree, that no more
romantic
prospect stretches before the left than an attempt
to create bourgeois
democratic welfare states, and to equalize life-chances
among the
citizens of those states by redistributing the
surplus produced by
J
market economies.
I

Leaving romance aside, events since 1989 have shown
for

capitalism with a

would appear

human

that the “social

face,”

you would appear

that, if

to be out

you

of luck,

still

too.

long
It

democratic scenario” has to a large extent consisted

not of self-reforming liberal institutions but of
forced concessions in the face of
resolute foreign and domestic opposition. This
appearance

is

fortified

by the

observation that, Rorty and Sidney Hook’s assumptions
notwithstanding, as the

perceived threat to capitalism has disappeared
493.

in the final

years of the American

Century, so have the liberal concessions. 4 ^

There

is

strong empirical evidence, then, to doubt Rorty's claim that

494.
...contemporary liberal society already contains the institutions for

)

It

will

be recalled that

its

own

Dewey ascribed salary hikes for high-school and
War to “a fear that poorly paid ‘intellectuals’

college instructors after the Great

would be

Dewey

attracted toward

1984,

p.

1

Bolshevism” (“What

is

the Matter with Teaching?” in

17).

“The End of Leninism," pp. 1-2. A more consistent nominalist might have
)
described the social surplus as having been produced by workers rather than
“market economies.”
495.)

Refer to relevant remarks

in Steel.

167

improvement.”

made

496

Indeed, if the lessons of the past
are any guide, the case could be

that the best

North Atlantic

is

hope

the renewed threat of popular
insurrection at

Of course,

claim

to

is

be corroborated, then the burden of proof still

work and argue

that they

of the question, they must do

body of evidence
they

fail

to

It

do

may

make

this

then

we

with the critics

that belie liberal ideals, explain

on a case-by-case

how

basis, building

up enough of a

about bourgeois society as a whole.

If

are justified, at most, in withholding judgment.

not be an easy task to meet this burden of proof. But

necessarily a transcendental task, either.

Surely

first-order, non-transcendental sense of the

rule, or

lies

liberal ideals.

a big difference. Moreover, by the very
nature

to justify a generalization

this,

or abroad

democracies systematically undermine and belie

of liberalism. They must identify the dynamics
they

home

these observations, taken singly or in
combination, do not prove

that existing liberal
If this

for the resurrection of the
so-called welfare-state in the rich

it is

it

is

not

possible to determine-in a

verb—whether or

not, say, capitalist class

imperialism are compatible with liberal political practices but
nevertheless

foster inequality

vocabulary

may

and cruelty and

limit effective political freedom.

not be particularly well-suited to this task.

Rorty's public

497

Fortunately,

496.
however, alternative vocabularies are available, and at least one of these alternative

497.
vocabularies, namely the one introduced

in

Chapter Two, does not involve

specifying transcendental conditions of anything at

)

CIS,

)

It

p.

all.

63.

would require a clock shop

full

of epicycles to pretend

cases of CIA subversion of democracy which William
Killing

Hope were merely

that, say, the forty

Blum examines

in his

book

the result of moral failure or shortsightedness on the part

of “greedy” individuals who, as a matter of merely contingent
and again to have ensconced themselves in high office.

fact, just

happen time

168

Describing the international scene
that

in this

vocabulary,

it

becomes apparent

massive violence and exploitation have constituted
not only causal conditions

for the

appearance of liberal democracy, but conditions of its
on-going actuality

Merleau-Ponty’s observation continues to be as poignant

American Century

as

it

was

in the final

years of the

in 1947:

Judging from history and by everyday events, liberal ideals belonu
to
a system of violence which, as Marx said, are the “spiritual
point'
d’honneur," the “solemn complement” and the “general basis of
498
consolation and justification.”

Goinu beyond Liberalism

We

have already granted

liberal institutions

committed by,

that

some

some

extent and in

some

cases,

have as a matter of fact mitigated the on-going depredations

for or in the

scale, persistence

that, at least to

name of liberalism.

Nevertheless, in view of the sheer

and frequency of these depredations,

it

should not be surprising

parties—especially the targets and victims themselves— have

suspect that there must be

more

existing institutions of liberal

efficacious

democracy

means of ameliorating

come

to

suffering than

alone.

Rorty, however, claims that neither the “radical” opponents of liberalism nor

anyone else has offered a workable alternative

to liberalism that

would be

better at

ameliorating pain and making the scene safe for strong poets. For one thing, few of
these left-wing opponents except the Marxists

notable success in so
social

change

in the

much

among them have

as even tabling a sustainable

registered any

program

for

sweeping

twentieth century. Moreover, the alleged attempt of Marxists to

abolish private property— a proposal that Rorty describes as “just about the only

498.)

Merleau-Ponty, pp.

xiii-xiv.

He

cites

passages from Marx's Introduction to

Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right
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constructive suggestion
lead

him

conclude

to

Though

Marx made” JW ~did

not work. This record of failure has

that,

was brought up to be a socialist, no longer
want to
means of production (because the experience of
Central and Eastern Europe suggests that
nationalization is, to put
mildly, no help in redistributing wealth
and power).
1

I

nationalize the

1

stuck with market economies-which

means with

for the foreseeable future. 500

On
a

those occasions

when Rorty acknowledges

suspect

we

it

are

private nroDertv-

that the

word

“socialism’' has

use-and as we have seen, he sometimes advocates
abandoning the term-he uses

499.

it

“Review of Spectres of Marx,” p. 8. Rorty ’s claim just cited
)
underscores
what some commentators have observed, namely, that he does
not display much
familiarity with Marxist literature (Fraser, in

Malachowski, p. 320, note 5; Bhaskar
This should have been apparent long before his unapologetic
admission of the fact (“Review of Spectres of Marx,”
p. 2). Fie has confirmed this
impression, for example, when he has written that “Nobody [on
The
1991,

p. ix).

left’]

bothers to

criticize the

Tdeology’ of communist countries” (“Thugs and Theorists,”
p. 576.
note 13), or when he poses what he apparently takes to be the
rhetorical question:

“Has the left any positive suggestions about some actions for the American
500.
government to take, or some middle-range policy goals 9 ” (“Thugs and Theorists,”
577, note 5), or when he blithely states:

p.

1

Dissent remains pretty

much

the only leftist organ in the U.S. which

is more concerned with spelling out tactics for fighting
injustice than
with maneuvering for strategic position in intellectual or political

(“Movements and Campaigns,”

circles.

)

Rorty, in Balslev,

socialist,'

it

is

p.

89.

With reference
is

one of the “six liberals” to

dedicated CIS (Rajchman and West,

book was dedicated, namely

Communists

in
in

With reference
Geras,

p.

43.

to Rorty’s upbringing as “a

interesting to note that his maternal grandfather, the social gospel

advocate Walter Rauschenbusch,

Sidney Hook

p. 8.)

p.

whom

Rorty

274, note 14). Another person to

his father James, reportedly

whom

the

had been active with

“Communist front organizations” until they publicly broke with the
933, two years after the younger Rorty was bom (Klepp, p.
7).

1

to

1 1

an instance of James Rorty’s subsequent

political writing, refer to

170

to

mean someth, ng

He

like “attempts to foster
institutions

conduce to

5 '"

liberal aims.’’

contrasts this to what he (perhaps
under the influence of Kolakowski)
apparently

takes to be a Marxist use of the
word, to designate “nationalization
of industry" or
abolition of private property. 502

Rorty prefers Alan Ryan's suggestion
that the best

we

can hope for

is

a kind of welfare-capitahsm-with-a-human-face,
not easy to
tstingmsh from a ’socialism’ with a big role
for private capital and
F
individual entrepreneurs. 503
.

,

It

is

worth noting, however, that the two “isms”
which Ryan’s hope invokes

would not be hard

to distinguish if

workers rather than

draw sharp

capitalists.

one were

to define socialism as state

As we have

seen, however, Rorty does not wish
to

distinctions along class lines or to

do so would clash with

his

Deweyan

power of

emphasize

vision of the Great

association of publics united by shared interests.

It

political

domination.

Community

might even

as a voluntary

raise the question

the legitimacy of capitalist class rule in the
rich North Atlantic.

As we have

however, Rorty associates sweeping schemes for reordering
the

political

with, at best, pointless ressentiment.

He

To

of

seen,

landscape

expresses the hope that our successors

in

502.

50

Review

ol Spectres of Kiarxf p. 8. It is worth noting that
)
the experience of
the Nineties has, to put it mildly, cast suspicion on
Rorty's
suspicion
about
503.
nationalization and redistribution of wealth: At the date of this writing,
one would
1

be hard pressed to cite even one case in Eastern Europe or the ex-Soviet Union
in
which Je-nationalization ol the means of production has not coincided with everwider disparities of wealth and deeper poverty for the majority.

)

“Review of Spectres of Marx ,” p

that ‘industry should

of “the public” (Dewey 1984,

)

8.

Dewey,

also, has critiqued the

demand

be taken out of private hands” and should pass into the hands
p.

“The End of Leninism,”

“Socialism for the Nineties,”

in

286).

p.

1

.

Rorty

is

quoting Alan Ryan, from his

Dissent (Fall 1990),

p.

442.

article,
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the next century will agree that
“...history

is

an endless network of changing

relationships, without any great big
climactic rupture or peripit.es.” 504

Rorty gives the impression
has dispensed with
seriously.

all

Foucault,

nothing in the
nationalism

"

programs

who

way of an

is

for abrupt,

sometimes described as an

in fact

is

working within the
is

right

anarchist, offers

be taken

little

or

Various brands of “progressive
(as in, say,

on

liberal tradition.

this point, there is

reason to believe that he

means of production, of course, Marx made

one other suggestion which many people have considered

Communist Manifesto { 1848)

875), he insisted that the

proletariat to the position

With

to

dispatched Marxism in at least one of its forms. In
addition to the

abolition of private ownership of the

the

need

Mexico, Algeria or Egypt), Unger might represent
a more

Whether or not Rorty

( 1

that

Tanzania) or-more typical ly-have been
commandeered by

in, say,

attractive option, but he

From

sweeping change

have either felicitously resolved themselves
into liberalism

thugs (or both, as

least

by dismissing the Marxist competition,
he

alternative to liberalism.

India, the Philippines or

has not

that,

this in

first

to the Critique

of ruling

class, to

win the

battle of

to Rorty's

All right, let us accept that the

be constructive:

of the Gotha Program

step in working class revolution

mind, an obvious response

institutions could be:

to

is “...to

raise the

democracy.”

505

defense of liberal

many

betrayals of liberal ideals

504.
are only contingently related to such institutions and practices
as an uncensored
505.
press, free universities, an independent judiciary

and so

on.

And

let

us assume,

furthermore, that these institutions and practices are effective instruments for

ameliorating suffering. Let us have them, then-but

let

us have

them within the

context of working-class state power, instead of corporate capitalist

)

“Movements and Campaigns,”

)

Communist Manifesto

,

in

p.

1

1

McLellan,

p.

237.

at

rule.
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Since workers far outnumber
capitalists

democracies;'

this

would appear

to be a

in the “rich

recommendation

North Atlantic

more democratic

for a

set-up than exists even under the
most liberal capitalist regimes.

It

also comports

with a long-standing Marxist emphasis
on democracy and republicanism as the
most
appropriate forms of political rule under
the dictatorship of the proletariat
If

indeed liberal institutions are not a priori
incompatible with non-capitalist

alternatives, then

with, say,
In a

it

is

natural to ask

working class

paper published

in

institutions could not be

power or armed defiance of U.S.

state

1

why such

987, Rorty

came

combined

military domination.

as close as he has ever

come

to posing this

question:

There
do.

is

one question wish Marxists would discuss more
than they
can we not yet point with pride to a noncapitalist
I

Why

democracy?

506

Without pausing for a response from Guatemalans, Chileans
or Nicaraguans, he
immediately adds, apparently with a straight

face:

the only answer that you cannot, in the present situation,
be a
Marxist government without becoming a client of Moscow, and
that
Moscow will not let its clients encourage a free press, free
Is

universities,

and so on 9 Does

such institutions

this entirely explain the
in, for example, Cuba 9

absence of

Escalating U.S. aggression against the Republic of Cuba

in the

post-Soviet

era suggests a rather different answer to these questions: U.S. leaders and their

agencies have resorted to sponsorship of massive terrorism, unilateral acts of war

and economic blackmail—frequently
agreements of which the U.S.

and impoverish

506.)

in violation

is itself

a signatory--to destabilize dozens of countries

their people precisely in order to

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

of international law and numerous

576, note

7.

foment

political instability.

173

thereby obstruct,
ng the development of “a free press, free universities
and so on .” 50

For three decades,

until pliant leaders in

Moscow bowed

that Russia abrogate
mutually-beneficial trade

has viewed socialism in

example

to others.

Cuba

When

it

to

Washington's demands

agreements with Cuba, Washington

not as a failure but as an alarm,
ngly workable

has

come

to health care, nutrition, literacy,

occupational safety, worker self-management
and other important components of
social welfare,

Cuba has demonstrated

democratic regimes Uncle

Sam

its

clear superiority over the so-called

has foisted onto people elsewhere

in Latin

America

and the Caribbean. Moreover, as Uncle Sam's
eventually successful campaign of
enforced impoverishment of the island reminds

achievement was won

in the face

us,

Cuba's thirty-year record of

of vicious and unrelenting foreign aggression

Rorty has written that

Only if one refuses to divide the public from the
private realm
one dream of a society which has “gone beyond
mere social
democracy,” or dream of “total revolution.” 508

The foregoing

discussion, by contrast, should at the very least have
indicated that

one can indeed imagine going beyond
liberal institutions that

achieved,

is

will

bound

Rorty

is

to fall short

social

concerned

democracy, while also retaining the

to preserve.

Of course,

of what Bernard Yack has dubbed

this

goaf

if

“total

507.) Sometimes this aim has been surprisingly explicit. For example,
Edward
Rorry, the Eennedy-liberal U.S. ambassador to Chile during the Umdad
Popular
years, stated that the U.S. would

within our power to

condemn Chile and the Chileans to
utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to
come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in
...do all

Chile. (Quoted in

508.)

EH,

p.

196.

Chomsky,

p.

395.)

174

revolution.”

05

Nevertheless, if achieved,

it

might involve sweeping and
perhaps

convulsive social change, including
perhaps the overthrow of one or
another
existing liberal regime, or the
dismantlement of

some of the

institutions than which, according
to Rorty, nothing
*

In

Chapter

One we saw

*

is

existing liberal

more precious

*

that Rorty envisions a liberal utopia

which serves the

highest purposes of two paradigmatic
figures, the strong poet and the decent
citizen.

These two figures are personifications of two
lives alone

and minimizing

liberal ideals:

leaving people's private

suffering, respectively. 510 Rorty believes
there should

be no aims higher than these.
In

Chapter Two,

I

suggested that Rorty seriously underestimates the
role

social institutions, including political institutions,
play in defining the private sphere

and private selfhood. Taking

do not appear

to

measure of the extent

chapter
to

I

hand

lives alone.

have suggested that Rorty also has failed

which

his favorite liberal

their cartographic borders.

Once we do

he has not provided convincing evidence that
at

North Atlantic democracies

exemplify Rorty ’s ideal of leaving people’s private

In the present

beyond

this into account, the rich

to take full

democracies proiect power

so,

however,

it

becomes

clear that

liberal institutions are the best

for ameliorating the suffering liberal regimes continue to cause.

In

means

view of

these considerations, actually existing liberalism could hardly be said to exemplify

Rorty’s ideal of public decency.

509.)

The longing

for total revolution, according to Yack,

world without social sources of dissatisfaction” (Yack,
510.)

CIS,

p.

63.

p.

is

the longing for “a

365).

175

As
from

I

have emphasized, however, one would
not be warranted

this that liberal institutions

concluding

such as a free press and representative
democratic

institutions are incompatible with a
vision

exploiters no longer wields state power.

the context of workers’

in

power might well

of the future

in

which a minority of

Indeed, a vision of these institutions within
satisfy Rorty’s

pragmatic requirement for

an alternative vision that more closely
approximates his public ideal than either the
status

quo or

As

his liberal utopia.

the

title

of

one of Rorty

s

better-known papers would indicate, he

advocates placing politics before philosophical considerations.
Before bringing
discussion to a close, then,

it

would be wise

to take a look at his public

this

and private

vocabularies from the perspective of his explicit political
commitments.

CHAPTER

4

OF LIGHT MINDS AND HEAVY HANDS

We

have already noted that existing

liberal institutions

and practices

are, in

important or systematic ways, incompatible with Rorty's
two highest liberal

ideals.

In the

balance of this discussion,

we

examine

will

his public role as an advocate

of

actually existing liberalism in relation to his private role
as a lighthearted ironist.

should become clear that Rorty the ironist

is

It

similarly at cross-purposes with Rortv

the apologist for actually existing liberalism.

Rorty's Politics

Increasingly, Rorty has written as though pragmatism

is

not and should not

be merely “an anti-representationalist account of experience and an anti-essentialist
account ot nature,
utopia.

but also, as

In a footnote,

"everything

is

politics.”

or admonition that

we

Dewey

he avers that

has put

EH,

“...start

pp. 27-49; p. 47.

that

Unger's slogan,

Unger's slogan, he says, follows from Dewey's observation

with our social hopes and work dowTi from there to

According

writings on moral and social issues

commitments

“a project for a social-democratic

Dewey would have endorsed

theories about standard philosophical topics.”

511.)

it,

have motivated

from the outset” (Malachowski,

p.

to

make

512

Guignon and Hiley,

explicit “...the moral

his critique

339).

himself comes close to corroborating

it

Rorty's

more

recent

and social

of epistemology-centered philosophy

The point might be overstated, but Rorty
“The Priority of Democracy to

in

Philosophy.”

512.)

20

.

The

last

two quoted passages are from “Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

578, note

177

'Working down from there' does not involve
the

futile exercise

of trying to

provide philosoph, cal just, f, canons or
foundations for one's social hopes.
Rather, as

he indicates in “The Priority of Democracy
to Philosophy" among other
places,
involves redescribing things, past, present
and future, in terms that will
social

hopes appear attractive and convince others

case, says Rorty, “[I]t

would be well

to

make

it

one's

embrace them. This being the

for us to debate political topics
explicitly,

515
rather than using Aesopian philosophical
language.”

With reference

to the suggestion that he

justification for the claim that

ought to have some theoretical

freedom and equality are “the West’s most important

legacy,’ for instance, Rorty has written:

do not have any philosophical backup for this claim, and
do not feel
the need of any. The claim is little more than
a hunch that the way in
which the recent West differs most interestingly from other
1

cultures

that

have existed

developed.

Theory

is

is in

the utopian social aspirations

514

useful for public purposes

utopian visions. Accordingly,

...the

when

it

comes

which

it

has

to thinking through these

philosopher of liberal democracy

may wish

develop a theory of the human self that comports with the institutions he
or she
513.

admires."

51

Rorty stresses, however,

that,

514.
.

515.

.

.such a philosopher

reference to

putting politics

first

)

EH,

)

Rorty, in Balslev,

)

ORT,

p.

178.

516.)

ORT,

p.

178.

p.

is

not thereby justifying these institutions by

more fundamental premises, but the
and

25.

p.

20.

reverse;

tailoring a philosophy to suit.

516

He

or she

is

to

178

In

keeping with

this view,

he acknowledges promoting a
particular account

of selfhood, namely the
Davidsonian-Freud account glossed
primarily because

might

it

suits the political

Chapter One above,

purposes of “us social democrats.” 517
As one

from Chapter One, he refers to

recall

in

this sort

of tailoring operation as

philosophical articulation of a political
vision. Liberal democracy
does not require
philosophical justification or backup,
though

philosophical articulation.

51

"

In this context,

already encountered above, and to which

we

it

does stand to

“Apologetics”~a word

I

we have

will return in the final section

could be used interchangeably with
“articulation ”
ideology, as

gam from

And

below-

both are clear instances of

defined this word towards the end of Chapter
Two.

At times, Rorty has identified himself as a

what he supposes

“leftist intellectual”

to be a left-wing audience." 17 This

is

addressing

apparent, for example,

when

he has recommended Roberto Unger to Third
World leaders, 520 or advised a future
generation of

leftist

521
university students to adopt Vacislav Havel
as a hero,
or

517.
lamented the overtheoretical obsessions of left-wing
522
Americans,”
or collegially
518.
chastised

the Cultural Left”"

-5

for

worrying so

much about such

topics as

The

519.

520.
521.
)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

)

ORT, p.178.

)

“The End of Leninism,”

)

EH,

)

“The End of Leninism,”

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

522.

523.)

EH,

p.

577, note 20.

pp. 3-4, 7, 9;

pp. 177-192.

p.

137.

p. 7.

p.

570.

“Review of Spectres of Marx”

p. 2.

179

Meaning of Modem,
ty
Office

.ha.

„ has faded to help ge, hberal
Democrats elected ,o

5-4

(as if this goal

were uncontroversially acceptable

to “leftists"!).

Although he expresses impatience
with what, following Harold
Bloom, he
dubs The School of Resentment 545
he betrays a somewhat bemused
sympathy for
,

"the Cultural Left" and a more
somber sympathy for
part

because of the

feminists

526

Perhaps

.

two cons, derations, some commentators
have claimed

last

his occasionally-alleged
cultural conservatism

conservatism .'

some

is

in

that

not backed up by political

27

Key terms

in Rorty's alleged cultural

conservatism that would be easy to

confuse with political conservatism
are elitism, aestheticism,
etknocentrism and
-

humcenmsm.
own

his

Indeed, he has

cultural use

made

it

so easy for “third-rate cntics” to
conflate

of these words with prevalent

524.
that, in
*

hghtminded

ironic style, he

is

inviting

political uses that

them

one suspects

to score quick but illusory

a

525.
points.

Reply

to a question from the audience
99"> lecture
at Rorty’s January 17
Northwestern University, entitled “Intellectuals
at the End of Socialism.”
)

1

527.

)

EH,

pp. 179, 184.

Rorty speculates that the reason feminist
Ideologiekritiker “are actually
having some new ideas” is “...in part, because the
patriarchy-nonpatnarchy
distinction swings free of the capitalism-socialism
529.
distinction” (“Thugs
5_6.
528.

)

and

Theorists,”

p.

577, note

16).

Hall, p. 76. Presumably, allegations of cultural
)
conservatism are a
consequence of his conception of social change as largely
cultural change, the
dependence of cultural change on changing vocabularies and the
parasitic
dependence of abnormal discourse on normal discourse.
1

)

)

“Review of Spectres of Marxf
With reference

to

p. 4.

“know-nothing”

critics, refer to

CIS,

p.

82.

at

180

There

is,

of course, no hard-and-fast
factual connectton between
the two

conservatisms: Lots of political
radtcals have been cultural
conservattves, and
least as

and

many

political

cultural radtcals

have been

views have become more

political conservatives.

explicit,

however,

his

right as

from the

left”

has

become

Rorty's social

1987 statement

(unsupported by citations) that “fortunately"
he has received “as
530

As

at

much

flak

from the

increasingly doubtful. Witness
not only the

generally hostile reception he has
received from his supposed fellow
social

democrats

5

1

but also the increasing sympathy with
which he

is

viewed by

neoconservatives like Dinesh D'Souza.

One

reason he has been receiving more sympathy
from the right might well

be his escalating expressions of antipathy
to “radical”

critics

of existing

liberal

democracies. In such recent writings as “The
Priority of Democracy,” “Thugs
and
Theorists,” “Post-Modern Bourgeois Liberalism,”
“The

End of Leninism,”

“Movements and Campaigns” and “Review of Spectres
of Marx,” Rorty
increasingly sounds like a proponent of what
Bhaskar described as “old-fashioned

cold war liberalism.” 53 - Indeed, he has
530.

Among other things,

531.

their politics are

come

close to describing himself as such. 533

Rorty objects to the frequent claim by

guided by theory. He scores Marxists,

many

leftists that

in particular, for insisting

532.
that

...we theorists (and in particular,

533.
play in achieving socialism.”'' 34 This

we
is

philosophers) have an important role to

because they

“...see political theory

534.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

pp. 564; 574-5, notes 2

)

Bhaskar 1991,

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

p.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

pp. 568-9.

575, note

5.

pp. 99- 1 00.

576, note

1 1

and

3.

and

181

Philosophy as foundahonal because
they see

i,

as penetrating ,o a social
reality

behind contemporary appearances.”' 35
Rorty associates the attempt
to “penetrate to the

true, natural ah.stoncal

matrix of all possible language
and knowledge” 536 with what he
describes (with the
unselfconsciousness of the vanquishing
missionary) as the “state religion”
of

Marxism. Taking another cue from
Kolakowski, perhaps, he lumps
Marxists
together with Hegel and Acton, as
537
votaries of History with a capital
H.
Writers of
History present us with a long story
of the realization of a latent potential
ity-the
return of Spirit to itself in

increasing technological

its

plenary fullness, the realization of
freedom or

command

over nature. In other words, such
writers present

538
us with teleological sagas of
maturation.

their

main phases or chapter

History.

3

As we have

radical critique

The
535.

is,

turn

’

twists

and turns

structure, reveal the “shape

seen, Rorty advocates turning

and the movement

away from movements

in these sagas,

and movement of

away from

politics associated with

in philosophical terms, a turn

and toward Bacon,
536.

The

it.

this sort

As he describes

campaigns which am suggesting
away from Kant, Hegel and Marx

to

1

Hume

as proto-pragmatists.

It

and Mill-considered not as empiricists but
is a turn away from the transcendental

question “what are the conditions of possibility
of this historical
movement 9 ” to the pragmatic question “what are the causal
conditions of replacing this present actuality with

537.
538.

actuality?”

a better future

540

539.
)

EH,

p.

25.

)

EH,

p.

25.

)

Refer, for example, to

)

“Movements and Campaigns,”

)

“The End of Leninism,” p

540.

)

of

“The End of Leninism,” p
pp. 5-6, 14.

1.

“Movements and Campaigns,”

p.

16.

1

it:

In this passage,

pats

it,

Rorty associates programs for
sweeping

-movement

w„h

politics,”

political

change, or as he

the transcendental project,
and reformist politics

with pragmatism.

Upon

a

little

reflection,

however,

this association is

and implausible. Although one would
not guess

it

both undermotivated

from Rorty, the larger

part of
Marx’s writings consists of thousands
of pages of detailed narratives
about what

“certain contemporary communities”
have done in the past and what they
might do
in the future.

Clearly, the preconditions for the
appearance of capitalism which

Marx discussed

in, say. Part

VIII of Capital, Vol.

I,

are straightforward, non-

transcendental historical causes. So are
the preconditions for the emergence
of
private property, political institutions,
pre-capitalist

These constitute the

on.

sort

of first-order “historical narratives” of which
Rorty the

historical nominalist should approve.

So when he writes

“metaphilosophical scientism,” or that
presence,
541.

moving straw man bearing

more

is

that

Marxism involves

“a perfect example of the metaphysics of
hit

on a

large, slow-

”
the placard: “Karl Marx: Transcendental
Philosopher

At times Rorty’s opposition
the

it

he appears to have scored yet another direct

542.

as

economic formations, and so

to

Marxism, and especially

to

what he describes

544
blood-thirsty side of Marxism, the specifically
Leninist side,”
has

543.
544.

)

“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p.585.

Rorty ascribes to Marxists a notion ot “History” as an inspiring
blur (“The
p. 4). It should be pointed out, however, that some Marxists
could without difficulty restrict themselves to talking about the
constitution of
modes of production at given times and places, and dispense entirely with “history,”
whether capitalized or not, except as an abbreviation for “social transformations.”
)

End of Leninism,

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

)

“The End of Leninism,”

p.

578, note 21.

p. 2.
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ordered on caricature
that

we

This

leftist intellectuals

apparent, for instance,

when he

writes:

can no longer be Leninists,

we have

to face

is

questions which Leninism helped
545
us evade.”

One of these

“But

up

to

now
some

questions has to do

with the importance of theory
to politics. Leninism allegedly
has held an appeal
Within academia(
theories about

')

precisely because, enthralled as
academics are with deep

deep causes,

5J

‘

to play within the Proletarian

they have reserved a place of
honor for philosophers

Movement.

547

By encouraging academics

imagine

to

themselves as occupying this place of honor,
Leninism allows them to pretend they
can play an important public

role,

while

at the

same time

gratifying

...our blood-lust

by letting us picture ourselves as swept
up by the
aroused masses-bome along toward the
slaughter-bench of history
the altar where the bourgeoisie will
be redemptively sacrificed. 548
In order to avert this danger,

to

combine sublimity and decency

in

and

in

recognition of the futility of the attempt

one overarching theory, he advocates

abandoning not only Leninism but the very attempt
546.

545

,

to get underlying realities right

The End of Leninism,”

p. 3. To read such passages, one might never
guess
of Rorty's audience resides in the rich North Atlantic,
where, it
is safe to say, Leninists have always
been a small and persecuted minority.
have
not encountered any evidence that would suggest
547.
that Rorty ever considered himself
to be a Leninist in any familiar sense of the term.
)

-

that the greater part

I

)

“The End of Leninism,”

sense of objective’

11

(CP,

p. 3.

Rorty disparages “Lenin’s blood-curdling

Not only does this sound silly, but it is unfair, in
view of the regularity with which Western academics, editors and
opinion makers
have wielded the word “objective” and its cognates as a handy stick
with which
p.

1

73).

indiscriminately to beat their Marxist opponents.

Refer to Thugs and Theorists,’ pp. 570. This view does not square well
)
with Rorty's more recent observation that left-wing intellectuals in the ITS. typically
have not ascribed much importance to philosophy (“Movements and Campaigns ”
p
6 ).

548.)

“The End of Leninism,”

pp. 3-5.

184

before proceeding to political
utop.as.
argues,

of a

would

liberal.

To eschew such

not require giving up very

The concerns of public

which are "codifiable

much

that

morality, after

is

"political theorizing," he

useful for the public purposes

all,

are the sorts of concerns

and maxims.” 549 These concerns are
adequately

in statutes

handled by the greatest happiness principle
and the principles of procedural justice
already built into current liberal democratic
political structures. Thus,

comes

to

“Western

social

and

when

it

political thought,'’

J.S Mill’s suggestion that

governments devote themselves to
optimizing the balance between leaving people's
private lives alone
and preventing suffering seems to me pretty much
550
the last word.
Rorty’s Dickensesque references to “poor inner
city children” and “a

desperate third world” victimized by “greedy white
suburbanites,” “greedy, shortsighted democracies,” “greedy and stupid
conservatives”'-

1

and so on appear

to

be

self-conscious reaffirmations of the futility of political
theory. If leftists would stop
trying so hard to penetrate to a social reality
underlying contemporary appearances,

they would have more time and energy to devote to
getting on with the hard work of

ameliorating suffering and extending freedom. Thus, not only
do

leftists

deep theories about deep causes, but the obsession with such theories

is

not need

an

549.
impediment to getting on with the main event.

550.

To avoid

this distraction,

public discourse.

...I

As he

puts

Rorty advises

I

suggest that

entire vocabulary of leftist political

we

start talking

)

Rorty, “Freud and Moral Reflection,” in

)

CIS,

p.

63.

551.)

CIS,

p.

170.

Cf.

transvalue banality in

it,

hope we can banalize the

deliberation.

leftists to

Fukayama.

about greed and

EH,

p.

153.

185

“

^T'

wages
an^ lav'offs**
fe
f
her than about
«
a „H about
!h , J
and
differential

One
in

general

is

5 ideol °®'

»on

per-p U p,| expenditure on
schools and

ea th
'

^

rato

striking feature about this
passage

how

abou *

the commodification
of labor
,Ha " ab° U1

-«£.

and Rorty's advice

of

to those to his left

poorly motivated they are.
In the passage just cited,
for example,

he writes as though

talk

abou, class divisions and
differential per-pup,l
expenditure

on schools were an “ei,her-or”
proposition: Either you do one
or you do the other
bu, you can', do both. 553
Clearly, however, this is no,
the case a, all:

One could

perfectly well talk abou,
expenditure on schools or access
to health care-and
else besides— as these

liberalism have
It

mark out

done just

class divisions.

much

Indeed, lots of opponents of
existing

554

this.

may be worthwhile

to illustrate this point by turning,

the liberal institutions Rorty
praises.

As we have

however

already noted, the

briefly, to

more

carefully

we attend to the details that Bagdikian,
552.
Parenti, Herbert Schiller and
others have
553.
provided, the clearer

i,

becomes

that the print

corporate-owned, the corporations that

and electronic media are increasingly

own them

are ever fewer and larger in

number, the range of opinions presented
approximates ever more narrowly the
)

“The End of Leninism,”

)

By presenting

554.

p.

]

the matter in this manner,

it

will

his claim that.

be noted, he casts doubt on

There are no

modem

tacts about economic oppression or
class struggle, or
technology, which that vocabulary [that is,
the vocabulary of

social democratic politics

which Dewey and Weber helped cobble

together-MM] cannot describe and
(EH,

p.

a

more

’radical’

metaphoric can

26.)

Berstein has scored “Rorty's fateful, although
shifting, dichotomies--the
either/or s that structure his thinking.” These
dichotomies “lead him to all sorts
)

dubious and double-edged claims” (Bernstein,

p.

549).

of

186

opinions of corporate owners
and advertisers and there

between
business

state institutions

-

community

and what the corporate media
In

view of these observations,

is

a seamless connection

itself refers to as “the
I,

beta, democracies today

can hardly be said to promote
domination-free communication. 556
It

would be easy

inviolability

to

make

similar remarks with reference
to the alleged

of the private sphere, the
“independence" ofjudicianes, the

representative" character of
political institutions, the
“freedom” of universities, the

vigilance" of public opinion,
and so on

down

Rorty's

list

of

liberal institutions as

they actually exist in the rich
North Atlantic. In each of these cases,
the more
details

one attends

might well come

to,

the less precious the institutions
and practices under scrutiny

to appear,

the solemn complement.
cast additional doubt

when measured

More

against the vety ideals of which
they are

importantly, perhaps, such an
exercise might well

on Rorty's claim

that “...the rich

democracies of the present

day already contain the sorts of
institutions necessary to their

own

reform

” 557

Refer tor example, to Bagdikian,
Parenti and Schiller. It should be
noted
acknowledges “such things as the control of
mass-circulation magazines
V people who want to safeguard their own
wealth and power at the expense of the
poor and weak' (“Habermas, Derrida and
the Functions of Philosophv ,”
p 3). In
the case of doing this, however, he
lumps particular cases of exploitation and
domination together as mere variations on the
“old, old”
- -

)

that Roily

story

556.

of the

rich

"continuing to steal” (as he puts it in “Review
of Spectres of Marx ”
p 8) from the
poor. This raises a number of questions:
557.
One is tempted to ask, for starters, how
s that he knows what people who
own mass-circulation magazines want.
'

What

some of them do not want what he claims they want?
What if the major
shareholders of, say. Time Warner or Gannett are
not especially greedy or
if

hungry personalities 9 And even

power-

if

they were, as seems unlikely,

assume that corporate policy would be appreciably
happened to be more attractive personalities 7

different if those individuals

)

Compare

)

’‘Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,”

to Rorty’s claim, at CIS,

p.

why should one

68.

p.

21.

187

Dewey and Weber may be

Rorty,

decided upon,

means

are at

often a straightforward pragmatic exercise to determine what

it is

hand

correct in pointing out that, once ends are

meet those ends. This may amount

to

looking steadily and carefully. Once ends are

set,

it

may

'radical critique' is required, but just attention to detail”

to

little

well be true that “...no

53 *

Rorty's invocation of

attention to detail -together with his /^attention to the question
instructive,

however, coming from one

who

nature has no preferred self-description.

same causal process

descriptions of the

acknowledges what

in

any case

is

more than simply

“Which

detail?” — is

has reminded us more than once that

By reminding

us also that alternative

are useful for different purposes,

well enough conceded on

all sides,

559

he

namely, that

different observers will attend to different details, depending on their purposes,

among

other things.

Before one can identify the most efficient means, one must of course
identify one's ends.

The

latter task,

however, involves a familiar

first

Just as

difficulty:

surely as one cannot get outside one’s skin, one cannot describe a problem from no

perspective at

all,

or from

ways we conclude how

v,t

all at

once.

And

the problems

we

identify— not just the

to ameliorate “avoidable suffering,” for

example, but the

558.

very evaluation from case to case of what constitutes avoidable suffering
559.

problems themselves depend on our

560.

Even the words used

561

to describe a

political ends.

3

’

1

— these

They depend on who we

problem-”freedom

fighter” as

opposed

are.

to

)

EH,

)

ORT,

)

Refer to Burrows’ discussion

)

Rorty advocates substituting “the struggle against avoidable misery” for “the

p.

25.

p.

60.

anticapitalist struggle”

in

Malachowski, pp. 328-9.

(“The End of Leninism,”

p.

1 ).
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terrorist,’

for

example, or 'Tiof as opposed to
“upnsing'-often cannot be

settled

empirically, without reference to
political ends

Rorty, presumably,
particular cases, however,

would not dispute
it

is

When

this point

not always clear that he

is in

it

comes

accord with

to

To

it.

take

one particularly relevant example, the
standard vocabulary of corporate
journalism
portrays a central
rights

term

theme of political philosophy as an age-old
trade-off between

of the individual

is

assumed

to be,

it

and the rights of “the community”
typically

is

contrast to individuals. Rightists are
leftists

are champions ol

community

taxes or fewer social programs 9

from

right

Leftists

lower taxes and

less

is

viewed as a monolithic given, which

champions of the

portrayed as a litmus

In either case,

neutral given, devoid of class character or

Rorty

s

rights

test, to

‘‘government”
function.

vocabulary, and his account of the public/private

exists in

dilemma “Higher

distinguish left

social programs; rightists

hegemonic

latter

of individuals, while

welfare. Thus, the hallowed

want higher taxes and more
government.

Whatever the

the

is

want

assumed

to be a

As we have

seen,

split in particular, is

consistent with this usage.

After reading a book by, say, William Domhoff, Victor Perlo or
Michael
Parenti, however,
arbitrary

one might come

to

view

this

supposedly intractable dilemma as

and unperspicacious. One might instead pose the

alternatives:

taxes for corporations and capitalists or higher taxes for workers?” or

programs for the working class and the poor, or more
bailouts for monopolies and the super rich 9

Here

“Higher

“More

social

social programs, subsidies

we have one

and

example, among

dozens that could be gleaned from daily headlines, of how an alternative public
vocabulary

may

enable one to pose very different questions from the conventional,

banal questions Rorty wishes exclusively to focus on.

189

These observations are

We
to

when

significant

it

comes

to Rorty's claim that.

[liberals closer to Daniel Bell's

radicals

like Althusser

end of the political spectrum than
and Jameson] think that Dewey and

Weber absorbed everything useful Marx had to teach,
just as they
absorbed everything useful Plato and Aristotle
had to teach and got
562
rid of the residue.

The judgment
this case,

it

what

ot

follows from Rorty's prior

actually existing liberalism.

view of the

useful, to repeat, follows

is

prior political

consider what

Marx

If

commitment

indeed “everything

commitments of Daniel

from one’s purposes.

to apologetics

is

politics,”

In

on behalf of
not surprising, in

it is

Bell and Rorty, that they

would

has to say about, say, exploitation, class struggle and
the

dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to be a useless residue,
at best.

Nor

is it

surprising

Rorty would give his readers permission to write off any
description of

that

capitalist exploitation, class rule

“Hegelian romance,”
562.
Other,

5

'”

and imperialism as an instance of ressent intent, or

or the yearning for "total revolution” 564 or the “Radically

or the satisfaction of blood-lust or

those on the

left

with

whom

some

other similarly pernicious

trait

of

he disagrees.

Technocrats, “mainstream social scientists,” official speechifiers and editors

of corporate-owned newspapers do not need to start talking about greed, selfishness

)

"Thugs and Theorists,”

563.

enough of an exposure

p.

571

it is

not clear, however, that

Dewey had

Marx to absorb very much at all. A sympathetic reviewer
Freedom and Culture where Dewey discusses Marx at greater
to

has noted that in
564.
length than anywhere else in his published opus, he “...does not reveal even to the
extent apparent in some earlier references, first-hand knowledge of Marx's writings”
,

(Cork,

p.

335; in the following pages, the reviewer surveys and dismisses what he

takes to be three of Dewey's most serious criticisms of Marxism).

assessment to Dewey’s remarks on Marx and “radical socialists”
pp. 309, 378.

)

“The End of Leninism,”

)

Yack,

p.

p. 2.

385. Rorty cites

Yack

at

CIS,

p.

65.

Compare Cork’s
in

Dewey

1984,

190

and short-sightedness rather than
bourgeois ideology, the commodification
of labor

power and

class divisions.

Despite obvious problems with using
psychological

terms to describe institutional policies,
they have long preferred

ways of talking.
first

place.

all, is

Indeed, talking the

what

part of

This, after

it

When

is to

be a

Rom's

prescribed

what makes these ways of talking banal

way Rorty

advises his readers to talk

is

in the

arguably just

/?ow-leftist intellectual.

Rorty advises "us” to

start

talking this way, then, he

would appear

to

be referring to (though not necessarily addressing)
the small number of embattled
dissenters from

take

all

hegemonic public vocabularies. By thus exercising

vocabularies seriously, he abets those

political discourse to the

who would

his right not to

limit "responsible”

narrow parameters of conserv ation versus reform, "big”

versus “small” government, and incumbent leadership
versus loyal opposition. So

Rorty

s

real leftist politics

the political

6

would appear

framework of corporate

to be coterminous with reform within

capitalist rule.

Within the context of actually

existing liberalism, then, his advice once again
amounts to the promotion of

conformity to a political vocabulary which already exercises a
near-monopoly on
public discourse. This

is

a strange view,

“keeping the conversation going,” one

coming from a professed advocate of

who hopes

that the crust

of convention will

565.
be as superficial as possible. 366

As we have

seen, Rorty 's vocabulary

is

poorly suited to the task of

566.
describing such contemporary trends and states of affairs as the enormous and rapid

concentration of capital, gaping distributive inequalities, overproduction and

)

"The End of Leninism,”

our appreciation of banality
“initiatives for the reduction

)

EH,

p.

18.

in

p. 4.

On

the

same page,

the author contributes to

public discourse by defining “real

of human misery.”

leftist politics”

as

191

militarism on a global scale

Noting

this,

David

Hall has identified "the
strand of

modernity" Rorty effectively omits
from his Grand Narrative as
Ot the capitalist/Marxist
dialectic in the origin

age

.” 367

"In

modern

society-,” Hall writes,

"...the

and development of the

interweaving

modem

with reference to one side of the

aforementioned dialectic, “the capitalist
celebrates the multiplication of
desires and
568
their transmogrification into
needs .”

He

concludes:

seems to me that if, as Rorty contends,
pragmatism "helps us
what we want ” then we should certainly
be worried about the
manner in which a capitalist liberal
It

democratic society helps us
shape the character of wants and needs 569

get

to

.

Rorty, like

Dewey, would

like to

maintain a consensus on the question of

wants and needs to be met. The public
Rorty approximates Nancy Fraser's “cartoon
version

'

of the technocratic impulse which sees
history as “a succession of social

problems posed and
progression,

social

problems solved, a succession

that

is

in fact a

thanks to good luck, increasing technical
competence and public-

spintedness.

Solidarity consists in arriving at a consensus
as to the problems to

be solved and
Surely

how
it

is

567.

to

relevant to note, however, that in

above with reference

568.

pluralist claims,

569.

community.”

570.

is

go about solving them

to class rule

view of considerations noted

and the corporate media, such a consensus, pace

likely to continue to reflect the priorities

of “the business

"The business community,” however, accounts

)

Hall,

p.

41.

)

Hall,

p.

45.

)

Hall, p. 46.

)

Fraser, in

Malachowski,

p.

304.

for a rather small

192

proportion of the total populatton
of the nch North Atlantic.
Furthermore,

foregone conclusion that

its

not a

perceived interests are the interests
of everyone else

will he noticed that

It

is

it

we

have come

full circle:

Confronted with the charge

that existing liberal institutions
systematically betray liberal ideals,
Rorty

acknowledges constant betrayal, but claims
institutions,

it

is

thanks to those very same

possible to approximate the ideals ever

however, he assumes the point originally
existing liberal institutions

acknowledges the
it.

that,

With reference

when

circularity

“we

to

in question,

comes

it

of this

sort

more

In so

dome,

namely, the efficaciousness of

to realizing liberal ideals.

He

of justification, but can see no way around

pragmatists,” he writes:

We

should say that we must, in practice, privilege
our
even though there can be no noncircular

own

group,

justification for doing so.

We

must

insist that the fact that

nothing

is

immune from

does not mean that

we have

liberal intellectuals

should accept the fact that

where we

we

closely.

are,

and

that this

a duty to justify everything.

means

we have

that there are lots of

criticism

We

Western

to start

from

views which

simply cannot take seriously. 571

One
presumably,

thing that
is

makes “Western

that they already

liberal intellectuals”

do not take certain views

rephrase Rorty's position as follows: People

who do

what they

seriously.

are,

Thus,

we may

not take certain views seriously

should not take those views seriously. This amounts to a circular
justification so

571.

tight that

it

has no circumference. The question Rorty raises here

572.

innocuous: "Can
rather,

is:

we

start

is

not the

from anywhere but where we already are?” The question,

“Can or should we go anywhere from where we already are?” And

answer appears

to

be “No.”

572

Rajchman and West,

)

Rorty, in

)

William E. Connally has noted

p.

12.

that:

his

Recumng to the

dtscusston

at the

with the commentator's
observation

end of Chapter Two, then,
one might agree

that:

-Just

professes to be non-ideologtcal,
does not

mean

Indeed, as the

ideology

"...

same commentator has added,

just are

what

liberal

ideology

apologist for bourgeois liberalism,
he

claim as

that

it

non-ideological.”577

is

Rorty's claims that he is

comes down

to.”

would not be doing

574

his

beyond

As a self-descnbed

job

if

he failed to

much

Before bringing
least

because sophisttcated liberalism

this section to a close,

one additional reason

As he has put

it

should be noted that Rorty cites

for rejecting the vocabularies

of opponents to

As one becomes progressively more

attentive to the style

own

which

judgments

into question

and more like a tinted mirror held up
American technocracy. (Connally,
p 131.)

Comay

adds:

"'Hope-cured of its

we keep on going just

way we

Burrows,

in

Malachowski,

p.

327.

)

Burrows,

in

Malachowski,

p.

327.

(ORT,

p.

64), has

to

histrionic fervor-becomes, in Rorty, the

the

)

liberalism

less

preliminary'

574.

desire that

his left.

it:

governs his writing, as one becomes
more alert to its strategy of
gaining assent, the Rorty philosophy
of edification begins to look
like a hermeneutic circle which
constantly calls its

573.

at

wntten

are” (Comay,
p

happy

124)

Rorty, the advocate of “anti-ideological

that:

Whether

soviet imperialism is a threat is a paradigm of
a nonGdeological,” unphilosophical, straightforwardly empirical,
question. It is a question about what will happen if
such and such
other things happen (if NATO collapses, it South America
goes
Communist, and so on). (“Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 578-9, note
25.)
In order to resolve such questions in a suitably
non-ideological way, he advises us to
read the appropriate “intelligence reports on what the Politburo
and the Soviet
Generals have been saying to one another lately” (“Thugs and Theorists,”
p. 579,
note 25). Presumably, neither the opinions just quoted nor the intelligence
reports
would quality as ideological because none of them is “a bad idea”~at least with
reference to the purposes Rorty has set himself.
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w

r

0n " hy a " of us ln ,he
international
CrmS
L eapitaiism,”
'bourgeois

are going to have to
culture" (and, alas even

.

l

'

'

.

.

socialism
1

)

out ol our vocabulary
'° 0k

* US

employ them’™'''"

This passage, published as

'

left

is that our fnends in
Central and
nCredulous| y ifwe “"tinue to

late as 1992, is fully ,n

keeping with an author

who

reinterprets objectivity as
mtersubjectivity, or as solidarity” 576

Less than one year after these lines
were published, however,
clear that the consensus gentium
,n Eastern
that time, Polish

it

had become

Europe had shifted dramatically. By

workers had pretty much abandoned the
Solidarity union in favor

of the former Workers' Party union,
and Polish voters had returned self-described
socialists to national office,

parliament.

A

year

where they came

latter, in

to

dominate the government and the

Hungary~the country free-marketeers most
frequently

pointed to as their exemplary post-Soviet
success story-voters overwhelmingly
elected self-descnbed socialists to local
and national office. In the years 1994 and

1995, similar election results were reported in
Ukraine, Slovakia, Slovenia and
575.
Bulgaria, while in Poland, self-described
socialists also
576.

won

the presidency.

577

In a

1995 radio interview. pro-Western journalist
Vladimir Posner reported that anti-

577.

Amencan

)

)

sentiment

among

his fellow

“The End of Leninism,” p

ORT,

p.

Russians was higher then than

it

had been

at

9.

13.

It would be easy, of course, to
)
challenge the Marxist credentials of these
predominantly nationalist forces. Speaking loosely, there is no more
reason to
believe that Gennady Zyuganov is a genuine Marxist than that
Vladimir Zhirinovsky
is a genuine liberal democrat. Moreover, many
of the self-styled socialist leaders in

Eastern Europe, exemplified by

reformed communist Aleksander Kwasniewski,
what Rorty would call social democrats, rather than Marxists.
These observations, however, are irrelevant to Rorty’s claim that such labels as
capitalism and socialism have lost currency in Eastern Europe.
clearly qualify as

1

the height of the Cold War.

communist

And

by 1996. the largest of
several

parties in Russia had rebuilt
a burgeoning

million, handily defeating

all

self-titled

membership of over half a

"pro-reform'' parties in elections
to the

During the Cold War, news
correspondents

in

Moscow and

omedians enjoy ed reporting the most
recent jokes circulating on
predilection for popular wtt
case,

one joke

that circulated

What have

question:

seems

have abated

to

among Muscovites

five years

95

in the

in the

578

Duma

expatriate

the streets.

Post-Cold

War

era.

mid-1990s poses

This
In

any

the

of capitalism achieved that seventy
years of

socialism failed to accomplish^

The punch

line:

It's

made

socialism look good.

Rorty wrote of the label social,si that
“The quarter of the world which has

worn

that label the longest

however,

his statement,

never wants to hear the word again.” 579
As

578.
Czech or Ukrainian intellectuals that
that he

may

can see,

only a few years old, has already
been outrun by events.

Nevertheless, he has repeated similar
statements as late as

and

we

Marx was

1

995: “If one reminds

a remarkably original thinker

haunt European thought for centuries,” he
wrote, "they are

[...]

likely to

shrug their shoulders.” 580

579.
)

Yeltsin

s

victor} in the July 3, 1996 presidential run-off
7

580.
vindication of Rorty

is

hardly a

when one takes into account his co-optation of
opposition rhetoric, his monopoly of television, and
the Western-subsidized hype
and bribery that drove his campaign. More importantly,
Yeltsin's electoral victory
may well be the prelude to a larger defeat, as it becomes clear to
s

view,

more and more
Russians that Yeltsin and his pro-Washington clique are not
delivering on their
campaign promises, and offer no realistic plans for doing so.
)

)

that,

“The End of Leninism.” p

15, note 13.

Review of Spectres of Marx,"

thanks

in large

economies' (ORT,

measure

p.

Ukrainian dissident to

p.

1

.

The saving grace of this statement

to the operation of Rorty's “large free

is

market

become much more difficult for a Czech or
make herself heard. The erosion of state subsidies for

209),

it

intellectuals, the evaporation

acquired popular disinterest

has

of academies of science and writers unions, a newlyin books, and the brain drain from impoverished

1

In

come

to

view of the

fact that so

view self-tdemifted

compelling than

many of these

socialist accounts

have

of these developments
as more

liberal accounts, the
last-mentioned reason for
rejecting anti-

capitalis, vocabularies
is itself defunct.

To

paraphrase Mark Twain, the
reports of

Marxism’s death are exaggerated.
And they are
Clear to

intellectuals’ compatriots

%

more and more people

market reformers"

in

likely to

remain so as

that the liberals,
self-procla.med

Eastern Europe and elsewhere
have

fa, led

i,

becomes

democrats and "free
miserably to live up

to their promises.

Rorty's Incompatible Rnlec

Rorty and his sympathizers have
used the adjectives de-divmized
,
hiS,° ric,:ed

deflattonary and relaxed to describe
his views on a broad

'

range of topics, including social
science, culture, liberalism and
community

some of these

adjectives, presumably, are roughly

All or

synonymous with “thin”-another

adjective commentators have used
to describe his views.

Instances of his celebrated

thinness might include: his
pragmatist definitions of such words
as truth and
rationality; his

abandonment of the search

for foundations

of knowledge, justice,

and culture; his disparagement of Philosophy;
his deflationary conception of the
sciences; his disparagement of
“methodolatty" an d preference for narrative
over
theory';*

about
light

;

1

his dismissal

his definition

of theories of reference

in

favor of a notion of “talking

of rationality as “the way things are done around
here”; the

he makes ot attempts by everyone from
psychologists to

critical theorists to

do

Central and Eastern Europe— all of these
developments have relieved the current
rulers of much of the annoyance of a new
generation of influential dissident writers.
581.)

Refer, for example, to Hall,

p.

53.
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deep thinking and

«o discern

deep processes

a,

work; his non-essentialis,
conception

0f SCll1l00d; hlS ident
'fieation of autonomy with
self-enlargenten, and restriction
of

autonomy

to the private sphere;

and his emphasis on the contingency
of human

affairs.

A

variety of cntics have taken
Rorty to task for presenting
,oo thin a picture

of our predicament
substantial

*

Early in this discussion, by
contrast,

agreement with him when

views on selfhood and rationality
and

it

comes

I

registered

my

to such topics as his -an,,-,
sms," his

h.s substitute for a theory

might also have revealed a mild
sympathy when

it

comes

of reference.

I

to his prognostications

and recommendations regarding
Philosophy as a fetch™
I

have not criticized Rorty' for excessive
histoncism, nominalism or thinness.

Indeed, turning to several of his
preferred topics,

1

am

of the opinion that his views

eXamplC t0 Geras P 85
Rorty's “nothing deeper”
account of the basis of solidarity; Prado,
p. 137, regarding “Rorty’
s perhaps
excessive histoncism”; Nielsen,
pp. 29-3
regarding Alastair MacIntyre’s

fu

r

’

’

^ding

’

reported

1 ,

inability to

stomach Rorty's thin analysis of truth, and
criticism of Rorty for telling too thin
a story of the

31 regarding MacIntyre's
history of analytic philosophy
p.

Nielsen, pp 39ff regarding Jaegwon
Kim, Ian Hacking and Alvin Goldman's
e lenses of putatively central tenets
of analytic philosophy against Rorty; Kolenda
p 91, regarding David Hiley and Michael Sandels' objections to
Rorty's Humean
notion of the self as a web of beliefs and
desires; Lovibond 1992, with reference
to
Rorty's anti-universalism and anti-essentialism;
Habermas’ criticisms of Rorty on
truth and other topics, as Rorty reports
them in

“Habermas and Lyotard on

Postmodemity (EH,

pp. 164-176)

Tom Sorell’s claim that Rorty 's
account of intellectual change is “too deflationary”
(Malachowski, p. 20); Bernard
Williams criticisms of Rorty for having seriously
underdescribed the sciences
(Malachowski, pp. 26-37); Jacek Holowka's protest against
“the promptness with
which Rorty' abandons philosophy” (Malachowski,
p. 188); Farrell’s disparagement
of Rorty s extremely thin world emptied
of the given, and so on.
58j.)

with

all

It

bears

at least

and elsewhere;

passing notice, however, that

of Rorty s non-sociopolitical views.

I

do not agree across the board

have suggested, for instance, that his
account of intellectual and cultural change exaggerates the efficacy
of discourse in
human affairs, at the expense of biology, work, power and other predominantly
nondiscursive processes and practices (cf. Comay, p. 123; Farrell,
122-125).
I

pp.

198

could stand to be further
deflated, less divinized,
more
584
consistently nominalist and
thinner.

viewing human

community

affairs as

'

These topics include:

more

just

more

his insistence

political

nature"; his account of
liberal

his picture

of the inviolable private sphere
neatly insulated

power.

Rorty's thinness

is

selective,

and

this selectivity

forensic aim of making bourgeois
liberal

becomes obvious,

for

works

in favor

of his explicit

democracy look good. 585 This poinl

example, when he ignores

his

own

advice to abandon the

attempt "to find a successor to 'capitalism'
or 'bourgeois ideology.' as the

Great Bad Thing," 581

seem

on

as essentially harmonious and
homogeneous; his invocation of "our

European purposes," and
from

more than

h, stone, zed.

to have

After

all,

name of the

"Leninism,” “Stalinism,” and "Soviet
imperialism"

done the same work for Rorty

that other scare

words designating

evil

essences have done for the Marxists he
has criticized, and that “logocentrism”
allegedly has done for Derrida and
fallen angel,

it is

how

hard to see

avowed aim of de-divinizing

Noms.

587

Keeping

in

mind

that a devil is a

Rorty's diabolificat.ons do not detract from
his

culture.

585.

^84

)

Although

beyond the scope of this discussion to elaborate the
point,
one respect in which believe Rorty’s views are too thin—
would describe as his undervaluation of causal depth in
it

is

I

should

at least register

586.

namely, what

1

I

social

science explanations. This undervaluation is related
to what Bhaskar.
others, has described as Rorty's "basically positivist
account

among

of the logical form of

sentences in science and of the structure of scientific theories”
(Bhaskar 1989, p
148; see also: Bhaskar 1991
p 6).
,

As one commentator has observed, Rorty s “conservative instincts
sometimes work against the grain of his theses” (McCamev, p. 6).
)

)

587.)

“The End of Leninism,”

EH,

p.

1

12n.

p.

12.
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Further examples are not
hard to find

Reviewing them,

it

,s

possible to

distinguish between his apologettcs
for the mstitutions and
practices of existing

bourgeots liberal democrac.es
on the one hand and
discourse.

These two elements

related historicist

and

ironist

are:

as thin as

I

pages

I

it

its

that

in

add a few words about

In the

and (b) other

when

it

comes

latter

to discourse every

.ha, the crus,

category

metaphor

of convention should be

589

have taken up point (a)

will

(a) his highest liberal ideals:

chance for self-sacnfice™ or

can be gotten.

two other elements of his

formulations he wishes to defend. The

would include Rorty's admonition
should have

at least

Chapters

Two

and Three.

In the

remaining

(b).

course of this discussion,

I

have highlighted Rorty's blind spots, 590

points where his conversation abruptly
fades to silence, irony lapses into
apologetics, and lightmindedness

notably
sphere.

the

when
It

it

comes

becomes heavy-handedness. This happens most

to his inattention to the political
character of the private

also happens

when

lump of the West and

it

comes

to his inability or unwillingness to
break

in particular to his lack

one hand and the public sphere on the other
as
588.

happens when

it

comes

to his dismissal

of recognition of the

state

distinct analytical categories.

up

on the
It

of exploitation, class conflict and class rule

589.
as constraints on the possibility of consensus
within liberal democratic

communities, and of imperialism as a constraint on the
extension of solidarity
abroad, too.

)

)

EH,

And

p.

happens when

it

comes

to his lack

of recognition that

his “we's”

18.

Geras has argued that Rorty's repudiation of a universal human essence
his warm commendation of “the culture of civil rights”
(Geras pp 71-

undermines
105).

590.)

it

EH,

p. 87.

200

do not encompass the

entire range

of tolerant, cruelty-averse
intellectuals in the

north Atlantic.

A

recurring pattern

is

discernible

among

these lapses, omissions and

unconscious presuppositions ’: 591 Time
and again Rorty

the ironist appears to lose

nerve when he encounters Rorty
the apologist for bourgeois
liberalism

This pattern

592
constitutes the background of a
certain silence
which, once attended to,

simultaneously compromises his credentials
as ironist and confirms what
he

acknowledges
If

to

be

his role as apologist for
‘'bourgeois liberal ism

liberal ironists

of the past have escaped

apologists did not get too

complemented)

much

in the

this conflict-if their roles
as

way of (and

their roles as iromsts-this

,,59:?

at

times perhaps even

was because they were comparing

ideals or utopias yet unsullied by
repeated betrayal invidiously with
institutions

which repudiated these

ideals

incumbent

and openly stood against them

Enlightenment France, for example, where the
bourgeoisie had yet to
accounts with the ancien regime,

it

was

liberal

In

settle final

easier for ironists to be apologists for the

bourgeoisie. Rabelais, Montaigne, Moliere,
Bayle and Voltaire contributed to the

selt-image of an increasingly confident bourgeoisie
facing

down

the reaction

Their

public enemies, namely the Church and the
political reaction, corresponded more or
591.
less neatly to their private enemies, the
hidebound defenders of Tradition and the
592.
enemies of free expression.
593.
In Jefferson's day, public office

attractive fields

and diplomacy seemed

of self assertion, along with

scientific

)

The term

)

Refer to Rorty's remarks on Heidegger

)

Refer, for example,

is

from

to:

CP,

p.

207; CIS,

EH,

p.

be exciting and

and technical innovation.

EF1, p. 87.

in

to

p.

54-5.

46

201

The second U.S. ambassador
into both public affairs

to France, like the fist one,
hurled himself

headlong

and Natural Philosophy. However,
over the course of the

next century and a half, as the natural
sciences attracted fewer of the
natural ahstoi,
the

mamage

became

of ironic self-creation and apologetics
for bourgeois

increasingly problematic, too. Liberal
ideas

passion.”

594

Even assuming

came

principle’ has survived the twentieth century
intact.

American

intellectuals in

shining historical example,” 595

During Wilsons tenure
the Spanish-American

not yet
594.

it

be

democracy

less “infused with

the disputable point that the equality
and freedom that

Tocqueville celebrated survived the nineteenth
century,

that “...most

to

liberal

was

War to

Dewey's day

we might

still

lay special

it

is less

When

still

Rorty notes ruefully

thought their country' was a

emphasis on the word

possible for a conscientious

read

certain that either

Whitman without

giggles.

young opponent of

596

Song of America,

overwhelmed by Twain's War Prayer found a diminished echo
,

in

Sandburg.

Yet Dewey had a problematic and sometimes inconsistent
reaction

595.

596.
imperialism.

597

Although he courageously defended war

still.

resisters,

to U.S.

he eventually

597.

)

Daniel Bell’s expression appears

)

ORT,

)

EH,

)

Rorty gives the impression that Dewey's Marxist

p.

p.

in

a citation in Bernstein,

p.

555.

201.

187.

critics

unanimously write

him off as ’4he philosopher of American imperialism” (EH. p. 133). Some have
indeed denounced Dewey's version of pragmatism as such “the philosophy of
American imperialism or “the main-line philosophy of U.S. imperialism” (the
references, cited in Novack,

Idealism (1955),

p.

275, are from Maurice Comforth's Science versus

422 and Harry K. Wells’ Pragmatism: Philosophy of
p. 187). Adorno, Horkheimer and other members of the
Frankfurt School also have associated pragmatism with U.S. business values
p.

Imperialism (1954),
(Kolenda,

p.

220). Other Marxists, however, have provided

more nuanced
was not

characterizations. One, for example, has argued that Rorty's pragmatism

the outlook of rising finance capital

and the monopolies, but of

202

threw his support behind the

War

to

End

All Wars, even to the point of allowing

chauvinist-sounding writings to be published,
implicating Hegel as a prop for the
Kaiser.

Dewey appeared on
industrialization, the

the scene at a time of rapid urbanization,

changing demographic character that resulted from
waves of

immigration, and the growth of a laissez-faire ideology,

emerging monopoly capitalism.

5 '*

As

in the face

of a newly-

a leading figure of the Chicago School, he

personified progressivism as a political movement. 599
“If radicalism be defined as

perception of the need for radical change,
liberalism which

not also radicalism

is

is

he famously wrote, “then today any
irrelevant

This oft-quoted passage~so different

Rorty

6 '"

-should, however, be read

in light

and doomed.”

tone from what one finds in

in

of the

fact that

contemporaries were convinced that the conservation of

sweeping change. The thirty-second president

598.

.

.

.the

educated petty bourgeoisie

in the

600

U

many of Dewey's
S.

capitalism required

of the United States

summarized

this

epoch of the climb of

American capitalism to world domination and the transformation of
bourgeois democracy into imperialist reaction. (Novack, p. 41.)

599.

600.

According to

this account,

Dewey's pragmatism

is “...the

conciliatory' philosophical

instrument of the middle classes on the downgrade, trying to clutch
salvation” (Novack,

)

Berstein,

)

Novack,

)

Quoted

appears

in its

p.

p.

538; Munkirs, pp 12-20.

p. 40.

p 540 and Bhaskar 1991, p. 108, note 4. The passage
original context in “Liberalism and Social Action,” in The Later
in Bernstein,

,

p.

45.

1

1

(Carbondale, Southern

Illinois University Press,

Refer to Rorty 's comments on this passage

pp. 15-17, note 15.

601.)

any means for

278).

Works ofJohn Dewey Vol.
1987),

at

Cf. Bernstein, p. 541.

in

“The End of Leninism,”

conviction

when he

declared: “Liberalism

becomes

the protection of the far-sighted

conservative.”
Stalin's

depredations lent

liberal apologetics

and monism

adopted and promoted the

War years, and

life to

in

the increasingly dysfunctional marriage607 of

the West.

Both the Orwells and the Nabokovs

official vocabularies

of the Free World. During the Cold

especially after the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., the

samizdat sustained a burgeoning readership

in

Eastern Europe, while dissidents

there found a sympathetic liberal audience in the West, confirming the officially-

promoted metaphoric of Iron Curtains, captive nations, dominos and Gulags.
In 1987,

Rorty wrote that "There

interesting Theoretical'

is

no way

to consolidate

way" Among these enemies

millionaires manipulating

Reagan"

our enemies

604

Broederbond

in

in his gallery

he counted the Soviet leadership as the worst by

in Iran.”

With the disappearance of the Evil Empire

an

he counted “the shadowy

as well as “the nomenklatura in

South Africa, and the ayatollahs

in

Moscow,

And among

the

the rogues

far.

in the final years

of the American

Century, however, the liberal imagination has been deprived of a suitably
threatening Great
602.
liberalism.

603.

Bad Thing with which

invidiously to contrast actually existing

At the same time, class divisions deepen and wages and standards of

living continue to slip in the north Atlantic,

604.

605

the Free

Market has brought

prosperity to few Eastern Europeans outside a clique of financiers, foreign brokers
605.

and mafiosos, and the gap between North and South gapes ever wider.

)

)

Quoted

1

in

Novack,

have adopted

this

p.

poignant metaphor from Haber,

p.

64.

Citations in this paragraph are from “Thugs and Theorists"

)

According

(September

Bureau of Labor

4, 1995), pp. Iff.

of

16.

)

to

In spite

Statistics figures cited in

p.

566.

Los Angeles Times

204

the

momentous changes, however,

it

does not appear that

it is

any easier for Rorty to

consolidate his enemies in an interesting theoretical way. 606

One

reason tor this difficulty might be that his public allies are his private

enemies: The functionaries and apologists for existing
defenders

in

word and deed of the public

Rorty, nothing

is

liberal

democracies-the

institutions than which, according to

more precious-just happen

to help inhibit not only majority rule,

informed consent, freedom abroad, national self-determination and the mitigation of
suffering, but also such private desiderata as an inviolable private sphere

and a

thin

of convention.

crust

As Nancy Rosenblum has

noted, privatization, detachment and self-

absorption are typical responses to powerlessness. Rorty's message of privatized
theory, ironic detachment and duty to self as distinct from others

diminished expectations for the powerless/’"
vulnerability, those

who

a

message of

virtue of their poverty

and

stand to benefit most from Alan Ryan’s “welfare-

capitalism-with-a-human-face” have

own

By

is

little

resources and efforts. If Ryan’s hope

chance of achieving
is

to

be realized,

it

it

by relying on their

must be achieved

for

the poor and vulnerable by others in positions of influence and with access to
resources.
606.

Nancy

607.

Fraser has described Rorty as vacillating between technocrat ism or
,

the view that solutions to public problems are best
608.

left

to technical experts, and

romanticism characterized as the belief that self-creation
,

life.

6 "*

Within

this context, as

)

As we

)

Though of course

we can

is

the highest aim in

see. politics is not a field for the self-

are lead to believe, for example, in

it

is

“Review of Spectres of Marx"

not a message addressed to the powerless.

Rosenblum argues that what made liberalism and romanticism mix was that
the two movements both cherished privacy: Liberalism requires a sharp distinction
between public and private spheres, the latter of which is the domain ot toleration ot
)

205

emancipation

becomes a

ol the

working class or any other underdog community. Rather,

field tor philanthropists, noblesse oblige

it

and "well-intentioned,

confused, university-trained young crypto-leftists.”609 These
civic-minded
individuals

mark

their

political vocabularies

time

in the public

and theories or by listening

but by patiently seeking technical
fortunate,

whose

democracy

sphere not by trying to

means

with

new

language of the oppressed,

to ameliorate the suffering

fates are describable in the inherited vocabulary

Weber and Dewey helped cobble

that

to the

come up

of the

less

of social

together.

Social experimentation, stripped of "pompous" theoretical dissertations610

and reduced

more than

to little

the piecemeal tinkering of earnest technocrats,

is

hardly an inspiring career choice for the best and the brightest youth, Jefferson’s

At times, Rorty appears

“natural aristoi.

liberal affairs, at least with reference to

to

“we

acknowledge the uninspiring
rich, fat, tired

Nevertheless, he defends liberal democracy as

much

state

North Americans.”

preferable to

all

of

611

competitors.

609.
religious, artistic, ethical differences.

flourish only within a context of

romanticism

is

decorum and in
610.

)

masses

deep respect

for private fantasies.

Hugo claimed,

liberalism in literature (as Victor

Beuve's view that romanticism

611.

Similarly, the romantic imagination can

its

is

royalism

subversion of classical

in politics), in its

Hence

against Sainte-

disregard for classical

rules.

For example, Rorty applauds Unger's assertion that hope for the victimized
lies not in the

workers and peasants of Brazil

masses themselves) but rather
technocrats (EH, p

1

82).

in the

Unger,

it

(that

is,

not in the victimized

hands of well-intentioned petty-bourgeois

would seem,

is

guilty

of the charge of elitism

and condescension which Kolakowski, Castoriadis and others have regularly leveled
against Leninists.

)

“Thugs and Theorists,”

)

In his

cited by Jo Burrows, in Malachowski,

p.

338, note

28.

essay “Unger, Castoriadis and the

included in EH,

pp. 177-192.

Romance of a

National Future,’

206

The

fact that liberal

people

is

offset

democracies produce so many

by the freedom such

At other times, however,

it

petty, greedy,

narrow-minded

political setups provide.

seems Rorty would

rekindle Dewey's sense of national mission

It

is

like his fellow' citizens to

not hard to discern the

promotional tone of passages such as the following:

We

Deweyans have a story' to tell about the progress of our species, a
whose later episodes emphasize how things have been getting
better in the West during the last few' centuries, and which concludes
with some suggestions about how they might become better still in

story

1

the next few/’

"

Aside from the occasional expression of enthusiasm, however, he provides
little in

the

way of inspiration

to

nudge the natural

aristoi

the direction of public-spirited community' service.

of a coming generation

When

it

comes

in

to his

conceptions of democracy, autonomy and resolution of the opposition between
612.
public and private spheres, as

we have

seen, he has backed

away from Dewey and

reverted to formulations of the classical liberalism of Locke,

Bentham and

Mills — the professed spring of inspiration of contemporary neoliberals/’

613.
)

ORT,

p.

1

the

'

212. Elsewhere, Rorty protests against Foucault’s “amazing one-

sidedness”:

You would never guess, from Foucault's account of the changes in
European social institutions during the last three hundred years, that
during that period suffering had decreased considerably, nor that
people's chances of choosing their own styles of life increased
considerably. (EH, p. 195.)
of “Neo-Liberalism,” which Merquior dates to around 1980
(Merquior, pp. 147ff), coincided with the publication of Rorty's most influential
works. Haber makes the case, plausibly enough, that Rorty speaks for classical
)

The

rise

liberalism (Haber, p 62). It is interesting to note in this regard that, with reference
to Marxism, Rorty has written:

We

see no

more point

in trying to

rework a

political

vocabulary

developed in the middle of the nineteenth century than in trying to

207

Dewey

could

still

convince himself and others that his public role as

advocate ot the ideals of the French Revolution did not conflict
with his public role
as defender of the institutions

and practices of existing

have attempted to point out, however,

when he makes

the

same claim

appearing as they do

in a

it

has

liberal

become more

Rorty’s interventions

democracies. As

difficult to believe

1

Rortv

in socio-political discourse,

context of slipping wages and living standards in the rich

North Atlantic, a growing gap between rich and poor both

at

home and abroad and

the dismantlement of the so-called welfare state, have a very different
political
thrust

from Dewey's era of optimistic

social engineering/

14

Rorty has described himself as a happy-go-lucky pragmatist. 615 As an ironist

who,

like Nietzsche,

manages

appear to qualify as such.

to

When

be ironic about theory, the private Rorty does
it

comes

to

what Rorty and Jefferson considered

to

be the properly private themes which allegedly give meaning and purpose to our
lives-those religious and metaphysical themes of ultimate purposes-Rortv

encourages good-natured public indifference:

If one’s

moral identity consists

in

being a citizen of a

liberal polity,

then to encourage light-mindedness will serve one’s moral purposes

Moral commitment,

does not require taking seriously

after all,

all

the

matters that are, for moral reasons, taken seriously by one’s fellow
614.

rework one developed

615.

and Theorists,”

p.

in the

middle of the fourth

)

(“Thugs

571.)

Apparently, however, he sees a point
in the

century'.

in

reworking a

political

vocabulary developed

eighteenth century.

See:

Dewey

1957, Introduction,

p. vi.

Compare

to:

Rorty, in Malachowski;

“Post-Modern Bourgeois Liberalism,” “Thugs and Theorists," CIS; “Unger,
Castoriadis and the Romance of a National Future," in EH, pp. 177-192.

)

“Review of Spectres of Marx ,”

p.

3

208

citizens.

It

may

require just the opposite.

may

It

require trying to

616
josh them out ot the habit ot taking those topics so
seriously.

Playfulness and moral
air ol

is

lightminded aestheticism

way of promoting

a

commitment come together here because, by promotinu

It

the sort ot playful

maneuvering Rorty describes

the Jeffersonian compromise.

should be noted, however, that when

happy-go-lucky persona abruptly exits stage

what he

“the

calls the “loose, resentful

it

right.

Heideggenan

being 'metaphysically speaking, the same,'“ and

between the Gulag and the

comes

to his social hopes, the

For instance, Rorty

talk about Russia

is irritated

by

and America

“all the loose, resentful

'carceral archipelagoes' of the democracies.”

analogies
618

He

himself, however, has produced loose, resentful analogies of his own, as in his

statement that the difference between Lenin, Stalin and Hitler
1

is

merely one of

J

Echoing Daniel

facial hair/'

Bell,

he even asseverates, off-handedly, that by the

time Orwell wrote Animal harm,

...the effort to

and

see important differences between Stalin and Hitler,

to continue analyzing recent political history with the help of

616.
617.

618.
619.

)

Rorty, in Malachow'ski,

)

Rorty, in Malachowski, p 293.

)

EH,

)

“Intellectuals at the

(as for

p.

293.

192n.

example

at

EH,

p.

End of Socialism.” Rorty

25), Stalin with Hitler

directly with Hitler, too (CIS,

the

p.

same time excluding

p.

1

57;

(EH,

associates Lenin with Stalin
p.

1

89; CIS,

p.

“Review of Spectres of Marx"

liberal leaders

from the mix.

1

74),

p.

and Lenin

L), while at

209

terms like “socialism” “capitalism.” and “fascism.”
had become
unwieldy and impracticable. 620

--as

this

it

It

preposterous pronouncement were becoming

is

institutions

hard to be happy-go-lucky

when one

and practices one considers

to

is

common

surrounded by evidence that the

be most precious are

being hauled out the back door to the dumpster.

knowledge.

in the

In the final years

process of

of the American

Century, the liberal democracies have achieved virtually undisputed
global

hegemony. Yet

liberal

hopes for equality, justice, amelioration of suffering and a

realm of negative freedom beyond the pale of

more

appear to be ever

wistful exercises in nostalgia

Of course, one
I

state institutions

have done

in

could describe the existing

Chapters

perspective of a

Two

liberal

democracies

and Three above, and then evaluate them from the

“we” with no big investment

in their

continued existence. This

might be one way to josh oneself out of the habit of taking seriously,

Sam

s

differently, as

say.

Uncle

pretensions as the disinterested arbiter ot global conflicts, or the increasingly

grotesque spectacle of Yankee electoral politics, or the importance of good
citizenship in the age of the corporate-government nexus, or any of dozens of other
idols

on very high-and by now very shaky-pedestals. By thus relinquishing the

view

that these institutions as they presently exist are exceedingly precious,

might well be

in a position to

persistently ironic than Rorty.

the

of Rorty

who view

CIS,

74.

left

620.

)

p.

1

“the struggle for

When

be more happy-go-lucky and more consistently or

There

are, after all,

acute

in

what

some Marxists and

Rorty writes that Marxism has done nothing to clarify

power between those who currently possess
it

would take

to “clarify”

it”

it [...]

and those who

(EH, pp. 25-6), one might be tempted

such struggles. This question

is

especially

view of Rorty's claim that “bourgeois liberal democracies” are “ already

organized around the need for continual exposure of suffering and
p.

others far to

the degeneration of liberal institutions and the

are starving or terrorized because they lack
to ask just

one

25; Rorty's emphasis).

injustice.. .”

(EH,

210

evaporation of the so-called welfare state with a sort of bemused
detachment
unavailable to Rorty's dutiful citizen.

Horn Fern Flaber has noted

Viewed

taken, as tar as

it

and

and public concerns respectively, “seem

essentially private
other.

that Rorty's aesthetic

political impulses,

to

be

at

odds with each

the light of the preceding remarks, this observation

in

The mere drawing of a

goes.

distinction

is

well-

between public and

private spheres, however, does not necessarily set public and private concerns

As

against each other.

have not always been
at

odds

in a

way

I

at

indicated earlier in this section, public and private impulses

odds

that liberal

in the

manner

Rorty's are.

impulses were not

at

Enlightenment France, or Tocqueville's northern

His particular impulses are

odds with ironism
states, or

in

Whitman's America, or

Dewey's Chicago, or behind the Iron Curtain. Ironic self-creation and
decency do not necessarily

Nor do ironism and apologetics

However, ironism and apologetics

liberalism.

the

conflict.

American Century do appear

to conflict.

vocabulary he uses to defend the

liberal

civic-spirited

for bourgeois

for bourgeois liberalism at the

Rorty's public vocabulary~the

democracies-is

at

odds with his private

vocabulary~the ironic, de-divimzed, anti-essentialist vocabulary he uses
In order for

his duty to himself.

him

end of

to fulfill his role as apologist, he

to satisfy

must become

not merely a /ww-ironist, but an r//?//-iromst.

This point

may be

“thoughtlessness,”

in

illustrated with reference to Rorty's

Heidegger's sense of the word, as meaning “inability to

imagine alternatives to the particular beings
languages

we

are speaking.”

political institutions

621.)

Haber,

622.)

EH,

p.

comments about

6

"

that

have been opened up by the

In his role as apologist for the existing set

of

of liberal democracy, he must be thoughtless with reference

49.

pp. 43, 46.

to

the distinction between public and private persons,
the political character of the

private sphere, relations ol exploitation and so on
is

a far cry

Thoughtlessness thus conceived

from the lightmindedness or insouciance which he prescribes

for theory

in the private sphere.

Rorty can, of course, switch back and forth between his public and private
roles.

In this sense, his public

however,

at

each other's expense, problematically,

metaphors locked
Gramsci,
that

is, it

and private selves can and do

in

mutual siege

623

respectively).

like

They

coexist.

coexist,

two enemy armies of

mix metaphors bomnved from Nietzsche and

(to

As we saw

in

Chapter Two,

it is

literally self-defeating-

defeats purposes defining either a public or a private self--to

commit

oneself, as Rorty' does, to the inviolability of the private sphere on the one hand,

while defending actually existing liberalism on the other: Where bourgeois
liberalism obtains today, there the private sphere has tended to be least inviolable
vis-a-vis institutions of the state
in

and other public

institutions.

Chapter Three, Rorty's public role as apologist for the

Moreover, as

liberal

we saw

democracies

is

incompatible with his public role as mitigator of evitable pain, particularly with
reference to the massive suffering these countries continue to engender beyond their

cartographic borders.

The problem,

then,

is

not that Rorty’s

two

principle ; rather, they are incompatible in fact.
fulfills his role as ironist theorist, as

roles are

On

incommensurable

in

the one hand, the better he

defender of the inviolability of the private

sphere or as mitigator of suffering, the more clearly he abrogates his role as
apologist for the bourgeois liberal democracies.
institutions

more he

623.)

and practices of existing

liberal

The

better he

is at

defending the

democracies, on the other hand, the

contributes to “thoughtlessness,” the concealment of cruelty the “freezing

Gramsci's metaphor appears

1

,

in Said, p. 195.

over of culture

example

and the constriction of permissible discourse.
This might be an

what David Hall has referred

ol

to as Rorty's

and the moral virtues.”624

intellectual

This helps explain why,

in the

words of one commentator,

“...refuses to give birth to the offspring

it

626

As

yet another

625

conceives,”

another commentator, his argument “...loses
dispensed.”

“dichotomy of the

its

grip

commentator has put

or

when those

in

the

words of

whenever reassurance
it,

is

being

“..Rorty shrinks back from

the potentially subversive or utopian implications
of his
retreats to safer ground,”

why,

his pro)ect

own

undertaking and

implications threaten his apologetic purposes

627

As

I

have indicated, Rorty’s lapses of critical acumen conspicuously
benefit

his apologetic aims.

do, the apologetics

When

his apologetics conflict with ironism, as they frequently

more often than not come out on

top.

As Haber has noted with

reference to Rorty, “In the wedding of liberalism and ironism, one of
the partners

dominated by the other.” 628
624.

*

*

*

625.

626.
627.
)

Hall,

)

Rajchman and West,

167.

p.

p.

268

In a similar vein,

observed that “...Rorty drops out of the conversation

more

demanding” (Connolly,

intense and

)

McCamey,

)

Comay,

628.)

Haber,

p.

p.

p. 6.

125.

64.

p.

131

).

William Connolly has

just

when

it

should become

is

213

These observations lend

credibility to the conclusion that.

...despite occasional protests to the contrary,

Rorty's defense of liberalism

is little

quo-the very type of liberalism
62
“irrelevant and doomed .”
status

it

begins to look as

more than an apologia
that

Dewey )udged

to

if

for the

be

'

In the

likely to

view

meantime, and

this

could be a long time,

his pragmatist defenses

no argument

629.)

like success.

Bernstein,

p.

541.

is

of actually existing liberalism as conclusive,

despite the defects registered in this discussion
is

much of Rorty’s audience

In the class struggle, after all, there
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